The Global Terrorism Threat: Youth Radicalization in Kenya

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A Dissertation Submitted to the University of Nairobi, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the Bachelor of Arts in International Studies

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DECLARATION

This Dissertation is my original work and has not been presented for the award of a degree in this University or any other Institution of higher learning.

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This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the University

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Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies University of Nairobi
DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my family that supported me, especially my wife Florence Ooko and all the children who missed my presence emotionally as I walked the journey. At times it was energy sapping but with their encouragement and support this piece of work is now complete.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to acknowledge the support and encouragement I received from colleagues and more so my supervisor in ensuring that this work was completed in time. I also wish to acknowledge the lecturers that I interacted with during the time of pursuit of knowledge. Without their support I could have not walked the journey.
ABSTRACT

Radicalization is a process by which an individual or group comes to adopt increasingly extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations that reject or undermine the status quo or reject and/or undermine contemporary ideas and expressions of freedom of choice. Radicalization is therefore seen as the process that leads to violence which, in the final analysis is what distinguishes a terrorist from other extremists. This process occurs over time and causes a fundamental change in how people view themselves and the world in which they live. The exact nature of this process is still misunderstood with researchers having developed a number of different theories and conceptual models that seek to explain the process. These theories have not been conclusively and empirically tested. The process is however, largely perceived to start with initial exposure through indoctrination, training, and then violent action. There is broad agreement, however, that many people who begin this process do not pass through all the stages and become terrorists. Many people who become extremists still stop short of the violence that is typical of militant jihadists. The Kenyan case is not different as much as it is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multicultural society that is predominantly African in character. The Muslim community that roughly forms 30 per cent of the population and is drawn from the whole spectrum of Kenyan society has been seen as the bedrock of radicalization. This study has also shown that the radicalizers take advantage of poverty, low level of education and perceived marginalization to influence the youth into joining radical groups, among them the Al-Shabaab, Mungiki and Mombasa Republican Council. Today, Kenya hosts various radicalized cells that are ready to indulge in violence as exemplified by the restive Muslim youth at the Kenyan coast that is forcibly removing the moderate sheikhs and Imams in the running of mosques and madrassas, giving room to enhanced radicalization on Muslims.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>AIAI</td>
<td>Il-Itihad Al-Islamia</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>ANU</td>
<td>Anti-Narcotics Unit</td>
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<td>AQEA</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in East Africa</td>
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<td>AQIM</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb</td>
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<td>AS</td>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
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<td>ATPU</td>
<td>Anti-Terrorism Police Unit</td>
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<td>BCU</td>
<td>Border Control Unit</td>
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<td>BH</td>
<td>Boko Haram</td>
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<td>DCI</td>
<td>Directorate of Criminal Investigations</td>
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<td>EALS</td>
<td>East Africa Law Society</td>
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<td>GOK</td>
<td>Government of Kenya</td>
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<td>GWT</td>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
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<td>IDB</td>
<td>Islamic Development Bank</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Agency for Development</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Terrorism Task Force</td>
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<td>KDF</td>
<td>Kenya Defence Forces</td>
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<td>LSK</td>
<td>Law Society of Kenya</td>
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<td>MRC</td>
<td>Mombasa Republican Council</td>
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<td>MYC</td>
<td>Muslim Youth Centre</td>
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<td>NCTC</td>
<td>National Counter-Terrorism Centre</td>
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<td>NIF</td>
<td>National Islamic Front</td>
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<td>NIS</td>
<td>National Intelligence Service</td>
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<td>NNM</td>
<td>Neo Nazi Movement</td>
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<td>NYM</td>
<td>National Youth Movement</td>
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<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organization</td>
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<td>POTA</td>
<td>Prevention of Terrorism Act</td>
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<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troops Contributing Countries</td>
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<td>UGS</td>
<td>Union of Gulf States</td>
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<td>UIC</td>
<td>Union of Islamic Court</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>US-ATA</td>
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction to the Study

Understanding how people get persuaded to become members of terrorist organizations is critical in the design and development of counter-terrorism measures, and without members, terrorist organizations cannot exist. Appreciating how and why an individual is radicalized and recruited into a terrorist organization therefore forms the basis of addressing the problem. The individual level is where terrorism begins. It is the individual who keeps the organization operational and helps perpetuate the organization’s ideology.\(^1\) It is therefore important to know what causes an individual to embrace terrorism. It is more helpful to supplement such profiles with examinations of recruitment patterns.

After examining the radicalizing elements that drive an individual to embrace terrorism, it is apparent that there is not one single factor that leads to terrorism, but a series of elements which combine to make an individual more susceptible to recruitment. The fact that millions of people share the same grievances as those who become jihad terrorists and yet do not become terrorists themselves indicates that there is a much more personal element to the individual who embraces terrorism than is often assumed. For such an individual there seems to be certain pathology as to why they chose that route, while others did not.\(^2\)

African states have responded to this threat in different ways. In West Africa for


example, Sahelian states have welcomed American help in getting control over their ungoverned spaces but still face unrest from within those territories. Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, South Africa and lately Rwanda, facing the growth of Islamic terrorist groups, have struggled to balance the need for new security legislation with the preservation of newly gained civil rights. Kenya’s case, so as to avoid the worst repercussions from the recent developments in Somalia has also resorted to active diplomacy and later armed intervention.

Some, like Ethiopia and the previous government of Mauritania, have used the terrorist threat to solidify policies of suppression and antidemocratic practices, while solidifying U.S. support for their anti-terrorist policies.

Somalia due to lack of central authority provides a safe haven, training camps and opportunities for extremism to flourish. Al-Qaeda and later Al-Shabaabare such groups that have found bases in the country from where they are executing attacks in the region by relying on local assistance and support. At the same time, Al-Shabaabas managed to recruit Kenyan, Ugandan and Tanzanian nationals to its ranks in Somalia. The central question that this paper seeks to answer is, what makes people, most often young ones susceptible to extremists’ jihad ideology? Instead of presenting Somalia as the root cause of all regional problems, the focus will rather be on the domestic conditions that those behind radicalization exploit to recruit their followers.

This paper seeks to focus on the important process of recruitment of individuals, in this case the youth, into terrorist groups and activities. The study also seeks to realize the motivating factors leading to individuals joining terror-groups.

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3 Ibid: 57
5 Khalilzad Z., and Byman D; The Consolidation of a Rogue State, Afghanistan. p. 60-63
1.2 Statement of the problem

Terrorism is a process, which has a discernable beginning, middle, and end. Therefore, in order to understand terrorism, the various parts that make up this process must be studied and fused to create a more comprehensive picture of terrorism. One important component of this picture is recruitment. The purpose of this paper is to examine the foundations, specifically the process by which individuals get enticed. By examining indoctrination and recruitment, the study seeks to inform as to what motivates them to voluntary recruitment (also forced recruitment if any). It is during the early state of indoctrination that an individual crosses the threshold into violent action. The understanding of the process is crucial in understanding the full operation of terrorism and thereafter countering it.

Most terrorist groups have a list of grievances. It is not enough to address these complaints, as these complaints alone are not a sufficient cause of terrorism. If they were, there would be a far greater number of terrorists in the world committing a far greater number of attacks. Since this is not the case, other factors beyond grievances must drive or motivate an individual to embrace and join terrorism. The main resource of any terrorist organization is its militants; membership is usually recruited from the pool of supporters. In a way, members make up the body of the group, while the leadership constitutes the head. The ideology that drives the group is the heart. Because most people tend to associate terrorist organizations with their leaders, it is easy to overlook the fact that there would be no organization without the foot soldiers. Focusing on the upper

echelons of an organization itself ignores one of the most important elements that constitute the organization in the first place; the members. It is this lower level of terrorist organizations that commandeers the focus of this paper.

1.2.1 Research questions

The study will seek to answer the following:

i. What motivates the Kenyan youth to enlist with terrorist groups?

ii. What is the impact of Kenya's counter-terrorism measures.

1.3 Objectives of the study

The following are the objectives of the study

1. To Establish the relationship between Youth Radicalization and Global Terrorism

2. To Examine the motivations that lead to youth recruitment into terrorist groups in Kenya

3. To Evaluate the impact of Kenya Government’s counter-terrorism efforts

1.4 Justification of the Study

There is a lot of academic research material on the general concept of terrorism: its activities and the threats emanating from terror attacks. This paper seeks to focus special attention on the body of the terrorist organization, which is the members of a terror group- the terrorists themselves. More specifically, it will focus on what motivates the youth into joining terrorist organizations such as the Al-Shabaab. This focus is based on the understanding that the 'body' (members -terrorists) is crucial to the operations and activities of terrorism. Without the body, the activities would be nil, even with the head (leadership) still in operation. Generally the factors determining the joining of individuals into terrorist groups are key in the counter-terrorism war. The focus on the important process of recruitment of individuals, in this case, the youth, into terrorist groups and
activities is therefore vital.

1.5 Literature Review

1.5.1 Introduction

Cooper states that the term terrorism poses a problem for academics and policymakers alike. He notes that there is a problem with the definition of this phenomenon, specifically that the difficulty is derived from establishing the kind of problem terrorism personifies. In other words, political violence represents a social problem, but exactly what that problem is and how to understand it within the confines of sociological theory seemingly escapes the contemporary discussion of terrorism. Cooper’s recognition of such analytic confusion rests on several issues that impact how we conceptually and operationally define the problem of political violence. For example, simplistic definitions of terrorism abound in the literature and are used by various scholars and government agencies. These definitions are typically atheoretical and are often analytically defeated by the variants of violence that have come to be categorized under the umbrella term terrorism and within the globalized social dialogue regarding political resistance and mass violence. Likewise, many of these simple definitions are politically loaded and reflect the interests and the power of the defining entity that wishes to delegitimize their opponents.

Alternative definitional perspectives on what constitutes terrorism do exist and offer some variation in thought over the simplistic definitions that are commonly used.

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8 Ibid
These alternatives typically focus on one sub variety of terrorism (for instance, state terrorism) and they represent viable criticisms of the power dynamics embedded in the labeling process represented in many of the definitions noted above. Due to their limited applicability and singular focus, these alternative definitions do not necessarily fully help to cultivate an understanding of the multiplicity of experiences that should be accounted for when discussing a globalized social problem like terrorism. They, like the simple definitions used by government agencies and some academics, represent political choices about what constitutes the relevant issues and what are acceptable questions for study. Since such ideological battles over what constitutes terrorism have existed for decades, with neither side finding an academic foothold of any note, some scholars have attempted to move beyond these debates by using seemingly sterilized, or “value free,” typologies as a means to bring some order to the variations of political violence they encounter.\footnote{Collins R., Rituals of Solidarity and Security in the Wake of Terrorist Attack; Sociological Theory 22, 2004, pp. 53-87.}

\subsection{Definition}

This study will use the AU’s definition of terrorism: the following definition of an act of terrorism as provided in the OAU/AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism provides the necessary framework on what an act of terrorism in the African context implies. According to Article 1 (3)(a):

\begin{quote}
“Any act that violates the laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, and is intended to: (i) frighten, compel or induce any government, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or refrain from doing any act, or to accept or abstain from a particular viewpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or (ii) unsettle any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or (iii) create insurgency in a State”\footnote{OAU/AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, Article 1 (3)(a), Algiers}.\end{quote}
Article 3 of the AU definition is however worth noticing for it exempts the struggle waged by peoples in accordance with the principles of international law for their liberation or self-determination, including armed struggle against colonialism, occupation, aggression and domination by foreign forces from qualifying or being considered as terrorist acts; however political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other motives shall not be a justifiable defence against a terrorist act.\textsuperscript{13}

1.5.3 Perceptions about Terrorists

Conceivably the most glaring misconception about terrorism is the assumption that terrorists are underprivileged, uneducated individuals on the fringe of society. Increasingly, empirical studies of terrorism have demonstrated that such a notion is flawed. Not only is there no empirical basis for this perception, but terrorism also appears to be more of a desirable undertaking than a last resort for many individuals.\textsuperscript{14} Kruegerindicate that terrorists tend to be more highly educated and from wealthier families than the average population.

Part of what makes terrorism complex is the inability to rationalize such extreme acts of violence and often self-sacrifice. What circumstances other than pure desperation could drive a person to become a terrorist? The rationale behind the idea that terrorists are desperate seems logical; rational choice theorists, at least, would posit that if a person is willing to risk his life and/or freedom to commit an act of terrorism, he must have few preferable alternatives. Although academics from various disciplines have focused their attention on answering this question, researchers have offered no conclusive explanation.

\textsuperscript{13} OAU/AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, Article 3

According to Gurr political violence as the result of collective discontent arising from a discrepancy between expected and achieved welfare.\textsuperscript{15} The study will review the existing concept on terrorism and build on existing research of social and economic conditions by examining the interaction effect of unemployment and higher education as a possible determinant of terrorism.

The Islamic radicalization that is observable in many Muslim societies has its roots in revivalist movements that emerged in the 1950s\textsuperscript{16} and Kenyan Muslims are no exception. The Kenyan Muslim community that stood at 4.3 million of the country’s 38.6 million population\textsuperscript{17} has been exposed to various strains of radical Islamism in the last four decades, much of it based on an amalgam of Salafi theologies, the best supported of which has been Wahhabism. The Salafi radicalization was gradual and unfolded in three distinct phases, each complementing the one before. The first wave occurred in the late 1970s and coincided with Saudi Arabia’s emergence as an oil power keen to export its brand of Islam. It was essentially theological and driven by an unstated proselytizing agenda.

The proselytizing drive was initially reliant on organizations run by Indian and Pakistani expatriates, most of them adherents of conservative sects popular in the Indian sub-continent, such as Deobandism and Tabligh Jamaat.\textsuperscript{18} Dissemination of Salafi ideas and values had a lasting impact on the community. Conservative Muslims resent the dominance of Western-style entertainment and consumerism, and the Salafi quest for doctrinal “purity” and “authenticity” fomented discontent with modernity and the secular

\textsuperscript{17} National Bureau of Statistics,\textit{Census report, 2009.}
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid
state. The community grew more insular, puritanical and conservative; sectarian animosities escalated, and traditional support for moderation and coexistence waned.

The second phase started in earnest in the early 1980s and was overtly political, rested on the Salafi creed and unfolded against the backdrop of Iran’s Islamic Revolution. The political message of the new generation of Salafi radicalizes was simple, but compelling: “pure” and “authentic” life was impossible under a secular state, not least because it did not allow Muslims to live in conformity with Sharia (Islamic law). Muslim minorities had no business seeking accommodation with the state. Short of overthrowing the state, the only options were to emigrate as the Prophet Muhammad did or struggle for separatism. The third stage unfolded in the 1990s, entirely driven by a new generation of Salafi Jihadi militants and groups. This added a deeply militant layer on top of small but influential radicalized institutions, based on a distinct puritanical theology and a potent political narrative. The jihadis neither invented a new language nor a new theology but simply built on the solid foundation established by their predecessors.

The first two were run by expatriate scholars and technocrats recruited from India and Pakistan. They built a vast network of charities, madrasas and health clinics in Muslim dominated areas. Madrasa graduates obtained full scholarships to study in Saudi and Pakistani Islamic universities. Magazines and newsletters in English and Swahili were launched, often targeting the educated and professional classes. TablighJemaat is a conservative missionary movement that is often castigated by salafists for its practices. In most parts of the world, it is nonpolitical and not involved in violence, but in part because

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19 PrestholdJ., Kenya, the United States and Terrorism”, *Africa Today*, vol. 57, no. 4, 2011.
of similarities of appearance, it is frequently used as a cover by more extreme groups.\textsuperscript{21}

Iran strove to export its Shia faith and brand of radicalism to Kenya, which has a tiny Asian Shia community that has traditionally stayed out of politics. The community showed no signs of radicalization despite close links with Iran. Attempts to radicalize Shia were intense in the 1980s and early 1990s, but have petered off. The targets were communities in Nairobi and Mombasa. These activities triggered serious sectarian tensions with Wahhabi groups with Jamia Mosque (Nairobi’s largest) being the battleground.\textsuperscript{22}

Like counterparts elsewhere in the Muslim world, they were influenced by Sayyid Qutb, Abu al-A’la Maudoodi and other Islamist ideologues. These ideologies lay in the elevation of jihad to a supreme act of faith, promotion of the cult of martyrdom and justification of terrorism. The Muslim condition was viewed as the same everywhere, their grievances and rage commonly shared. Jihad was an apocalyptic imperative aimed at emancipating the umma in preparation for the day of reckoning. It had to be waged simultaneously locally and globally.\textsuperscript{23} The chief proponent of this violent message was al-Qaeda. It had by the early 1990s forged links with a number of groups in the Horn of Africa, principally the al-Ittihaad al-Islami (AIAI), an armed Islamist movement that waged a violent campaign in south-western Somalia until militarily defeated in the mid-1990s by Ethiopia\textsuperscript{24}. The AIAI was succeeded by the Al-Shabaab that rose to relative dominance in southern Somalia. It remains a major threat to Somalia’s sovereignty as well as the region’s security and stability. In the last four years, it has built a formidable

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid
\textsuperscript{22} Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Mind?\textit{Crisis Group Africa Report} No.95 11 July
\textsuperscript{23} Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalization\textit{Crisis Group Africa Briefing} No. 85, 25 January 2012, pp. 6-9.
and secretive support infrastructure in Kenya.\textsuperscript{25}

Al-Shabaab radicalizes and recruiters have for some time been actively looking beyond the Somali community for potential jihadis, and in line with its regional agenda, Kenya’s and Tanzania’s coastal Muslims are an increasingly important target. There is growing evidence to suggest that attacks in North Eastern, Nairobi and Coast regions are joint operations of Kenyan Swahili and Somali jihadis. Swahili members and Islamized non-Somalis are easily able to evade security by posing as locals and counting on outdated profiling by Kenyan security officers that all Al-Shabaab members are Somali-looking.\textsuperscript{26} It is clear that radicalization and recruitment is not slowing down even in the face of enhanced counter-terrorism measures being employed by the Kenyan government.

\textbf{1.6 Theoretical Framework: Relative Deprivation Theory}

In understanding the causes that motivates individuals into terrorism, it is important first to understand relative deprivation as a theory of political violence. Gurr\textsuperscript{27} explains that instead of an absolute standard of deprivation, a gap between expected and achieved welfare creates collective discontent. This theory also applies to individuals who find their own welfare to be inferior to that of others to whom they compare themselves. Gurr argues that relative deprivation is a term used to denote the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the “ought” and the “is” of collective value satisfaction. The concept of relative deprivation dates back to ancient Greece. Aristotle articulated the idea that revolution is driven by a relative sense or feeling of inequality, rather than an absolute measure. For Aristotle, the principal cause of revolution is the

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid
aspiration for economic or political equality on the part of the common people who lack it, and the aspiration, Gurr states that perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities is what leads to discontent, not the millionaire’s absolute economic standing.

Gurr further explains that the primary source of the human capacity for violence appears to be the frustration-aggression mechanism - the anger induced by frustration - is a motivating force that disposes men to aggression, irrespective of its instrumentalities.” However, Gurr was not the first in his field to propose a link between frustration and aggression. Dollard and others were the first to propose the theory, postulating that frustration leads men to act aggressively. Accordingly, frustration is caused by relative deprivation, and the resulting aggression is manifested as terrorism.

The hypothesis is therefore that levels of terrorism may be explained in part as an expression of country conditions conducive to relative deprivation. To examine this theory empirically, one examines whether high unemployment rates, dependent on there also being higher rates of enrollment in tertiary education, are positively correlated with terrorism. When a large group of highly educated individuals enter the work force at low levels, they may feel over-qualified and disappointed relative to what they expected to gain from their education. Presumably individuals pursue higher education with the expectation that additional studies or training will help them find better jobs. As a result, well-educated individuals may feel greater discontent from unemployment than those who did not expect such employment opportunities. This socioeconomic discontent, in turn, may result in political violence. While individual economic indicators alone do not

28 Ibid
appear to be strongly correlated with terrorism, the interaction effect of an economic variable (unemployment) and a social variable (education) may provide better insight into understanding terrorism.\textsuperscript{30}

Quantitative studies of terrorism have increased dramatically in the past decade. Many articles in this body of literature sought to explain terrorism as the result of poor economic development and lack of education in a country. However, it soon became clear that this is not the case. Krueger and Malecková\textsuperscript{31} argue that eradication of poverty and universal secondary education are unlikely to change these feelings. Indeed, those who are well-off and well-educated may even perceive such feelings more acutely. In fact, terrorists tend to be better-educated and wealthier individuals than average. Azam\textsuperscript{32} also notes that, the emerging picture is that terrorists are men and women in their twenties with some post-secondary training, mostly in technical or engineering education. For example, biographies of Al-Qaeda members recorded by Sageman\textsuperscript{33} reveal that they are generally highly educated, mostly in scientific or technical disciplines. More recent studies of terrorism have focused on individual determinants rather than any interaction effect of economic and social variables.

Relatively, Li and Schaub\textsuperscript{34}, examines whether economic globalization increases or decreases transnational terrorist incidents inside countries. Globalization may be tied closely to relative deprivation, in the sense that greater access to information about

\textsuperscript{31}Krueger, A., Malečková J. “Education, Poverty, and Terrorism,” 2013, pp 14-25.,
\textsuperscript{32}J.-P. Azam And V. Thelen. “The Roles of Foreign Aid and Education in the War on Terror.” Public Choice 134.3-4 (2008): 330-348
people in other countries increases awareness of one’s relative world view. Li and Schuab hypothesize that increased globalization leads to greater levels of international terrorism because trade makes it easier for terrorists to mobilize and move materials that they eventually use to carry out attacks across borders.

Krueger and Malecková’s finding on the connection between education, poverty, and terrorism confirm the core assumption that terrorists tend to be better educated and from wealthier backgrounds. They find that Palestinian suicide bombers are less likely to come from impoverished families and more likely to have completed high school and attended college than the rest of the Palestinian population. They also find that poverty is inversely related with whether someone becomes a Hezbollah member, and education is positively correlated with whether someone becomes a Hezbollah member, suggesting that wealthier, more highly educated people are more likely to join this particular terrorist organization. Another scholar, Johan Galtung says that “feelings of deprivation arise when one has inconsistent rankings; that is, high education but low salary.

Many results from studies provide some evidence that within countries where there are recorded attacks, the interaction between unemployment and higher education may be an important indicator. This could suggest that while the effect is not significant enough to drive individuals in a nation to the point of terrorism, in countries where there is already terrorist activity, an increase in these conditions could further increase the incidence of terrorism.

1.7 Hypothesis

The hypotheses for this study are based on two main variables; Radicalization through

deprivation and desirability.

The study posits that;

i. That enhanced Youth Radicalization has a corresponding trend in global terrorism

ii. Radicalization of terrorism is on the rise among Kenyan youths

iii. Kenya's counter-terrorism war has both successes and failures.

1.8 Research Methodology

The study will explore qualitative design. Secondary sources of data will be relied on, including. Desk Top research and the use of published and unpublished books and journals as sources of information. Descriptive survey and /or studies aim at giving an accurate account about a specific aspect of a situation, person or community. It is also used to determine causes and reasons for the current situation which is being studied. This design will be used to investigate the Global Terrorism Threat and the Youth Radicalization in Kenya.

1.9 Chapter Outline

The study will have five chapters. Chapter one will be revised research proposal. Chapter Two will discuss the youth radicalization as well as factors surrounding the recruitment of individuals into terror groups. Chapter three will look at the successes or otherwise of Kenya’s counter-terrorism strategy. It will also look at the research conducted with regard to the problem statement and will largely interrogate secondary data from previous studies. Chapter four will look at some of the more prominent issues featuring from the study (emerging issues and challenges) and analyze them in depth. Chapter five will summarize the research and offer recommendations.
CHAPTER TWO

YOUTH RADICALIZATION

2.1 History of Youth Radicalization

Radicalization has become a matter of critical concern to the global community given that it breeds and/or feeds terrorist groups whose activities transcend borders. Africa in particular has a host of terrorist organizations that include Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreba/AQIM, Al-Shabaab, Wahabiyasalafist sect in Ethiopia, the Boko Haram in northern Nigeria and the Lord’s Resistance Army, which continues to pose an increasing threat to sub-regional peace and security. The terrorism crisis having transcended across the border of states to the degree which they become more transnational indeed raises grave security concerns not only to the regional security of Africa, but also to the international community. Kenya for instance has borne the brunt of many terror attacks in the East African region as it neighbors key states that host terrorist including Somalia which offers sanctuary to both Alqaida and its surrogate the Al-Shabaab. Kenya is also a hot bed for radicalization as well as being home to multiple and complex domestic criminal groups besides the area also being characterized by a youth bulge. The sub-region also accommodates diasporas radicalization; and is characterized by fragile states and ungoverned spaces; in addition to being anchored in the underlying axiom of ‘Islamism. The East Africa region is moreover a net for militarized political culture, and an anchorage for Islamist movements.37

Early formations of Islamic revivalist movements began to take shape around the region, particularly Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea in the late 1960's. Nevertheless, Islamism as a political movement in the Horn of African region traces its origins to the 1980s when the National Islamic Front/NIF/ in Sudan, which was formerly known as Muslim Brotherhood successfully engineered a military takeover of power. Henceforth the movements embarked on a region-wide islamisation project?The time coincided with Islamic revival in Western regions of Ethiopia, and more importantly the emergence of Islamic Jihad groups in Eritrea. Similarly, Somali Islamic fundamentalist movements were at their formative stage. The Somali fundamentalist movement, which has been active in Somalia politics since the late 1980's, is rooted in the 1950's but was reinforced by state collapse in 1991 and the resultant civil war, international intervention, external influence, and the subsequent efforts made by the Somalis themselves at new patterns of political reconstruction in a bid to shape their own destiny. In the absence of such a sequence of events, Islamic fundamentalism would have remained politically marginal force in Somalia politics.

Currently, there are strong structural foundations for radicalization in East Africa. Radicalization has persistently spread, building both on the economic incapability, violent conflicts and lack of strong and legitimate states. The international dimension of radicalization is clearly, a major consideration and Somalia and Northern Nigeria could be relevant examples. To this effect, a comparative analysis of Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and the AQIM is worth being researched on since applying a society-wide generalization can be misleading.\textsuperscript{38}

At another level the threat to traditional values and way of life and religious

\textsuperscript{38}Kenya Government Report.
orientation that comes from globalization could be a determining factor. In many cases this is attributed to the perception of threats. In the face of a perceived and a common threat the Muslims tend to close ranks with Somalia and northern Nigeria being good examples. A major driver is the presence of some form of religious and societal discrimination, particularly in places where Muslims are a minority. In other cases challenge to the preexisting religious equilibrium could lead to radicalization and extremism. Hence, the context matters a lot, as the problem of radicalization has multi-layered causes and manifestation. For instance, in Somalia the collapse of the state and international connectedness appear prominent. In other parts of the region, the youth bulge, lost opportunities, identity and a sense of marginalization turn to be the major drivers.

Islamic radicalism, while it has been at the center of much political and policy interest may not be the only source of radicalized violence. Nevertheless, it is easy to discern the causes of political Islam and radicalization than other forms of radicalization. Youth vulnerability to fringe movements, such as left and right wing terrorism, the Neo Nazi Movement, street gangs and cults are screaming examples. Somali youth do not only join Al-Shabaab but also street gangs in the US. Kenya has started to witness the same trend which, trend should be viewed as a subset of broader youth vulnerability to fringe movements. The same reasons that push young Somalis to join Al-Shabaab can also push them to join street gangs. The reasons may lie elsewhere but are very specific. These include lack of skills and access to productive sectors, the weakness of social service institutions, inability to integrate fully to the society and host nation, the

breakdown of the family, and finally the problems of mosque leadership as is happening at the Kenyan Coast.\textsuperscript{40}

Those who join, these fringe movements and those who join extremist movements do not necessarily represent the youth or the population at large and in most cases are a tiny minority. In a way radicalization is ultimately an individual process particularly linked to social networks and personal relationships. In this particular context the role that social networks and group dynamics play is quite critical. Further complications to this are the influence of relatives, a neighbor or a charismatic local preacher. This makes it difficult to generalize across countries, regions and time periods; though the mutation of radical groups follows a certain pattern and historical development of a particular period. In addition to this, many of the radical movements have emerged in radically different social, political, economic situations and environments.\textsuperscript{41} Yet again, social and economic situations alone cannot explain the issues surrounding radicalization and violent extremism. Youth vulnerability to terror groups and rebellious movements both left and right wing terrorism and violent extremism, street gangs and cults are more of a feature of the developed world. In the same token poverty alone cannot fully explain the long process of radicalization and violent extremism. To complete the process other factors and agencies need to be present. Thus radicalization into terror groups is not mono-causal. Different reasons and different conditions do lead individuals to radicalization. However there are factors that play larger roles that lead to radicalization.

Most frequently, the situation is usually marked by a poor education system stratified along socio-economic lines and disparate economic opportunities across

\textsuperscript{40}Susan R. More trouble in paradise, \textit{Journal Open Democracy}, vol. 8, 17 December, 2002, pp 93-98..

segments of society. Frustrated expectations and relative deprivation of mainly educated youth represents a danger zone. Moreover, perceptions of social exclusion and marginalization in an environment of a youth bulge are definitely a recipe for radicalization. These are warning signals that could increase the likelihood for young members of society being lured towards extremist causes. Most importantly, the presence of an extremist infrastructure, the impeccable organizational discipline and widespread social networks (of Somalia and Nigeria), Islamic political and militant outfits, a failure of the moderate forces to deliver credible results, and myopic policies by regional and global powers further enhance radicalization and the influence of violent extremist forces.

In some contexts some issues are important than others and there is need to locate the problem in a long and complex process of interaction between multiple drivers.

In many countries of the sub-region the crisis of the state, the failure of secular and moderate forces to deliver credible results could provide a fertile ground for youth radicalization. However, other internal and external actors and/or factors get incorporated before this translates to violent extremism. The rise and development of Islamist extremist groups in Somalia (even Northern Nigeria) is the result of a long process. In many cases issues of identity, nationalism, group protection and clan affiliation as well as associated material benefits and security may feature prominently. Unfulfilled social and economic needs, though critical, alone may not lead to potent radicalization. But these social and economic needs coupled with acute form of social exclusion could mark the beginning of a serious wave of radicalization. This does not

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43 Tikuisis P.; On the relationship between weak states and terrorism. *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* (Online publication date: 1-Jan-2009), pp.166-179. Online publication date: 1-Jan-2009
mean, however, that radical and extremist organizations are the manifestation of a chronic socio-economic problems present in a certain country or region.

In fact, in most cases socio-economic problems may not be used by leaders of terrorist groups as a major weapon for recruitment. Nevertheless, it may still remain the case that drives the youth to join radical and terrorist groups. The Al-Shabaab continues to exploit the socio-economic conditions of the targeted youth. It promises financial rewards from the revenues it collects from various local and international resources such as sale of charcoal, levies and taxes from sea ports, jihad contributions and various forms of extortions justified in form of religious obligations, or zakat. However, al-shabaab’s main source of external funding remains Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. So there seem to be a gap between the official statements and policy manifestos of terrorist organizations and the drivers of youth recruitment. This partly explains the weakness of terrorist organizations and the frail member of their core membership. It may also explain why extremist groups are poor at governing. However, without such organizations and their leadership, radicalization cannot be turned into violent extremism or even terrorism. In order for this to happen there should be organizations that can frame and channel the relevant grievances in violent directions.

2.1.2 History of Terrorism in Kenya

Although Kenya is a secular state, it is essentially a Christian country because of the dominant Christian population. There is the perception that Islam is ‘alien’, despite the fact that it came to Kenya before Christianity. Some young Kenyan Muslims have been influenced by radical preaching, which leads them to believe that wars being fought

against Muslims abroad, for example, in Afghanistan and Iraq are part of a global campaign against Islam. It is noteworthy that non-Somali Kenyans constituted the largest and most organized non-Somali group within Al-Shabaab.\textsuperscript{45} The Islamist militants were exploiting sub-standard socioeconomic conditions, and the government's inability to provide basic services, by positioning themselves as providers of assistance. Creating or infiltrating bona fide charity organizations has been looked at as sure way to win the general support of ordinary people. One such group is the Muslim Youth Centre (MYC), which is operating from Majengo area of Nairobi City and whose objectives include promoting community health and social welfare, but which also advocates an extreme interpretation of Islam and has been preparing enlisted youth to travel to Somalia for indoctrination, training and undertaking 'jihad' [holy war) within the ranks of Al-Shabaab before returning home to perpetuate terrorist activities, as have been witnessed in Kenya and other regional countries.

Until recently, terrorism in Kenya was mostly a foreign affair. Operatives from elsewhere saw Kenya as a permissive, target-rich environment. The first major attack of the modern era was the Norfolk Hotel bombing in December, 1980, which killed sixteen people and injured more than one hundred. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) claimed responsibility. Most believe the attack served as retaliation for Kenya's decision to allow the launch of the 1972 Israeli military raid on Entebbe, Uganda from Kenyan soil. Nearly two decades later, on August 7, 1998, al-Qaida attacked the American Embassy in Nairobi with a truck-bomb. This attack killed some 250 people and injured roughly 5,000 Embassy staff, passers-by and people in neighboring buildings. Al-Qaida simultaneously attacked the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 11 and

injuring another 70. An attempt to destroy the American Embassy in Kampala, Uganda, was reportedly foiled on this same date.\textsuperscript{46} All three embassies were accessible and relatively unprotected, making them particularly attractive targets. The Kenyan attack also produced the first known al-Qaida operative from Kenya, Sheikh Ahmad Salem Swedan, from Mombasa, as well as Abdullah Muhammad Fazul, a Comorian who reportedly held a Kenyan passport, though his legal citizenship remains unclear.\textsuperscript{47} He was later to be killed in Somalia where he was hold up, planning further terror attack the time of his death, he was designated as the leader of Al-Qaida East Africa.

Al-Qaida executed Kenya’s third major terrorist attack on November 28, 2002. Two SAM-7 missiles were fired at, but narrowly missed, an Israeli passenger jet taking off from Moi International Airport in Mombasa. Five minutes later, a truck-bomb detonated just outside the lobby of the Israeli-owned and frequented Paradise Hotel in Kikambala along the beach north of Mombasa. Fifteen people were killed and another 35 injured in that attack.\textsuperscript{48} Clearly, in this case al-Qaida’s attention shifted from the U.S. to Israel with the perceived vulnerability of both targets, a clear incentive for their selection.\textsuperscript{49} Shortly thereafter, in June 2003, Kenyan authorities foiled a plot to attack the temporary U.S. Embassy in Nairobi using a truck-bomb and an explosive-laden plane. The plane was to be taken from Nairobi’s Wilson Airport.\textsuperscript{50}

Another incident, not associated with al-Qaida, occurred on May 12, 2006, when three assailants fire-bombed the Nairobi offices of the Christian radio station Hope-FM

after gaining entry to the station’s premises by killing a private security guard. An inner security door prevented the attackers from reaching the upper floor where several staff members were hiding. Little is known about their identity, but their motives appear less opaque. The station’s weekly program, “Jesus is the Way,” which many believe was explicitly designed to win converts to Christianity from the Muslim community, had just been aired. Although minor in scale, this attack marked Kenya’s first entirely domestic case of Muslim-based terrorism.\textsuperscript{51} Kenya has since then experienced other terror attacks associated with Al-Shabaab with the most spectacular being the one on Westgate shopping Mall in Nairobi in which a number of people perished besides smaller ones targeting social places, churches and security units.

Despite two major Al-Qaida attacks on Western targets in 1998 and 2002, the group’s operatives continued to move about the country freely. Its supporters and financiers are reported to have established several businesses in major towns such as Mombasa, Nairobi, Garissa, Wajir, Mandera, Lamu, Nakuru, and Kajiado besides operating Islamic charities, madarasas and duksi. The latter have been realized to be used by the Alqaida and Al-Shabaab ideologues to entice, enlist and radicalize the targeted youth. From the comfort zones in Kenya, the operatives and their masters are said to visit Somalia often, hold meetings, communicate with Al-Qaida senior figures outside the country besides the transfer of money and stockpile weapons undetected. The next two sections explore the factors which make Kenya a relatively safe haven for terrorist cells.

2.3 The radicalization of youths before joining terrorist groups

The process of radicalization is a very complex phenomenon. Radicalization,

particularly in the form of religious (Islamic) extremism is largely attributed to the crisis of the state or its complete absence, the bankruptcy of modern ideologies, the lack of strong institutions of governance, non-social service delivery and most importantly, international connectedness or globalization, where threats to westernization inspire fanaticism to counter westernization. This aspect has and continue to be exploited by anti-western groups, thus islamization takes place before the actual radicalization and subsequent enlistment into terrorist groups.\(^{52}\)

There are strong structural foundations for radicalization in East Africa. It has continued to spread, building on the economic decline, joblessness, violent conflicts and lack of strong and legitimate states, especially in the Horn of Africa. Al-Shabaab for example emerged in Somalia from the remnants of Al-Itihad al Islamiya (AIAI) a Wahabi Islamic terrorist organization which ascended in Somali in 1980s with the intention of replacing the then government with an Islamic state.\(^{53}\) It is also argued that the strength of political Islam in the sub-region, particularly Somalia lies in its ability to address the needs of certain groups that have been marginalized by both political processes and resource conflicts. Clearly, the international dimension of radicalization is a major consideration. Somalia and Northern Nigeria could be relevant examples. As such, specific domestic and external context does matter and pushed by the embers of globalizations.\(^{54}\)

At another level the threat to traditional values, way of life and religious

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\(^{52}\) Khayat M, Al-Shabab Al-Mujahideen and Kenyan Muslim Youth Center strengthen ties, Middle East Media Research Institute, Inquiry and Analysis Series Report no. 870, 12 August 2012, p.28.


orientation that comes from globalization could be a determining factor and in many cases attributed to the perception of threats. In the face of a perceived common threat, the Muslims tend to closeranks. Somalia and Northern Nigeria are emerging and being considered as good examples. The major driver is the presence of some form of religious and societal discrimination, particularly in places where Muslims are a minority. In other cases, challenge to the pre-existing religious equilibrium could lead to radicalization and extremism. Therefore, the context matters a lot, as the problem of radicalization has multi-layered causes and manifestation. For instance, in Somalia the collapse of the state followed by incessant power struggle among various war-lords and international connectedness appear very prominent.\textsuperscript{55} In other parts of the region, the youth bulge, lost opportunities, nationalism, identity and a sense of marginalization turn to be the major drivers.

Islamic radicalism, which has been at the center of much political and policy interest may not be the only source of radicalized violence. Nevertheless, it is easy to discern the causes of political Islam and radicalization than other forms of radicalization and youth vulnerability to fringe movements, street gangs and cults. It is important to note that Somali youth do not only join Al-Shabaab but also street gangs as have been witnessed in the US and is now showing signs in some countries in Europe such as Britain. The trend should be viewed as a subset of broader youth vulnerability to fringe movements. The same reasons that push young Somalis to join Al-Shabaab can also push them to join street gangs. The reasons may lie elsewhere and very specific such as lack of skills and access to productive sectors, the weakness of social service institutions,

inability to integrate fully in the society and host nations for cases such as refugees, the breakdown of the family, and lately the question of mosque leadership where the youth are forcefully ejecting the moderate mosque leadership and installing their own, which is radical.

Worth noting is that those who join extremist movements do not represent the youth or the population at large. In most cases they are a tiny minority. In a way, radicalization is ultimately an individual process particularly linked to social networks and personal relationships. In this particular context the role of social networks and group dynamics is critical. Compounding this is the influence of relatives, a neighbor or a charismatic local preacher. That is why it is difficult to generalize across countries, regions and time periods; though the mutation of radical groups follows a certain trajectory and historical development of a particular period. For example, many of the radical movements have emerged in radically different social, political, economic environments. Again, social and economic conditions alone cannot explain the problems of radicalization and violent extremism. Youth vulnerability to fringe movements and violent extremism, street gangs and cults are more of a feature of the developed world. In the same token, poverty alone cannot fully explain the long process of radicalization and violent extremism. To complete the process other factors and agencies need to be present.

2.4 Factors that make the youth vulnerable

The situation could be marked by a poor education system stratified along socio-economic lines and disparate economic opportunities across segments of society. Frustrated expectations and relative deprivation of mainly educated youth

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represents a dangerzone. Moreover, perceptions of social exclusion and marginality in an environment of a youthbulge are seemingly a recipe for radicalization. These are warning signals that could increase the likelihood for young members of society being lured towards extremist causes. Most importantly, the presence of an extremist infrastructure, the impeccable organizational discipline and widespread social networks of Somalia are factors that influences the youth or make them vulnerable to manipulation. Islamic political and militant outfits, a failure of the moderate forces to deliver credible results, and myopic policies by regional and global powers further enhance radicalization and the influence of violent extremist forces. In some contexts, some issues are more important than others hence the need to locate the problem in a long and complex process of interaction between multiple drivers.

In many countries of the sub-region the crisis of the state, the failure of secular and moderate forces to deliver credible results could provide a fertile ground for youth radicalization. But other internal and external actors need to be met before this translates to violent extremism. The rise and development of Islamist extremist groups in Somalia is the result of a long process. In many cases issues of identity, group protection and clan affiliation as well as associated material benefits and security may feature prominently. Unmet social and economic needs alone may not lead to potent radicalization. But unmet social and economic needs coupled with acute form of social exclusion could mark the beginning of a serious wave of radicalization. This has emerged as a common thread that

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is running through Kenya just as Somalia. It however, doesn’t mean that radical and extremist organizations are the manifestation of a chronic socio-economic problem present in a given country or a given region.

In fact, in most cases socio-economic problems may not be used by leaders of terrorist groups as a major weapon for recruitment. Nevertheless, it may still remain the case that drives the youth to join radical and terrorist groups. So there seems to be a gap between the official statements and manifestos of terrorist organizations and the drivers of youth recruitment. This partly explains the weakness of terrorist organizations and the minority of their core membership. It may also explain why extremist groups are poor at governing. This is however changing with time. However, without such organizations and their leadership, radicalization cannot be turned into violent extremism or terrorism. In order for this to happen there should be organizations that can frame and channel the relevant grievances in violent directions.

### 2.5 The Nexus between Religion and Terrorism

The nexus between religion and terrorism has a long genealogy in Western scholarship. The concept of ‘religious terrorism’ goes back to David Rapoport’s 1984 paper analyzing the use of terror in the three monotheistic religions. This seminal paper inspired many similar works on terrorism which sought to explain why violence and religion has re-emerged so dramatically at this moment in history and why they have so frequently been found in combination.\(^{59}\) As Scott Appleby’s \(^{60}\) classic work in the field begins by questioning the reason why religion seems to need violence and violence seem to need religion. In this strand of literature, religious terrorism has been raised above a

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simple label to a set of descriptive characteristics and substantive claims which appear to
delineate it as a special ‘type’ of political violence, fundamentally different to secular
terrorism.\textsuperscript{61} The claim about the special nature of religious terrorism rests on three key
hypotheses briefly discussed below.

The first supposition states that religious terrorists have anti-modern goals of
returning society to an idealized version of the past and are therefore necessarily anti-
democratic and anti-progressive,\textsuperscript{62} for example, it is argued that the forces of history
seem to be driving international terrorism back to a much earlier time, with echoes of the
behavior of “sacred” terrorists. It is further argued that religious terrorists have objectives
that are absolutist, inflexible, unrealistic, devoid of political pragmatism and hostile to
negotiation\textsuperscript{63}. Morgan puts it tersely, “Today’s terrorists don’t want a seat at the table;
they want to destroy the table and everyone sitting at it. Regarding the Al-Qaeda terrorist
organization, Byman argues, because of the scope of its grievances, its broader agenda of
rectifying humiliation and a poisoned worldview that glorifies jihad as a solution,
appeasing Al-Qaeda is difficult in theory and impossible in practice.\textsuperscript{64} Similarly,
Benjamin contends that unlike most terrorist groups, Al-Qaeda ‘eschews incremental
gains and seeks no part of a negotiation process; it seeks to achieve its primary ends
through violence.\textsuperscript{65} The second hypothesis states that religious terrorists employ a
different kind of violence compared to secular terrorists. Hoffman, for example, argues
that for the religious terrorist, ‘violence is a sacramental act or divine duty executed in

\textsuperscript{61}Agbiboa D. E. “Why Boko Haram Exists: The Relative Deprivation Perspective.” \textit{African Conflict and Peace-
building Review}, 2013b, pp. 144-157
\textsuperscript{63}Gunning, J and Jackson, R. “What’s so ‘Religious’ about ‘Religious Terrorism.’” \textit{Critical Studies on Terrorism}, 2011,
pp. 369-388.
\textsuperscript{64}Byman, D “Al-Qaeda as an Adversary: Do We Understand Our Enemy.” \textit{World Politics} 2003, pp. 139-163.
\textsuperscript{65}Benjamin, D “Strategic Counterterrorism.” Foreign Policy at Brookings \textit{Policy Paper 7}, October, 2008, pp.1-17
direct response to some theological demand,’ as opposed to a tactical means to a political end.  

The third, and final, hypothesis states that religious terrorists have the capacity to evoke total commitment and fanaticism from their members. It is argued that religious terrorists are characterized by the suspension of doubt and an end-justifies-the-means worldview, in contrast to the supposedly more measured attitudes of secular groups. Juergensmeyer argues that ‘these disturbing displays have been accompanied by strong claims of moral justification and an enduring absolutism, characterized by the intensity of the religious activists’ commitment.’ Moreover, it is suggested that in some cases the certainties of the religious viewpoint and the promises of the next world are key motivating factors in driving insecure, alienated and marginalized youths to join religious terrorist groups as a means of psychological empowerment. It is further argued that such impressionable, alienated and disempowered young people are vulnerable to forms of brainwashing and undue influence by recruiters, extremist preachers or internet materials. Piazza explains the higher frequency and intensity of terrorist activity among radical Islamists in the light of the misinterpretation of certain doctrine and practice within Islam, including the concept of ‘lesser jihad,’ the practice of militant struggle to defend Islam from its perceived enemies, or the Muslim reverence for ‘Itihad,’ the practice of martyrdom. Based on Piazza’s article, it would also be about how Al-Qaeda type groups fit a typology defined as ‘universal/abstract’ while other Islamist terrorist

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groups are more properly categorized as ‘strategic’\(^{71}\). For Piazza, the primary difference between universal/abstract groups and strategic groups is that the former are distinguished by highly ambitious, abstract, complex, and nebulous goals that are driven primarily by ideology. In contrast, strategic groups have much limited and discrete goals: the liberation of specific territory, the creation of an independent homeland for a specific ethnic group, or the overthrow of a specific government'. From this perspective, Islamist groups like Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda, and Boko Haram, among others, fall into the universal/abstract category on account of their global jihadist ideological stance against outposts of the West and perceived or real enemies of Islam. It is important to note that when examined in the aggregate, Al-Qaeda affiliated groups perpetrate more lethal attacks and are responsible for a disproportionate number of attacks and total casualties per group than any other religious oriented terrorist group\(^{72}\).

### 2.6 Conclusion

Scholars and security experts have tried to strike a balance and agree on a typology to determine what prompts people, especially the youth to accommodate radical ideas that lead towards terrorism. Poverty and alienation are popular explanations, but they do not stand up to scrutiny. Domestically a majority of radicalized youth come from the margins of society. But in other environments, for example, all of the eight suspects in the botched June 2007 terrorist attacks in London and at Glasgow’s international airport were professionals: physicians, medical research scientists and an engineer. All were residents of the United Kingdom. Moreover, the recent past has shown that many dangerous extremists spring from the ranks of the privileged middle and upper-middle

\(^{71}\) Ibid: 65  
\(^{72}\) Ibid: 66
classes. The Hamburg Cell that formed the hard core of the 9/11 conspiracy were all enrolled at German universities; while Osama bin Laden had an engineering background and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is a pediatrician.\(^7\)

There is a tendency to assume that deprivation and alienation are effective predictors of the kind of radicalization that can lead to extremist action. Consequently, there is a tendency to focus attention and resources on the young and on the “underclass.”

Another popular explanation for the kind of radicalization that leads to terrorism is rooted in the failure of concepts like multiculturalism and integration. This explanation assumes that a group at particularly high risk of crossing the line into terrorist activities is the children of immigrants who find themselves both trapped and marginalized by the conflict between the traditional world of their parents and the often confusing and contradictory cultural messages of modern western society.

While concepts like “alienation” are not completely irrelevant to the problem, they are not always useful in trying to anticipate or address the problem of radicalization. Ultimately, largely immeasurable social, political and religious motivations may trump mere citizenship. Radicalization remains a phenomenon that is difficult to predict, with little associated typology. Pre-radicalization indicators, if they do exist, or are detectable, they are often extraordinarily subtle, particularly to a cultural outsider like a police or intelligence officer. Nevertheless, a look back at some domestic and global examples does identify what seem to be a few common factors, at least in the transformation of young Canadian Muslims into extremists. Family ties, for example, can be critical.

Ahmed Said Khadr, father of Omar, inculcated all of his children with Islamist ideology

and ensured that they received training in Al Qaida camps in Afghanistan. He also encouraged at least one of them to become a suicide bomber.

The processes of globalization have facilitated the spread of terrorism that extends across and beyond national borders as the recent Westgate attack demonstrates, blurring the boundaries between domestic and transnational terrorism. This holds at least two significant implications for how we think about and prepare responses to terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab. One implication is the urgent need to better understand their power, command and control relationships with the global jihad network. Another implication is the need for countries fighting terror, like Kenya, Uganda and Somalia to be assisted in strengthening intelligence for effective responses. Addressing the underlying existential and ideological conditions that radicalizes exploit is presumed to be necessary as a long term solution for containing terrorism.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{74}CISSA recommendations, Nairobi, September, 2014.
CHAPTER THREE

PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES IN KENYA'S COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORTS

3.1 Introduction

Ever since the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Nairobi embassy, which killed 225 and wounded over 4,000, and the 2002 attack on the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel resort on the coast, which killed fifteen and injured about 80, countering terrorism has been a major priority for the Kenyan government. The government has greatly increased its capabilities, with substantial foreign help.\(^{75}\) Since 11 September 2001, Kenya has actively assisted Western efforts to identify arrest and detain suspected terrorists. This became very significant with the fall of the Union of Islamic Courts in Somalia in December 2006, when Kenyan officials arrested and detained more than 150 individuals fleeing that country, a number of whom were ultimately handed over to Ethiopian government.\(^ {76}\) This policy was extremely unpopular among Kenyan Somalis and Muslims in general. In part due to lack of resources, government counter-terrorism efforts continue to focus on policing and border security, rather than programs designed for counter-radicalization or de-radicalization of those who have joined radical groups.\(^ {77}\) The decision in October 2012 to deploy troops in Somalia’s Lower Juba to fight Al-Shabaab is the biggest security ‘decision the country has taken since independence. Operation Linda Nchi, is rather risky, because of the potential of getting immersed in Somalia for long with the likelihood of increasing Al-Shabaab retaliatory terror campaign on Kenyan land and the prospects for a

\(^{75}\)“Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation” *Crisis Group Africa Briefing* No. 85, 25 January 2012. pp. 11
\(^{77}\)Jeremy P. “Kenya, the United States and Terrorism”, *Africa Today*, vol. 57, no. 4 (summer 2011).
viable, extremist-free and stable polity emerging in the Juba Valley are slim, at least in the short term.\textsuperscript{78} If it costs many Kenyan lives or triggers a mass terrorist attack, it will precipitate a backlash (xenophobic attacks) against Kenyan Somalis and further radicalize the community. It has already triggered a number of attacks, on both civilian and government targets, in North Eastern and Coastal areas of Kenya.

The fight against Al-Shabaab has led to an increase in ethnic profiling of Somalis in particular and unease relations between Christians and Muslims in general.\textsuperscript{79} Kenyans have historically been suspicious of the Somali community due to deep-rooted suspicion dating back to the Shiffa War. Somalis are often without distinction labeled shiffas or today “Al-Shabaab”.\textsuperscript{80} Hostility towards them is exacerbated by their ambitious push and commercial success in Nairobi and other major urban areas, as well as their assumed but unproven association with piracy, extremism and terrorism. Though the government has repeatedly urged Kenyans not to stereotype or discriminate against Somalis, political’ statements and media rhetoric risk further demonizing them. Deputy Defence (former and late) Minister Joshua OrwaOjode, for example, likened Al-Shabaab to a snake with its tail in Somalia and head in Eastleigh.\textsuperscript{81}

Indeed, processes of globalization have facilitated the spread of terrorism that extends across and beyond national borders as the recent Westgate attack demonstrates, blurring the boundaries between domestic and transnational terrorism. This holds at least two significant implications for how policy analysis and security agents and all concerned stakeholders think about and prepare responses to terrorist groups like Al-Shabab. One

\textsuperscript{80}Guled M. Hounding Somalis hurts terror fight, The Star, 2 November 2011.
\textsuperscript{81}Odula T., War fears: Somalis in Kenya afraid of xenophobia, Associated Press, 11 November 2011.
implication is the urgent need to better understand their power, command and control relationships with the global jihad network. Another implication is the need for countries fighting terror, like what the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and regional grouping of IGAD countries to be assisted in strengthening their intelligence and civilian institutions, promoting the rule of law, and addressing the underlying existential and ideological conditions that radicalizes Islamist groups and fuel terrorism without borders.\textsuperscript{82} They are important in order to evaluate the success and failure in the fight against terror as discussed in this paper.

3.2 Religious Reforms at the Madrasa Level

Some reform-minded Kenyan Muslims believe the madrasa system needs to be modified, but there is insufficient will to draft a strategy given that the issue is deeply divisive. Realistically, madrasa reform can only be part of a wider reform. Conservative groups and hardliners dismiss the idea as primarily driven by the West hence a delicate balance for the government. Modest and discreet attempts by the U.S. in recent years to encourage debate, especially in Coast region have galvanized hardliners.\textsuperscript{83} In this light, competent, respected Muslim educators should be encouraged to prepare an action plan, drawing on experiences throughout the Muslim world. It is however, appreciable that even a Muslim-led plan may not be readily acceptable because of sectarian and ideological divisions, but failure to reform would strengthen the case of those who want to scrap the whole system.\textsuperscript{84}

Many Muslims remain ambivalent or disinclined to the idea of reform, while a


\textsuperscript{83} Ibid: 11-12

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid: 12
tiny but vocal constituency is implacably hostile. This aversion is mostly due to the religious and socio-cultural dominance of Wahhabism and other Salafi theologies and wanting state counter-terrorism policies that focus largely on security and heavy-handed policing and alienate and radicalize the Muslim community.\textsuperscript{85} Salafi groups oppose reform because they fear it could highlight troubling aspects of their theology. Modernizers and moderates prefer inaction because they consider the issue either not a great priority or to be inexpedient, since they could lose ground to the hardliners.\textsuperscript{86} This seems to be the emerging situation at the Kenyan Coast where radicals are taking over management mosques forcefully, even eliminating those opposed to their push or brand of teaching.

Worth noting is that there is no model of a successful madrasa reform program to serve as a template, though lessons could be drawn from the modestly encouraging steps toward reform in a few countries, especially in South East Asia. These might include bringing private madrasas under the education ministry; requiring registration and enrolment information; setting academic standards that can be checked; and instituting a module of non-religious courses and government help that would also justify supervisory visits. But any reform plan must balance Muslim integration and the community's right to live its faith. Reform will also entail a substantial overhaul of madrasa curriculum and a qualitative improvement in teaching, ideally by creating local teacher training colleges and universities. This requires technical interventions to progressively transform the system.\textsuperscript{87} More important, it is about modernizing and integrating traditional madrasa


\textsuperscript{86} Ibid

\textsuperscript{87} Crisis Group interview, former madrasa teacher, Eastleigh, Nairobi, September 2010. In, Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation” Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 85, 25 January 2012. pp. 15-17
pedagogy with mainstream secular schooling. Many other faith communities in Kenya have already done this.

3.3. Kenyan-Muslim Leadership

Many problems faced by the Muslim community, especially sectarian and regional divisions; inability to confront major challenges like radicalization; and mounting tensions with other major faith groups, are blamed on the lack of Kenyan-Muslim leadership. There is great disaffection with the “official” Muslim leaders, many of whom are widely viewed as elitist and self-serving; their integrity sullied through ties with the regime or foreign interests; and disconnected from harsh community realities.\(^{88}\) This trust and credibility deficit compounds the leadership crisis and undermines community cohesion. Radical organizations have emerged in the last decade to challenge the “official” leadership and institutions. Their political activism and radical anti-establishment politics are attractive to many youths, disillusioned with what they see as timid, pragmatist and moderate political apologists and style of the established institutions. The institution whose ageing leadership is at the center of this backlash is the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM), whose status as the pre-eminent Kenyan-Muslim body is increasingly contested. Its traditional strategy of cultivating close links with regimes and the major political parties, as well as its preference for dialogue and engagement, may have been understandable and useful in the past but is now part of the crisis of confidence. Its officials personally profited from those relationships.\(^{89}\)

During the reign of President Daniel arapMoi, many were stalwarts of the ruling

\(^{88}\) Ibid pp. 10-14  
\(^{89}\) Ibid p.13
party from the Muslim community received Moi’s patronage. That culture has not changed given that a number of them even today associate with the regime for individual benefits. Yet while SUPKEM maintains close ties to power, it has not been effective in modifying the ever increasing radicalization among the youth and heavy-handed security responses coupled with apparent and petty discrimination faced by Muslims. Critics complain of poor financial records and an inability to account for large grants from Gulf benefactors at the SUPKEM. Some also suggest the long-standing scholarship program, funded through a grant scheme of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), has not been well-managed or has often been awarded in a nepotistic fashion. SUPKEM remains useful to the state, primarily for channeling grievances in a non-confrontational, pragmatic and moderate manner. It appears, however, that the authorities suspect the body’s diminished influence and role are beyond repair.

3.4 Changes through Kadhi Courts

The Office of the Chief Kadhi has existed since colonial times, when, as an arm of the official judiciary, it was part of the hybrid judicial system designed to accommodate customary and religious legal systems. Its primary role was to oversee Kadhi courts across the country and enforce a limited Sharia regime, mainly in family and civil law. This modest concession to Sharia became the subject of a major controversy and a vigorous campaign in 2010 by churches to prevent the “entrenchment” of the Kadhi courts in the new constitution, raising Muslim-Christian tensions to unprecedented levels.

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91 Ibid
93 Ibid
But the main political parties, keen to gain Muslim votes resisted the pressure. However, while the issue is legally settled, there is no political closure.95

Many Christian groups still feel aggrieved. Inter-communal relations are distressed, and the cracks opened by the ill-tempered contest have widened and inter-religious tensions are likely to worsen due to the growing fear of Islamic caliphate that is associated with jihadi terrorism. The potential for violence is real. The Muslim community feels it recorded a major political victory over the status of the Kadhi courts. Yet, expectations also have been raised with the Muslim community expecting to extract more concessions, but a push for these would definitely rekindle tensions.96 Unless steps are taken to address the radicalization problem, it will worsen leading to violence. The biggest obstacle is however, the inability to gather the requisitedetermination. The predisposition within the Muslim community has often been to downplay the magnitude of the crisis or deny it exists. Unless it is accepted and a coherent, coordinated strategy mobilized, very minimal gain will be achieved. Improvementeventuallywill depend on the resolve to act decisively, which may appear distant given the political mischiefs.97

However, there are steps that could be taken to reform Islamic institutions and improve quality of leadership that including forming a Muslim Advisory Council of respected leaders, chosen by the community, to create a platformreceptive to Muslim anxieties and goals and able to eloquently articulate the community’s concerns to those in power and vice-versa.

95 Ibid : 13
97Ibid p.14
3.5 History of Terrorism legislation in Kenya

Terrorism remains a major threat to Kenya’s national-security interests. However, efforts to combat the menace are hampered by an insufficient legal framework. Previously, terrorism-related offenses were primarily handled under the provisions of the penal code, with the result that offenders received lenient sentences or even were acquitted. On the other hand, efforts to formulate specific counterterrorism legislation in the past were met with criticism from human-rights bodies, the clergy, legal bodies, and the public at large.

Civil society and watchdog groups have raised unease about Kenya’s antiterrorism legislation, especially on human-rights grounds. Observers, domestically and abroad, have accused the security forces of heavy handedness in the handling of terror suspects. Amnesty International for example accused the security agencies of torture, detaining persons without charge, and harassment of families of people suspected of terrorism.\(^98\) Kefa Otiso argues that the war on terrorism “should not be used as a pretext to wantonly violate the basic rights of Kenyans.\(^99\) He notes that the war can only be won through cooperation with citizens.\(^100\) The broader question here is the balancing of national security with civil liberties, which is just as prevalent and pressing in the developed world. At the international level, the threat of terrorism is similar, hence the calls for global and regional efforts to counter the threat.

A marked shift in policy after the 2002 bombings saw the government establish

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mechanisms to meet this growing terrorist threat. The country sought to formulate a national strategy to counter terrorism. The minister of justice and constitutional affairs initiated the developing of legal framework that saw the tabling of the Suppression of Terrorism Bill 2003 (Supplement No. 38 of the Kenya Gazette) in Parliament. The bill immediately stirred up controversy, as had the acts that prompted it. The bill was further criticized by the Law Society of Kenya and the clergy, who claimed it violated the country’s constitution and legalized civil-liberties violations in particular, freedom of association, the presumption of innocence, right to a fair trial, and particularly targeting Kenyan Muslims as terrorists. The Law Society of Kenya and civil society and watchdog groups organized protests across the country, sensitizing Kenyans to the negative clauses of the bill. Ultimately, the 2003 bill lapsed after parliament was prorogued, and failed the second reading. In 2006, another antiterrorism bill was proposed, but never made it to parliament.101

Counter-terrorism legislation in Kenya has its roots in the last years of British colonial rule, which flavored the focus and practice of counterterrorism law for some decades even after independence. This ambivalent legacy, as well as Kenya's post-independence efforts to deepen and broaden the rule of law, including genuine civil-liberties protections, left Kenya with a legal framework that was acutely ill-prepared for the kinds of international terrorist threats that came about with the end of the Cold War and the rise of Islamist extremism. The development of Kenya's main counterterrorism acts, the Suppression of Terrorism Bill of 2003 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act of

are the two rather different approaches to the demands of contemporary counterterrorism measures in Kenyan.

In October 1952, the British government, then administering Kenya as a colony, declared a state of emergency in the Colony of Kenya to contain the increasing—and increasingly violent—activities of Mau Mau fighters. Britain deemed as “terrorists” the Mau Mau fighters who had killed Chief Waruhiu on 7 October 1952, as well as 2,000 African civilians and 32 white settlers. In a debate at the House of Lords, the Lord Earl of Munster stated: “Mau Mau terrorism is carefully planned, centrally directed and its object is to destroy all authority other than Mau Mau.102” In rationalizing the imposition of the state of emergency, the Earl of Munster continued: Action against these leaders was imperative. The ordinary process of the law is necessarily slow. In present conditions in Kenya, it would have allowed time and opportunity for those behind the outrages to organize widespread disturbances in what number of innocent people might have been killed. The declaration of the emergency has enabled the Kenya Government to detain the ringleader and their lieutenants about 130 together. Thus, the Kenyan Legislative Council was permitted to pass the Emergency Regulations of 1952. The regulations made possession of ammunition and firearms a capital offence. Moreover, the regulations also shifted the burden of proof of lawful authority or justification for possessing firearms or ammunitions to the accused person, contrary to settled criminal practice, where the burden of proof rests with the prosecution. The regulation declared Mau Mau a terrorist organization and criminalized membership thereof.

These regulations created a specialized court, the Court of Emergency Assize, to hear and expedite cases against Mau Mau suspects. The court conducted 1211 trials between 1953 and 1958, in which 2609 suspects were tried on capital offences linked to the Mau Mau group. Among these cases 1574 were sentenced to hang. For example, in Regina vs Dedan Kimathi Wachiuru, a defendant charged under the Emergency Regulations for being a member of the Mau Mau and possessing a firearm and ammunition (but no direct acts of terrorism or “conventional” criminal acts) was tried in the court of emergency assize, presided over by Chief Justice K.K. O’Connor. He was convicted and sentenced to death. In light of these cases and considering that the Mau Mau revolution was an anti-colonial revolt against the British who had stripped the natives of their land, the measures put in place were heavy-handed and violent, to say the least. The legislation completely abrogated the basic civil-liberty protections that form the heart of any criminal code in a democratic state. Indeed, the British considered national security to be more important than colonial civil liberties and thus unleashed both the military and the special courts, outside the normal channels of justice and civic responsibility, to deal with the so-called domestic terrorists.

These measures set the tone for future government actions even after independence. Since the Mau Mau revolution, Kenya has changed, as has the nature of terrorism. For one thing, Kenya has been a target of both domestic and international terrorism. Today, it must balance its counterterrorism measures with its obligations to protect the fundamental civil liberties of its citizens. That is, terrorism legislation is

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meant to address the crime of terror and mitigate the risks posed. However, these are but the initial pieces of the puzzle; the evidence arising from terrorism is usually in the form of plotting the mission and thus difficult to detect and prevent. Legislation should therefore encompass measures that are both prophylactic and preemptive in nature because ordinary criminal justice system is not. These measures should be able to define the crime of terrorism, proscribe terror organizations, tackle terrorist finances and property, and stipulate law-enforcement powers. What’s more, Kenya is bound by its obligations to and within the international community. UN Security Council Resolution 1373 of 2001 also requires states to criminalize offences related to the planning and preparation of terrorist acts and including the perpetrators themselves. The instruments oblige states to domestically criminalize the offenses, deal with perpetrators of terror under the approved law, and collaborate with other states in prosecuting or extradition. The Republic of Kenya has so far acceded to all thirteen UN conventions under Resolution 1373 and, thus, must conform to its domestic law accordingly.105

The key objects of the legislation are to; provide an appropriate legal framework for the prevention, investigation and punishment of terrorism and terrorist financing and hence promote law and order and national security, domesticate in part the various counter-terrorism conventions to which Kenya is a signatory, the UNSC Resolutions and FATF recommendations and thereby enhance Kenya’s satisfaction of its international obligations.

105UN Conventions under Resolution 1373; 1. The convention on offences and certain other acts committed on board Aircraft (1963);
3.6 The Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012

The 1998 U.S. embassy bombing was followed by the 2003 Kikambala bombing in Mombasa; these two incidences marked the dawn of international terrorism in Kenya. In a bid to criminalize this acts of terror, the then– minister of justice and constitutional affairs tabled the Suppression of Terrorism Bill of 2003(Supplement No. 38 of the Kenya Gazette) in Parliament.106 The bill immediately stirred up controversy, as had the acts that prompted it. The government’s reaction was heavy handed, in part because that was the mood of the day and in part because the 1952 act established the precedent that an iron fist meant the authorities were dealing with the situation. Ultimately, its flaws undid the bill though not so fatally as to preclude a successor law nearly a decade later.

Law-enforcement powers in the Act are executed by officers from the National Police Service who, however, have been accused to be highly being corrupt thus undermining the fight against terrorism, The definition of Terrorism in the Act is also perceived to be critical because only an offense that meets this definition falls under the strictures of the law. In a sense, the definition establishes the threshold of terrorism from a legal perspective. For various reasons, however, even this vital first step is controversial, both within Kenya and internationally. To be sure, in 2010, UN Special Rapporteur, Martin Scheinin gave a model definition that it constituted the intentional taking of hostages; or is intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to one or more members of the general population or segments of it; and that it involves lethal or serious physical violence against one or more members of the general population or segments of it; and meant to provoke a state of terror so as to compel a government or international

organization to do or abstain from doing something. He opines that any definition that goes beyond the model prescribed “would be problematic from a human-rights perspective. Therefore, the definition of terrorism must at least be generally in line with specified international standards and norms.

In the 2003 Suppression of Terrorism Bill, terrorism is defined as: the use or threat of action where the action used or threatened involves serious violence against a person; and involves serious damage to property; endangers the life of any person other than the person committing the action; creates a serious risk to the health or safety or the public or a section of the public; or is designed to seriously interfere with law and order. The use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public; and the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political religious or ideological cause and provides that the it involves the use of firearms, explosives, chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons; or weapons of mass destruction in any form shall be deemed to constitute terrorism whether or not. This definition was critiqued for being vague, overbroad, and unclear, particularly in the articulation of the elements of the crime of terrorism. The East African Law Society described the definition as “so ridiculously wide as to mean anything and thus nothing.” The organization argued that incidents such as bar brawls, domestic quarrels and even college strikes could easily be misconstrued as terrorist acts if the definition were adopted in its form. Another definition that is considered to have a loophole was the reference to religious or ideological causes, which were argued as being redundant by

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Clive Walker and might cause problems by blurring into personal disputes, such as family or clan disputes over domestic matters.\textsuperscript{109}

\textbf{3.7 Institutional Framework}

In efforts to counter-terrorism, the government of Kenya through administrative and executive processes created the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) in 2003 but became operational in 2004 as a multi-agency organization to coordinate counter-terrorism efforts. The Center is responsible for public awareness campaigns, security survey so as to advice on how to reduce vulnerabilities and de-radicalization of the youth who have been radicalized, which effort it enjoins other civic organizations including religious and Community based organizations. The roles of the Center as captured in the instrument establishing it are to detect, disrupt, deter and prevent terrorist from executing their machinations.\textsuperscript{110} Similarly, there are also the Anti-Terrorist, Criminal Intelligence, Border Control, Directorate of Criminal Investigations and Rapid Deployment Units of the National Police Service that deal with detection, disruption, arrest and prosecution of the suspects. All these organs benefit from intelligence provided by the National Intelligence Service to be able to make informed decisions and execute their mandates. The challenges faced by these organizations are largely that of coordination, lack of cooperation from the Muslim community that remains highly suspicious and perceive the counter-terrorism measures as driven by the United States of America, which they observe as persecuting Muslims.

\textbf{3.8 Kenya’s Invasion of Somalia and its Impact}

Although Al-Shabaab has been weakened, as a result of the invasion, which was

\textsuperscript{109} Walker, Blackstone’s Guide to The Anti-Terrorism Legislation\textsuperscript{10}.

\textsuperscript{110} The Cabinet on the dvise of the National Security Advisory Council
largely aimed at containing terrorists within Somalia, it remains a formidable adversary that understands local dynamics better than its foreign foes and can maximise its asymmetric advantage.\textsuperscript{111} One tactical change has already become clear. Rather than fight in the open, it has resorted to guerrilla tactics, after allowing Kenyan mechanised infantry to move deeper into its heartland. Its fighters blend into the civilian population and distribute weapons\textsuperscript{112}. This is a result of lessons learned during the December 2006 Ethiopian intervention, when the Union of Islamic Courts deployed many of its combatants, including Al-Shabaab, conventionally in the vast arid plains of south-western Somalia, and they were decimated by ground and air fire.\textsuperscript{113}

The KDF has also not succeeded in the critical task of winning hearts and minds in Somalia, which is critical in warfare. The window for possibly being viewed as liberators is closing and the militants are waging a campaign to depict the troops as invader or an occupying force.\textsuperscript{114} Even if Kenya captures all, or large chunks, of southern Somalia, it will have to provide a credible alternative political leadership in a region where Al-Shabaab has been relatively successful. The allied Somali militias are unlikely to achieve the necessary unity and will be hard pressed to provide security. Something similar happened in 2006, when Ethiopian troops were sucked into an unpopular “occupation” that turned local Somalis against them and the TFG of President Abdullahi Yusuf that they were propping up.\textsuperscript{115}

The situation however, may have been tamed by the Kenya military based on the reduced cases of piracy in the Indian ocean but, statistics in the country indicate a

\textsuperscript{112} “Somalia”, The New York Times, Topics (online), 25 January 2012
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid
different thing as Kenya has since had to deal with a number of terror attacks in the main towns which the militia group has claimed responsibility despite lack of evidence. The attacks range from grenade attacks, minor bomb blasts in buildings and cars and also gunmen shooting innocent civilians in churches and other social gatherings with the Mpeketoni incident the most recent of all where over 50 people were gunned down while watching a world cup match which was similar to the attack in a Nairobi mall Westgate mid last year. Despite the government’s call of reassurance that the country will be safe from such attacks the situation continues to escalate throwing the question to the public that is the government doing enough.

On 21 September 2013, Kenya recorded a more devastating terrorist incident since the 1998 Al-Qaeda bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi. At least 70 people were confirmed dead, 175 others reported injured, and several held hostage, when a group of Islamists fighters stormed Kenya’s high-end Westgate mall in Nairobi and randomly opened fire on weekend shoppers. The Islamist fighters reportedly shouted in the local Swahili that Muslims would be allowed to leave while all others were subjected to their bloodletting. At least 18 foreigners were killed in the horrific attack, including citizens from Britain, France, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Australia, Peru, India, Ghana, South Africa, and China. The Somali-based Islamist group Harakat Al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (aka Al-Shabab, aka the youth, aka mujahidin Al-Shabaab Movement, aka Mujahideen Youth Movement, aka HizbulShabaab, aka Hisb’ulShabaab, aka Youth Wing) claimed responsibility for the attack through its now closed Twitter account.

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117 Mamdani, M “Senseless Violence at Westgate Mall, Aljezeera.com, accessed on 26th September, 2013
In one tweet, Al-Shabaab announced: ‘The Mujahideen entered Westgate Mall today at around noon and are still inside the mall, fighting the Kenyan Kuffar inside their own turf.’ In another tweet they stated their refusal to negotiate and later on said, ‘For long we have waged war against the Kenyans in our land, now it’s time to shift the battleground and take the war to their land’ (Edmund and Richard, 2013). The Al-Shabaab stated that the Westgate mall was chosen as the central target because it is frequented by Kenyan elites, diplomats, and tourists.

Kenya’s operations in Somalia resulted in Al-Shabaab’s loss of the strategic seaport of Kismayu, from which it had derived substantial revenues through the international charcoal trade. In July 2012, the KDF in southern Somalia, numbering about 4,000, were incorporated into the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) force of over 17,000 soldiers with a UN mandate to protect the weak Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Kenya is among the five troops contributing countries (TCCs) to the AMISOM that since 2011 has forced Al-Shabaab to retreat from Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, as well as other strongholds.

Through the invasion of Somalia, the Kenyan government had also wanted to achieve another strategy for Somalia codenamed the “Jubaland Initiative” whose aim was “to be the creation of a Jubaland, encapsulating Gedo, Lower Juba and Middle Juba in Southern Somalia, bordering northern Kenya with a population of 1.3 million. The

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establishment of Jubaland, according to Kenya’s diplomatic bureaucrats, would have two phases. First, it was meant to act as a “buffer zone” to safeguard Kenya from negative effects spawned by the lawlessness in Somalia, which included religious extremism, the flow of small arms and contraband, terrorism, piracy, uncontrolled refugees and to safeguard Kenya’s economic interests. The second phase would seek to establish the roots for a solid Somalia. The “Jubaland Initiative” is supposed to be modeled on the Puntland and Somaliland experience. Puntland and Somaliland are two provinces in northern Somalia that broke away and declared their own autonomous governments.” A politically stable Somalia is important for Kenya’s trade expansion in the Horn of Africa.122

3.9 Other Weaknesses

Kenyan criminal law does not specifically provide for terrorism, but for crimes encompassed by terrorism. Therefore, only some aspects of terrorism are covered in the criminal law, which is not sufficient to curb terrorism or give it the emphasis and due attention the associated crimes require. This erodes the seriousness of antiterrorism law. Some aspects of terrorism, such as funding, are not provided for in criminal law, leaving gaping holes for criminals to exploit.123

Kenya’s criminal laws do not provide for anticipatory crimes. This means that, to a large extent, the effective collection of intelligence would not enhance the criminal justice system, because the information collected could not be used to prosecute

122Ibid
122Ibid
123Mbote and Migai, Justice Sector and The Rule of Law, p.140.
persons intending to commit terrorism. If the criminal laws provided for prosecution of anticipated crimes, the justice system would be a milestone ahead in the fight against terrorism.

There is also a reward system for volunteers who give information that would prompt quick responses that can lead to the prevention of terrorist acts or prosecution of suspects. Cooperation is easily given when people are motivated, and a reward system would do that. Unfortunately, there is no express provision in Kenyan law to reward people who volunteer reliable information on terrorism. Even terrorist suspects can be prompted for information on other individuals involved in terrorism. Once these suspects volunteer such information, a lesser sentence can be preferred against them, or total amnesty. Given the different ways of commission, terrorism may be effectively preempted, prevented, and prosecuted under proper information given before a terrorist crime or after its commission.

Kenyan criminal law does not provide for anticipative criminal investigation. For any investigation to commence, a crime must have been committed or there must be sufficient ground to believe a crime is about to be committed. At times, there is the question of a complaint having been filed with the police. Evidence obtained in the latter case can fall under conspiracy to commit a felony, based on the credibility of the evidence obtained or of a suspect’s being in possession of such items as would be found illegal. This leaves preparation for the crime of terrorism aloof, which can be exploited by terrorists, since the law does not provide for prosecution of terrorism or any other crime in anticipation. The crime has to have been committed first. Otherwise a lesser charge would be preferred if the crime was not committed. Additionally, Kenya’s

\[124\) Ibid
criminal justice system can best be described as ineffective in the sense that it largely responds to a crime after the fact. This “lag” is particularly problematic in the case of terrorist acts, which may have devastating effects if they are allowed to reach fruition.

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) handbook: A forward-looking, preventive criminal justice strategy against terrorist violence requires a comprehensive system of substantive offenses, investigative powers and techniques, evidentiary rules and international co-operation. The goal is to proactively integrate substantive and procedural mechanisms to reduce the incidence and severity of terrorist violence and to do so within the strict constraints and protections of the criminal justice system and the rule of law. This balance may not be so easy to strike or sustain in Kenya, because various government agencies are not configured to deal with the threat of terrorism. They lack the capacity to deliver and perform dismally in one way or another when confronted with the task. Law enforcement agencies face a daunting task when confronted with terrorism, because their response must be within the international human rights framework and the rule of law. In Kenya, these agencies have some peculiar issues that render them less than optimally effective for countering terrorism.

Finally, intelligence gathering is essential in the fight against terrorism and can be conducted through covert or overt sources. Due to the nature of terrorism, intelligence and law enforcement agencies need to cooperate with their counterparts in other states. Covert intelligence collection has been critiqued, especially when not supported by law. Covert actions generally infringe on Article 17 of the ICCPR. The law must therefore

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prescribe conditions and regulations regarding covert collection, all of which must be stipulated in detail and implemented without bias. Covert collection methods that are currently used against terrorist suspects are wiretapping, Internet monitoring, and installation of tracking devices. Apart from laws governing unlawful interference, the information gathered must also be protected against arbitrary disclosure.

3.10 Conclusion

The fight against this crime cannot be won singly and many countries including the United States have placed substantial resources in the programme largely in pursuit of her interests. Stability in Kenya would have multiplier effect in the countries in the region. To indicate the international concern over the situation in Kenya, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in his statement said the UN is determined to work with the Kenyan government in combating terrorism. He said the UN will support Kenya’s efforts to fight the vice by boosting the capacity of the country’s security agencies.\textsuperscript{126}

It is extremely urgent for the ratio of police to the population to be bridged by hiring more police officers, while also improving the terms and conditions of service for the law enforcers besides enhancing coordination of counter-terrorism efforts so as to make a significant difference in Kenya’s security. In addition to this, until the relationship between the police and Kenyan public improves, it is unlikely for crime levels to make any major statistical decline. Furthermore, the court system in Kenya and the legal provisions needs a reorganization and overhaul for effective delivery of justice to discourage the ballooning number of youths joining the terror groups.

\textsuperscript{126} Kazungu C., UN to help Kenya Fight Terrorism, says Ban Ki-Moon. Daily Nation Saturday, June 28, 2014
The major problem with *Operation Linda Nchi* is that there are differences on its strategy, its goals are not sufficiently articulated, and the official line and rhetoric are incoherent. In its early days, statements suggested it was a limited operation designed to stop terrorists from venturing into Kenya where they abducted tourists threatening the crucial tourism industry. Since then, there have been suggestions within authority that the core goal is to eliminate Al-Shabaab, a much greater threat, presumably prompting a more severe response, while others have said it is to accelerate creation of an autonomous regional state, first called Jubaland, and now officially being referred to as Azania, as a buffer zone between Kenya and the remnants of Al-Shabaab.

In order to tackle the issue of radicalization, Kenya, therefore, in this situation perhaps, the most important consideration for international counter-terrorism policy would be to overcome the differences and encourage interagency communication, enhance legal provisions, address the socio-economic factors that encourage the youth to join militant groups and embrace inclusivity in the political environment.\(^\text{127}\) If government agencies agree to share their findings with less bureaucracy involved, it would be beneficial to combating terrorism. This will facilitate intelligence and other counter-terrorism mechanisms essential in this fight to work.

CHAPTER FOUR

COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORTS

4.1 Addressing radicalism in counter-terrorism efforts

Terrorism as is argued is the extreme posture of radicalism, it has multiple foundations and to understand these underlying forces, security studies need to adopt more interdisciplinary perspectives to the causes, operations as well as counter-terrorism mechanisms. An ideal breeding ground for recruitment emerges when various social, cultural, economic, political, and psychological factors come together. But even when such negative dynamics converge, different terrorist networks still have different political objectives. Despite such complications and multiplicity of reasons, all terrorist groups share one common objective; the willingness to kill or harm civilians for their cause. This is why terrorism is ultimately a major security concern. Therefore, there is no reason to repudiating that counter-terrorism is primarily about securing the state and protecting civilians from the threat and effects of a terrorist attack in case the plan is not interdicted. This requires greatest vigilance in safety measures, intelligence gathering, law enforcement, interagency coordination, and, when necessary, the use of force. Terrorist networks as it were would not be deterred by anything less than comprehensive security measures.

The debate about the root causes of terrorism, however, is not about counter-terrorism. Advocates of the root cause approach are interested in fighting the conditions that create terrorism, not the terrorists themselves. This is why the case for social and economic development in the Islamic world should not be made in the context of counter-


terrorism. The development agenda is not about terrorists themselves, but rather those most susceptible to the goals and messages of terrorism.\(^{130}\) It is precisely within this broader context that an approach that goes beyond the narrow confines of terrorism and counter-terrorism is important. Fighting radicalism rather than terrorism provides a better paradigm and framework for a number of reasons. First, radicalism more accurately reflects the political and ideological dimension of the threat. No matter how diverse the causes, motivations, and ideologies behind terrorism, all attempts at premeditated violence against civilians share the traits of violent radicalism.

Secondly, while terrorism is a deadly security challenge, radicalism is primarily a political threat against which non-coercive measures should be given a chance. There is nothing preordained in the possible transition from radicalism to terrorism. All terrorists, by definition, are radicals. Yet all radicals do not end up as terrorists. In fact, only a few radicals venture into terrorism.\(^{131}\) At the same time, it is clear that most terrorists start their individual journey towards extremist violence first by becoming radicalized. Since radicalism is often a precursor to terrorism, focusing on radicalism amounts to preventing terrorism at an earlier stage, before it is too late for non-coercive measures.

Finally, radicalism, unlike terrorism, has social dimensions. There are radicalized societies where acts of terrorism find some sympathy and degree of support. It is impossible to talk about terrorism as a social phenomenon, however. There are no societies that are predisposed to terrorist activities as being proposed albeit mistakenly.\(^{132}\) The relative popularity of certain terrorist networks in the Islamic world can only be explained within the framework of such radicalized societies where extremist violence


\(^{131}\) Ibid

finds an environment of legitimacy and implicit support. Such radicalized societies are permeated by a deep sense of collective frustration, humiliation, and deprivation relative to expectations. This radicalized social locale is easily manipulated and exploited by terrorists.\textsuperscript{133} This is why focusing on the collective grievances behind radicalism is probably the most effective way of addressing the root causes of terrorism. This effort at prevention can be conceived of as a first line of defense against terrorism. The goal is to reduce the social, economic, and political appeal of terrorism by isolating terrorists and winning over potential recruits. Once the challenge is defined as such, the next and more difficult step is to identify an effective strategy to fight radicalism. The socio-economic and political context where radicalism takes root, particularly among Muslims, presents an urgent situation for counter-terrorism campaigners. This enabling environment can be altered most effectively by focusing on relative deprivation and human development.\textsuperscript{134}

Breeding grounds for radicalism and terrorist recruitment emerge not necessarily under conditions of abject poverty and deprivation, but rather when negative social, economic, and political trends converge. In fact, when analyzed in a broader framework of socio-economic and political deprivation, the societal support for terrorism and radicalism gains greater relevance.\textsuperscript{135} Dismissing the social and economic causes of radicalism on the grounds that some terrorists have middle-class backgrounds as happens at times is rather one-dimensional and deceptive. Nonetheless, closer scrutiny tends to confirm that weak, failing, and failed states; ungoverned spaces; and civil wars that create safe havens for terrorism are all in underdeveloped parts of the world, not in the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{133} Ibid
\item \textsuperscript{135} Ibid:
\end{itemize}
industrialized countries. Terrorism is not necessarily caused by socio-economic problems, but there is certainly a correlation between deprivation and radicalism.\textsuperscript{136} The more challenging question, particularly in the Arab world, is relative deprivation and the absence of opportunities relative to expectations. The scale of youth frustration is compounded by a demographic explosion, growing expectations, weak state capacity, and diminishing opportunities for upward mobility in most parts of the Muslim world. Globalization further exacerbates this situation because restive Muslim masses of both genders are caught in the growing tension between religious tradition and western modernity that is emerging as a global culture.

4.2 Kenya’s Vulnerability due to its Domestic Issues

Kenya is the epicenter for East African economic, political, and humanitarian dialogue. It is a major player regionally and internationally because, until recently, it has been one of the most prosperous and politically stable countries in East Africa. To understand the present decision by the government to opt for national security over humanitarianism, it is important to appreciate that Kenya’s major domestic issues, which cause it to bleed through terrorists’ activities and attacks hence more wary as a result of heightened vulnerability to external attack. These issues range from weak legal regime, exclusion, political intolerance, marginalization, poverty, restiveness and youth bulge coupled with joblessness. These factors provide ready and already hopeless pool from which terror networks recruit followers. The threat from Al-Shabaab to Kenya’s political and territorial integrity is therefore not a threat that Kenya can choose to ignore.

The presence of huge Somali refugee population has also enabled the Al-Shabab to use the refugee camps as sanctuaries and offer a ready reserve of would be terrorists.

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid: 58
All these have contributed and showed the potential threat to Kenya’s security as a nation-state. The ungoverned space in Somalia has on its part enabled the recruitment and training of the terrorists who find their way unhindered into Kenya due to the porosity of the border.

Kenya therefore may have been forced to wage an overt invasion in to Somalia to tackle the Al-Shabaab threat, after having weighed the consequences including being reprimanded by the international community and the huge cost involved as another risk. The latter may have led Kenya to renegotiate its stance and accepting inclusion in the AMISOM arrangement. For the Kenyan government, it may appear to be a win-win situation as it considers pressurizing for the sendingback refugees to Somalia and giving them the means to take matters into their own hands, and at the same time counter the threats from Al-Shabaab.

4.3 Insufficient Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism Policies

The role of counter-terrorism increased significantly in Kenya since 9/11. The mission of fighting terrorists was not a new concept given that even prior to September 11, 2001, there were counter-terrorism units that existed in both the law enforcement and intelligence arenas. The main problems, however, were based on lack of funding and support from Western counterparts. Kenya was added to the U.S. Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program immediately after the 9/11 incident to partner in the war against terror. The addition to ATA however did not translate to immediate significant funding which only started to be disbursed several years later. This was, nevertheless, a

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137 GOK classified Source
138 Ibid
140 Samuel L. A. United States aid to Kenya: A study on regional security and counter-terrorism assistance
statement made by both America and Kenya to reiterate their joint fight against terrorism.

Since 2002, The ATA Program has “trained several Kenyan Security officials in the United States and many more in U.S. designated training facilities throughout East Africa.\(^{141}\) The Kenyan Government has also created an Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU) and a Joint Terrorism Task Force,\(^{142}\) the National Counter-Terrorism Centre, and the National Security Advisory Committee as a coordinating agency. The direct funding for counter-terrorism, which nominally existed prior to 9/11, increased roughly 15 times its previous value in the immediate year following the attack.\(^{143}\) The problem still remains with elaborate terror networks and infrastructure. Bringing the terror suspects to justice has been the biggest challenge to the establishment.\(^{144}\) The inadequate terrorism laws in Kenya have caused grave problems and even with improved legislation over the last few years, success has been minimal. For example, the definition of terrorism is vague and thus, able to be contested by many opponents.

The Kenyan government defines terrorism as “anti-state violent activities undertaken by non-state entities which are motivated by religious goals”.\(^{145}\) This definition neglects terrorism based on political, ideological, and criminal rationales and thus, places an unfair target on the minority religion in Kenya -Islam. Secondly, actual legislation has been very difficult to pass and put into practice, therefore the government has been operating without a comprehensive and encompassing anti-terrorism laws and standards. The 2003 Suppression of Terrorism Bill did not make it into law after a public


\(^{142}\) Ibid

\(^{143}\) Ibid


outcry over unconstitutionality, international human rights violations, and perceived discrimination against Muslims. Two years later, the Anti-Terrorism Bill of 2006 was again brought before Parliament. This bill contained many of the same issues as its predecessor and was, therefore, not passed into law. Certain crimes committed by terrorists (such as murder) can be prosecuted in Kenyan courts; however, there has yet to exist a comprehensive anti-terrorism law insofar as one exists in other Western democracies.

The lack of this comprehensive legislation puts Kenyan law enforcement officials in positions where they perform below expectations and with claims of human rights violations against the Muslim community.\footnote{Ploch, L., Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The US Response. \textit{Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress}, 2010.} Handing over terror suspects to neighboring countries did raise a lot of questions. In one instance after the 2010 bombings in Kampala, Uganda, the Government of Kenya transferred thirteen Kenyan citizens suspected of taking part in the attacks to Uganda. There are also several Kenyan nationals currently detained at Camp Delta, Guantanamo Bay. One such subject, Mohamed Abdulmalik, was informally suspected of participating in the 2002 Mombasa attacks\footnote{Ali A., Radicalization Process in the Horn of Africa- Phases and Relevant Factors, \textit{Berlin, ISPSW}, 2009, p.35.}.

In the aftermath of the Westgate attack in Nairobi, it is clear to security and policy experts that Kenya is still heavily vulnerable and relies on Western security resources in the fight against terrorism. This is not surprising for a developing democracy still dealing with critical levels of poverty and other social problems. Still, the counter-terrorism units that were expanded and funded for the sole purpose of responding to acts of terrorism are
apparently overwhelmed by inability to work together.  

To the extent that post-9/11 counterterrorism laws around the world allow for varying degrees of detention with little oversight, one can all but expect Kenyan authorities to use its power indiscriminately, albeit legally, to search for perpetrators, often at the expense of innocent civilians.

4.4 Human Development as a Way to Counter Radicalization

Several debates that have dismissed the social and economic causes of radicalism on the grounds that some terrorists have middle-class backgrounds is simplistic and misleading. However, the fact is that it is indeed some, not most nor all of the terrorists that are of the middle class economic level. Indeed as discussed earlier, terrorists do have socio-economic deprivation of some kind that makes them more vulnerable to recruitment.\textsuperscript{149} The economic and social context within which radicalism takes root is profoundly important.

Societal support, presents the environment where most terrorist and radical movements gets grounded. This is why prosperous and democratic countries have apparently fairly easy time dealing with terrorism compared to impoverished and politically unstable countries, where terrorism tends to become a systemic problem. The same argument can be made about civil war. What is known about the causes of civil wars can be very instructive for our analysis of human development and radicalism.\textsuperscript{150} In an excellent World Bank study on the root causes of civil wars, it is argued that “Countries with low, stagnant, and unequally distributed per capita income that have

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid.
remained dependent on primary commodities for their exports face dangerously high risks of prolonged conflict. In the absence of economic development neither good political institutions, nor ethnic and religious homogeneity, nor high military spending provide significant defenses against large-scale violence.”¹⁵¹ These factors should help us realize that unfavorable socioeconomic dynamics can degenerate into political violence and perpetuate a vicious cycle of radicalism, terrorism, and civil war.

At the very least, such problems create an environment where radicalism and political violence find social acceptance. While radicalism and terrorism result from many interrelated causes, it has recently become popular to argue that the root causes of radicalism are unrelated to economic deprivation and a lack of education.¹⁵² The argument that poverty and a lack of education are unrelated to political violence and radicalism is based on a fallacy that can be summarized in the following way; Terrorists do not tend to come from the poorest elements of the population; instead, they are often relatively well educated and above average in terms of income. Thus, individual poverty is not by itself the primary factor that disposes people to terrorism, and therefore, reducing poverty or improving education will not seriously reduce terrorism.¹⁵³ The most common objection comes in the form of the familiar argument about the September 11 terrorist attacks; out of the 19 hijackers, 15 of them came from Saudi Arabia, perceived as one of the wealthiest countries of the Middle East. If poverty and a lack of education were to produce terrorism, it is often argued, most terrorists would come from the poorest countries in the Arab world or from sub-Saharan Africa.

¹⁵² Krueger, A., Ian and Maleckova J., “Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection,
The argument that socioeconomic deprivation is unrelated to radicalism and terrorism is erroneous for a number of reasons. First, the argument is based on a very narrow and exclusive focus on ‘elite’ terrorist leaders. As terrorism expert Judy Barsalou points out; effective terrorist groups rely on a division of labor between young and uneducated ‘foot soldiers’ and ideologically trained and well-funded elite operatives. In Pakistan, the former are often plucked from madarassas.”\textsuperscript{154} It is therefore important to acknowledge that while terrorist leaders tend to come from professional classes, the foot soldiers are often poor and uneducated. One should also not be confused by the fact that at the highest level, the implementation of terrorist activity requires proficient organizational skills and sophistication. The poorest and least educated masses can be recruited and radicalized by terrorist masterminds yet, they would make ineffective terrorists in a complex operation. Indeed, the more complex an operation is, the greater security risks it entails, and the more likely the participants are to be elite, the result of a careful screening process. All these factors only reinforce the importance of addressing the question of relative deprivation, frustrated achievers, and radicalism as a social milieu.\textsuperscript{155}

The second point with regard to the link between socio-economic deprivation and radicalism is the fact that terrorist organizations usually seek failing or failed states, which are often poor from where to set up shop. This is why failed states in Asia and Africa - such as Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, and Sierra Leone easily turn into terrorist havens and are often engulfed in a vicious cycle of civil war, political violence, and

\textsuperscript{154} Judy B., “Islamic Extremists: How Do they Mobilize Support?” \textit{USIP special report} (July 2002, pp. 20-25

radicalism. As Susan Rice points out, “these states provide convenient operational bases and safe havens for international terrorists. Terrorist organizations take advantage of failing states’ porous borders, of their weak and non-existent law enforcement and security services, and of their ineffective judicial institutions to move men, weapons, and money around the globe.”

4.5 Conclusion

Rosenau argues that terrorist recruitment requires at least three elements, first, a lack of state capacity, particularly in the areas of police, intelligence, and law enforcement; second, a ‘mobilizing belief,’ such as Salafist/jihadist extremism; and third appropriate agitators who can propagate these ideas and create an effective terrorist force. This study has illustrated the first and third points but there is little evidence to show that a mobilizing belief for violent jihad exists within Kenya. Instead, majority of the major terrorist incidents in the country have been perpetrated by foreign nationals who use Kenya for a number of reasons, including geographic location and a lack of state capacity. Home grown terror networks is just starting to emerge with increasing number of youth seeking training with Al-Shabaab.

Kenya must continue to utilize the law enforcement and intelligence entities that are already in place, supported by well-planned coordination. These specialized units and departments, while not operating to their full potential, are at least partially mitigating terrorist threats. They act as both a deterrent and reactive force to terrorists, deterring the planning of attacks on Kenyan soil and reacting to intelligence gathered in the course of

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inquiries. In addition to the present capacity of these entities, there must be systematic improvements made at the individual and departmental levels.\textsuperscript{158}

Secondly, Kenyan officials need to take a closer look at the actual perpetrators of terrorist acts. While there is an overwhelming belief on both a governmental and societal level that Kenyan Muslims are mobilizing attacks in large numbers against their own country, history simply does not support the assertion. It is critical to make it a priority to include Muslims in politics, the economy, and everyday life. This includes, as has been an important strategy of the Global War on Terror, “winning the hearts and minds of target populations.”\textsuperscript{159}

The third and final recommendation is to secure the border. Kenya began “Operation Linda Nchi” (its first-ever regional military mission) with the goal of securing its northern border with Somalia, which was a reaction to long held belief that many of its problems of insecurity are related to the porous border with Somalia. If this mission is successful, the government will be able to improve on the deployment of immigration resources to the border and significantly reduce the number of people transiting unnoticed between Kenya and Somalia.\textsuperscript{160} This reduction will create not only actual internal security but also an image of Kenya as a politically stable country with strong state capacity. These recommendations have the effect to greatly lower the risk of future acts of terrorism in Kenya and put the country on a path toward political stability and economic prosperity, much desired by the people of Kenya and the whole of the international community.

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid
\textsuperscript{159} Prestholdt, J. Kenya, the United States, and counter-terrorism. \textit{Africa Today}, vol.57, 2011, pp. 3-27.
CHAPTER FIVE

5.1 Summary

Chapter one introduced the study, and attempted to bring out its causes and the theoretical framework used to conduct the study. Chapter two looked at the data of previous studies on the subject and attempted to bring out the history of radicalization in Africa, narrowing to the history of terrorism in Kenya and the subject of study, which is youth radicalization. It also looked at the multitude variables capable of provoking the youth to join terrorist groups such as deprivation, poverty, education, marginalization, political exclusion and globalization. Terrorism, as the study established occurs in rich as well as in poor countries; in the modern industrialized world and in less developed areas.

Chapter three looked at the efforts, impacts and challenges Kenya is facing in counter-terrorism endeavours while Chapter four analyzes the causes of terrorism. It emerged that when one is analyzing the causes of terrorism, one is confronted with different levels of explanations, the individual and group levels, of a psychological or more often socio-psychological character. Explanations at the societal or national level primarily attempts to identify non-spurious correlations between certain historical, cultural, economic and socio-political characteristics of the larger society and the occurrence of terrorism. For example, the impact of modernization, democratization, poverty and economic inequality may lead to frustration and hence vulnerability of the youth to recruitment into terror groups.161

It emerged that radicalization is an important component as terrorist groups cannot succeed in their operations as a vacuum and therefore need to recruit more

members regularly to carry out their agenda of terror. It is therefore of great importance for states that are affected by terrorism, such as Kenya, to focus on counter-radicalization measures. Counter-terrorism efforts therefore need to place the breeding grounds for sympathizers at the center of their efforts. Fighting radicalism with human development specifically social and economic development should emerge as a new and leading public narrative and long-term objective for strategic counter-terrorism.\textsuperscript{162} This brings the importance of the issue of the social concept of human security which is embraced by the modern school of international security studies.

5.2 Key Findings

There are several reasons as to why those who join terror groups do so. These have been discussed in the paper and are summarized below:

A crisis of national identity was cited as a potential cause of radicalization in East Africa. When young people are not firmly rooted in a sense of nation, they are more likely to be persuaded by foreign extremists who invoke transnational and radical ideals. Similarly, homegrown radicalization is more likely to surface along ethnic, clan, or communal lines when a strong sense of nation is absent from the national consciousness.\textsuperscript{163} Governments should therefore foster healthy nationalism through civic education, cultural events, and other activities that strengthen national solidarity.

Political drivers of youth radicalization were also realized. People being radicalized are noted to have been motivated by a desire to combat injustice, impunity, and corruption. When youth observe any of these negative behaviors in public officials,


especially corruption among security sector personnel, they become disillusioned with public institutions and look for solutions to problems outside of political processes.\textsuperscript{164} The unequal or inconsistent application of the rule of law is a major driver of youth frustration. Impunity among politically connected elites causes young people to lose confidence in their legal institutions, especially when youth receive harsh punishments for seemingly small offenses, such as operating an unregistered business or living in makeshift homes without formal titles.

Politicians and religious leaders have been noted to be important in mobilizing youth. Politicians for instance, use this in order to broadcast their political platforms and gain the youth vote, frequently communicating with young people using ICT cell phone technology and online platforms. Politicians commonly stoke youth frustrations and promise sweeping reforms aimed at improving their lives.\textsuperscript{165}

Individual factors that lead to radicalization as people (youth) in other world regions, seek a sense of purpose and meaning in their lives. Young men frequently convey a longing for adventure, glory, and heroic or iconic status, and search for outlets that enable them to break from convention. The young people’s quest for meaning and construct worldviews that satisfy youth desires for self-actualization and fulfillment is greatly noted. In order to offset radical worldviews, the youth must be exposed to a plethora of counter-narratives and positive life visions. Some of the most important

\textsuperscript{166} Ashour, O; \textit{The De-radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements}, Routledge, (New York), 2009, p.78.
interlocutors for communicating counter-narratives are religious leaders, mentors, coaches, teachers, and other civil society leaders.

In addition to exploiting young people’s need for purpose and meaning, radical terror groups take advantage of socio-economic factors that render them vulnerable to radicalization. The struggle to access employment and idleness for the lack of employment, education, housing, health services, and other necessities make the youth vulnerable to recruitment. A number of African countries have experienced and inequalities, thus affected young adults are finding it difficult to gain employment and advance according to various development indicators.

There are several areas that require further research. A further topic of interest is on the brief military operations in foreign territory conducted to apprehend suspects or to battle a group suspected of terrorism. Military experts sometimes use the term ‘snatch operations’. This is relevant to this study as Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia brought about retaliatory terrorist acts in Kenya including the Westgate attack.

There is need to study and recommend ways in which international law (such as human rights)\textsuperscript{166} can merge with security studies for a more complimentary outcome. This also brings the questions related to the use of force in international relations, upholding of national security and protection of human rights. However, for the duration of the use of force, those military operations are governed by the rules and principles of international law of armed conflict applicable to international armed conflict.

5.3 Recommendations for Counter-Radicalization

Governments of Kenya and the society at large must recognize the threat posed by radicalization in its various forms. While currently a great deal of attention is focused on Islamic radicalization in the region, due to the global war on terrorism, there is also need to recognize other more local forms of radicalization that may either increasingly pose challenges on their own or form alliances with Islamic radicalism or camouflage within such radicalizations.. Through dialogue with communities, the government should undertake genuine reforms aimed at creating socio-economic and political institutions with which citizens can empower themselves so as to identify and reject endeavours towards radicalizations and the issues emanating from it. In this regard, there is the need to address seriously the plight of the youth, especially as it relates to unemployment, since they form easy targets for recruitment, posing a dangerous challenge because of the youth population bulge that exists in all the African countries, and for the case study of this paper, Kenya.

Through regional organizations like the Eastern African Standby Force, and summits for security and intelligence chiefs, there is need to seriously address regional security challenges including the Somali question. This is because security threats easily become regionalized, threatening neighboring states. The Somali challenge is increasingly having regional ramifications across the borders including in countries that have contributed troops to AMISOMlike Kenya and Uganda including acts of terrorism.

Both government and the wider society need to recognize the power of information technology and globalization. Since the region cannot wish away their influence, creative ways need to be explored in utilizing the same to respond to the current challenges of radicalization. Still on technology, and information, there is need to
harmonize regional legal and enforcement systems as well as improve information exchange and other joint strategies to combat cross-border security challenges like terrorism and terrorist networks.

Additionally, of importance is the need to reform the judicial and the law enforcement systems in the region to ensure the adoption of necessary counter-terrorism legislation and practices. This includes both international laws and domestic laws.

In conclusion, although generally violent extremists adhere to diverse ideologies, the strategies that they employ to enlist youth into their ranks are often similar. Radical organizations understand and prey upon a combination of political realities, socioeconomic factors, and individual characteristics that render youth vulnerable to recruitment. A primary goal of preventing youth radicalization into terrorism is to promote understanding of the drivers of youth radicalization, identify Africa’s resiliencies and coping mechanisms to these drivers, and to generate policy recommendations aimed at mitigating the drivers. This is possible, though requires time, resources and application of relative cross-section expertise.
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