FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO INTER-ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A CASE STUDY OF UPPER EASTERN KENYA

MERCY GATWIRI LIMIRI
R67416292011

A PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF BACHELOR OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES: INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

SEPTEMBER 2014
DECLARATION

I declare that this project is my original work and has not been submitted anywhere else for any academic purposes.

NAME: MERCY GATWIRI LIMIRI
SIGNED: ……………………………
DATE: ……………………………

This project has been submitted with my approval as the university supervisor

NAME: MR. MARTIN NGURU
SIGNED: ……………………………
DATE: ……………………………
DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my family, especially my Mother Lena Gacheri Ngaruthi, my Father Sebastian Limiri Anampiu for their love, patience, understanding and moral support.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

In bringing this study to an end, many individuals have contributed, and I express my gratitude to them all. Foremost, I owe an intellectual debt to my Supervisor Mr. Martin Nguru, for his meticulous professionalism in supervising me. I valued his insightful theoretical and methodological guidance, coupled with prompt follow-up comments, which I unvaryingly received throughout my study period. His consistency and constructive criticism have been invaluable to me in bringing this study to completion.

I am solemnly thankful to the entire Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies for both direct and indirect support for my entire four years of study. My heartfelt appreciation is also due to friends especially Mr. Ramata Ahmed and colleagues for their kind support and solidarity during my study. Finally, I thank my family for their love, patience, understanding and moral Support. My Mother, Lena Gacheri Ngaruthi and my Father Sebastian Limiri Anampiu, deserves a special vote of thanks for their contribution towards the realisation of my entire four years of study both emotionally and financially. Your support and love have motivated me to work even harder. And anyone else that I missed out who deserved a mention.

Thank You All.
ABSTRACT

This research traces the root causes of retrogressive conflicts in Upper Eastern Kenya. It works from an education, conflicts and development perspective, critically examining and interrogating historical injustices and the politics of marginalization of conflicts.

The research also explores inter-ethnic conflicts, climatic conditions, theories of poverty, struggle over pastoral lands, unemployed youth and conflicts, land boarders and ownership, and examining how they have undermined education and hampered development in Upper Eastern Kenya.

We find that there is a positive relationship between education, conflict, poverty and development to the pastoral economy requires serious revision. The study looks into the impact of conflict and how it has affected the livelihood of people on that region, political and economic outcomes.
TABLE OF CONTENT

DECLARATION ..................................................................................................................... ii
DEDICATION ..................................................................................................................... iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ..................................................................................................... iv
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................ v
TABLE OF CONTENT ..................................................................................................... vi
ACRONYMS ...................................................................................................................... ix
CHAPTER ONE ................................................................................................................ 1
1.0 INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY ......................................................................... 1
1.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1
1.2 Background to the research problem .......................................................................... 1
1.3 Statement of the Research Problem ............................................................................ 2
1.4 Objectives of the Research .......................................................................................... 3
  1.4.1 Main / Overall Objective ...................................................................................... 3
  1.4.2 Other Objectives .................................................................................................. 3
1.5 Justifications of the Study ........................................................................................... 3
  1.5.1 Academic Justifications .................................................................................... 3
  1.5.2 Policy Justifications .......................................................................................... 3
1.6 Literature Review ....................................................................................................... 4
  1.6.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 4
1.7 Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................... 11
1.8 Hypotheses .................................................................................................................. 12
1.9 Methodology of the Study ........................................................................................... 13
  1.9.1 Primary sources .................................................................................................. 13
1.10 Scope and Limitations ............................................................................................... 13
1.11 Chapter Outline ........................................................................................................ 14
CHAPTER TWO ................................................................................................................ 15
2.0 THEORIES OF EDUCATION, CONFLICT AND POVERTY ................................. 15
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 15
2.2. Historical Overview and the Trajectory of Conflict and Poverty in the Upper Eastern
    Region ....................................................................................................................... 16
  2.2.1. Measures that should be taken ........................................................................ 17
  2.2.1.1 Education and Educational Activities ............................................................. 17
2.2.1.2 Water & Sanitation ................................................................. 18
2.2.1.3 Livelihoods & Food Security .................................................. 18
2.2.1.4 Small Arms and Light Weapons ............................................. 18
2.2.1.5 Interventions and Dialogues .................................................. 18
2.3 The Root causes of conflicts in Isiolo County and its neighbouring communities .... 19
  2.3.1. Education and Conflict ......................................................... 20
  2.3.2 Inadequate Security Provision ................................................ 21
  2.3.3 Climate change and conflict .................................................. 21
  2.3.3.1 Vulnerability to climate change .............................................. 22
  2.3.3.2 Adaptation to climate change ............................................... 22
  2.3.4 Water and conflict ............................................................... 23
  2.3.5 Pastoral land and conflict ..................................................... 23
  2.3.6 Land Borders and Land Ownership and Conflict .......................... 26
  2.3.7 Unemployed youth and conflict ............................................. 27
2.4. Impact of Conflict ....................................................................... 30
2.5 Conclusion .................................................................................... 32
CHAPTER THREE .................................................................................. 33
3.0 IMPACT OF THE CONFLICTS ON COMMUNITIES IN UPPER EASTERN ...... 33
  3.1 Introduction .................................................................................. 33
  3.2 Protracted Nature of Armed Violence ........................................... 33
  3.3 Grievances and Resiliencies ......................................................... 34
  3.4 Mobilization and Resources ........................................................ 35
  3.5 Impacts of Conflict ........................................................................ 36
    3.5.1 Violence and Ethnic Cleansing ............................................... 36
    3.5.2 Spillover Effects ................................................................... 37
    3.5.3 Increasing use of Violence ...................................................... 37
    3.5.4 Crime as Trigger of Violence ................................................ 37
    3.5.5 Internal Displacement of Persons ........................................... 37
    3.5.6 Economic Outcomes .............................................................. 39
    3.5.7 Political Outcomes ................................................................. 43
    3.5.8 Social Outcomes ................................................................. 44
  3.6 Linkages between Livelihood and Conflict .................................... 45
  3.4 Conclusion .................................................................................... 48
### ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALRMP</td>
<td>Arid Lands Resource Management Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASAL</td>
<td>Arid and Semi-arid Lands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>Conflict Assessment Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJPC</td>
<td>Catholic Justice and Peace Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Accord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVE</td>
<td>Crime and Violence Extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>District Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPC</td>
<td>District Peace Committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFA</td>
<td>Education for All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBO</td>
<td>Faith Based Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDG</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KRC</td>
<td>Kenya Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAPSSET</td>
<td>Lamu Port-South Sudan Ethiopia Transport Corridor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lords Resistance Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEP</td>
<td>Northern Eastern Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCCRS</td>
<td>National Climate Change Response Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPPCM</td>
<td>National Policy on Peace building and Conflict Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Steering Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLF</td>
<td>Oromo Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRA</td>
<td>Participatory Research Appraisal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALWs</td>
<td>Small and Light Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ONE

1.0 INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

When two or more parties have incompatible goals about something, they are said to be in a conflict situation. This may happen because the parties have different perceptions, goals and thoughts on how to realize them.\(^1\) The incompatibility of goals normally characterizes the conflicts, whether they are political, labour oriented, organizational, communal/clan or international in nature. The consequence of conflicts whenever they occur is largely to undermine relations between the parties. The causes of conflicts are diverse but include hierarchy, poor working conditions and remuneration, competition for scarce resources, wanting governance and constitutionalism within a country, territorial disputes, land ownerships and grazing lands for livestock.\(^2\) In this case study we are looking at the factors that contribute to insecurities and intercommunity conflicts between Meru and Isiolo counties. It is quite evident that these two counties are entangled in fighting for resources, grazing lands for their animals and, land ownership conflicts.

1.2 Background to the research problem

We are set to investigate and analyses conflict within the dry season grazing area around Kisima Hamsini/Kom situated at the convergence of Isiolo county access which is claimed by Borana, Samburu, Rendile and Somali pastoralists. The area is traditionally used by the Borana, Samburu, Rendile and Somali pastoralists for grazing, but its use has been constrained by conflict over the years. The case study seeks to clarify the link between conflict over grazing land, environmental, climate change, gender issues, landownership, stealing of livestock, land grabbing in areas bordering Meru and Isiolo, and how the two conflicts are impacted upon by the establishment of conservancies in the area by the Northern Rangelands Trust.

For example, the Kisima Hamsini/Kom Area is a dry season reserve grazing area situated at the convergence of Isiolo, Marsabit, Samburu East and Wajir districts. It operates as a last resort drought refuge for pastoralists for the Somali community from Isiolo, Borana

\(^1\) Mwagiru Makumi, *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*. 2006, p. 3
\(^2\) Ibid, p. 20
from Garbatula and Merti, Samburu from Wamba Maralal and Baragoi, and Rendile from Laisamis and Marsabit. During severe droughts, like the one experienced in 2011, the area also hosts the Turkana from Isiolo and Somali (Degodia and Aajuran) pastoralists from Garissa and Wajir districts also pastoralists from as far as Moyale also migrate into the area.

1.3 Statement of the Research Problem

This study is also designed to find out how the conflicts will be transformed to peace, analyze the impacts of the conflicts on livelihoods of the involved communities and their relationships as well as on the rangelands, assess whether and to what extent this reality of conflicts is integrated in the development planning and programming by government and other development actors operating in these areas, analyze the local communities’ perceptions about the viability of pastoralist and their future as pastoralists in the light of the conflicts and recommend holistic strategies and approaches for addressing the conflicts that integrate indigenous knowledge, traditions and systems of the relevant communities.

This study focuses also on the linkages between climate change and resource-based conflicts between Meru and Isiolo. The aim is to deepen understanding of the complex relationship between these factors in order to develop more informed and nuanced policy responses. At the heart of the climate change/conflict relationship is the issue of natural resource scarcity and competition. This is not a simple one-way connection: climate change is one of a range of factors causing natural resource scarcity, while natural resource scarcity is one of a range of factors causing conflict. Climate change is often referred to as a ‘threat multiplier’ – a factor that will compound other drivers of conflict. The question is, how significant is, or will be, the threat-multiplying effect of climate change, and what measures can be taken to pre-empt or mitigate the threat. The study is also focused in capturing narratives about the origins of the conflicts and how they have evolved over time; the parties to the conflicts (both primary and secondary), and coverage in terms of the area.
1.4 Objectives of the Research

1.4.1 Main / Overall Objective

- To examine the major causes of conflicts and insecurity acts in the upper eastern.

1.4.2 Other Objectives

- To examine the influence that the conflicts have.
- To analyze the impacts of the conflicts on livelihoods of the involved communities and their relationships as well as on the rangelands.

1.5 Justifications of the Study

1.5.1 Academic Justifications

Conflict systems, especially when they are demarcated regionally have a close ideological condition. This means not the hard ideology of political systems and belief, but the designs for living of the actors involved. In most cases, the conflicts within the system have common sources and causes, and the fighting aims to achieve similar results. An example from the Horn of Africa conflict system illustrates this. In that conflict system, the conflicts, both present and past are about inter alia national liberation, and especially internal self determination. There is a gap between the conflict resolvers and the conflicts itself. Scholars have come up with the mechanisms to deal with the conflicts but it is basically theoretical. Practical actions should be taken towards resolving this conflicts from the grass roots. Although studies shows there is much is being done, more should be done by the actors involved.

1.5.2 Policy Justifications

Conflicts and instability trends in East Africa continues to make it one of the most unstable regions in the world. Significant portions of East Africa remain unable to break free of the lethal cocktail of armed conflicts, violent crimes, extremism, communal violence, political instability, and state failure that has plagued the region for decades. Most of East African zones of armed conflicts and instability today are concentrated near boarder areas pose a major risk of spill over, and feature powerful cross boarder drivers.

---

4 USAID East Africa Regional Mission (USAID/EA) covers Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Djibouti, Somalia, Republic of Congo (ROC), Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, and Burundi.
interests and actors. In recent years, regional governments have made a much greater efforts to police their boarders, and their renewed commitment to address transborder conflict issues constitute an important window of opportunity. However, few regional states have the capacity to effectively administer their remote, expansive border areas. As a result, much transborder conflict management and prevention falls on the shoulders of local communities and their local authorities, in partnership with central governments and interstate regional organizations. The resilience and adaptability of this collection of local and regional actors are critical factors in determining whether, and to what extent, crossborder conflict and instability issues are successfully managed. This research calls for policy makers to recommend the regional mission to expand its programming into the region by providing support for regional responses working to combat the negative impact of conflicts.

1.6 Literature Review

1.6.1 Introduction

Many of East Africans zones of conflict and instability are sites of long-running crisis, some of its civil wars and insurgencies have lasted for decades. Long-running wars can create their own systems of adaptation, economies and interests which can reinforce instability. This includes the rise of war economies in which powerful interests seek to perpetuate conditions of lawlessness and violence. The initial causes of the wars in East Africa are thus not always the same as the factors that perpetuate them. Insurgencies and armed groups are also a source of conflicts in the region. Recruits for armed gangs, tribal militias and extremists movements are readily available as a result of high unemployment, the youth bulge and large refugee camps. Young men in rural areas are often encouraged to join tribal militias by their community leaders. Financing of armed groups is rarely a major constraint, due to the practice of militia living off the land as their principal form of payment, support to tribal paramilitaries by regional governments, access to high-value “lootables” such as gold and diamonds, diverted aid, diasporas contributions, and the availability of cheap small arms across all East Africa.

---

5 East Africa Regional Conflict and instability assessment. Final report, March 2012. p v
One of the realities of conflict system, and an invaluable aid to their analysis, is the existence of an epicenter in each conflict system. The epicenter of a conflict system is the area around which the conflict system turns. The notion of the epicenter of a conflict system and its proper identification has profound significance for responses to conflicts within the system. The idea of an epicenter of a conflict suggests that systemic conflict management should concentrate on the epicenter influences in the trends and prospects for the conflicts in the region, concentrating conflict management efforts on it calls for creative conflict management processes is likely to collapse. Conflict management processes must bear in mind these sometimes subtle but often dramatic shifts in the epicenters. As the epicenters change, so too must conflict management processes and approaches accommodate the shifting balance. In practice, what has tended to happen is that one epicenter is usually abandoned for the new one, rather than change gear and emphasis to accommodate the emerging realities of the conflict system.6

A conflict arises when two or more parties have incompatible goals about something.7 Conflict is also the result of two or more parties (individuals or groups) having, or perceiving to have, incompatible goals and interests and acting upon these differences. Conflicts arise from imbalances in human relations, whether in social status, access to resources, or power, which can lead to discrimination, poverty and oppression and environmental degradation. Conflict is a natural phenomenon that is an expression of a changing society. It does not necessarily lead to negative outcomes, but may be a constructive process of change. Violent conflict, on the other hand, always has negative repercussions. It refers to the actions, attitudes or systems that cause physical, psychological, social or environmental damage. Killing and intimidation are the most visible forms of violent conflict.8

The conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), is about different sets of incompatibility goals. One of these is the difference in perception between the rebels and the government about their role in Congolese society. At another level it is about the

---

incompatible goals between Laurent Kabila, his government, and Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola on the one hand, Rwanda and Uganda on the other and about how the affairs of DRC should be managed, with those help, and with what internal and regional consequences.9

The end result of conflict wherever it is located is to dislocate the valued relationships and to cause tension on the structure on which relationships are based. Conflicts can only be beneficial if they are managed properly and in a timely way.10 The tendency in many cases is to see only the dysfunctional effects of conflict. This leads to the breakdown of social order and the breakdown of social and personal relationships and this often leads to injury and death. According to Johan Galtung, violence often leaves behind trauma and traces that are difficult to remove from the mind of victims or participants. They live to tell the story hence the concept of conflict memory.

Responses to conflicts in this setting tend to be negative and on the other hand conflict can be positive. The way in which conflict is perceived determines to a large extent how it is responded to and managed. Johan Galtung conceptualized and classified conflicts in three forms. a) direct violence, which is the explicit act or behavior and physically damages a person or object, b) structural violence, which refers to the violence built into political, social and economic systems which determine unfair distribution of power, resources and opportunities, leading to actors feeling oppressed and unable to meet their needs, and c) cultural violence which is entrenched in cultural norms, beliefs and traditions, hence makes other types of violence seem legitimate, accepted, normal or natural. In most cases only direct violence is analyzed and addressed, while other forms of violence are ignored.

The causes of conflicts are diverse as conflicts and the parties to them. This causes have been broadly discussed by scholars for example, interpersonal conflicts, their cause include desertion, adultery, violence in the home. In industrial conflict, causes are poor working conditions, remuneration, and bad interpersonal relations. In political conflicts, particularly in the third world, the causes of conflict include the illegitimacy of

9 See Museveni, Why Uganda must intervene in the Congo crisis, the East African 21-27 September 1998, p.8
10 Mwagiru Makumi, Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management. 2006, p. 4
governments and regimes, and conflicts of constitutionalism as these regimes resist challenges and their legitimacy and authority. In international conflict, there are diverse causes of war and conflicts.\footnote{See Holski, K.J. Peace and War: Armed Conflict and International Order, 1648-1989 , Cambridge University Press, 1991.} The idea of needs bridges the gap between international and other forms of conflict. Since all international conflict have sources, the link between international and domestic conflicts can be traced to the lack of fulfillment of these needs. The lack of fulfillment of these needs leads to internal conflict. Indeed the notion that all international conflicts have domestic sources is one of the important contributions to the understanding of conflict and its processes.

Conflict is endemic in society, meaning that conflict will always be an important part of human life. For as long as there human beings in the world, there will always be conflicts. Conflict is an important and ever present part in the society and a society without conflict would be both satle and sterile. Being endemic, conflict is an inalienable part of life and it is important to learn how to manage it well. Conflicts can also serve the useful function of warning when things are going wrong with relationships in society. Conflict can make authorities initiate remedial action for example 1997 in Kenya, many wanted constitutional and legal changes that would permit a free and fair election to be held. The government was adamant against this for a long while until demonstrations in the streets of Nairobi and strikes forced its hand. The government agreed to some reforms that would permit the election of that year to be conducted on a better circumstance. In this sense, the challenges that society and even individuals face, is not to eradicate conflicts, but to manage it properly.

While conflicts are a constant in history, and are part and parcel of the dynamics of society, Kenyan conflicts should be viewed in their specific historical context. The nature and conflicts in Kenya are the results of a complex, dialectic relationship between internal social factors and the structure of the external environment. What changes in the nature and intensity of conflict, as a result of two main factors: internal social factors, such as ethnicity, class and religion, and changes in the sub regional, regional and
international environment, which have various degrees and levels of influence on the internal situation.

In attempting to transform a conflict, efforts are made to modify actors goals and their approach to pursuing these goals, influencing the context in which conflicts occurs so as to challenge the meaning and perceptions of conflicts itself, particularly the respective attitudes and understandings of specific actors towards one another. Redefining the issues that are central to the prevailing conflict and reformulating the position of key actions on those very issues, changing in the norms and the rules governing decision making at all levels determine the extent to which conflicts are constructively resolved and appreciating the fact that conflict is underpinned by, and embedded in prevailing structure of relationships power distributions and socio-economic conditions,\textsuperscript{12} changes to which impact the very fabric of interaction between previously incompatible actors, issues and goals.

Conflict and human-made crises are present, both pastoral and election-related violence are common forms of conflict in Kenya. In the aftermath of very closely contested elections in 2007 (the results of which, many observers and citizens thought, were not adequately verified), there was widespread violence, killing, and displacement and the destruction of livelihoods that accompanied these. There had been election-related violence in Kenya before, but the extent of the violence in early 2008 was unprecedented. Over 1,000 people were killed, with estimates of the number of people displaced running as high as 300,000–400,000. Furthermore, since 2008, many civil society groups have emerged to join a small number of long-standing organizations concerned with peace and conflict resolution in Kenya. These organizations are promoting civic education, conflict prevention, and conflict resolution at the local level to give people the tools to try to prevent violence, at least at a local level.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{12} Mwagiru Makumi, \textit{Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management}. 2006, p. 28
\textsuperscript{13} Feinstein International Centre, \textit{Conflict Management and Disaster Risk Reduction: A case study of Kenya, A partnership study between Tufts University, Kenya Red Cross, and Nairobi Peace Initiative – Africa for USAID/OFDA}, p.7
The study finds that the threat of increased conflict between Meru and Isiolo as a result of climate change is real, validating broader concerns of the international community that climate change will adversely affect peace and stability. The field research indicated that climate change is already having an impact upon natural resource scarcity and competition, while demonstrating that a number of other factors affect this relationship. The research also suggested that resource scarcity is already contributing to heightened insecurity and conflict in these areas. It underlines that the threat-multiplying effect of climate change depends upon the nature and efficacy of mechanisms for natural resource management, and upon the coping capacities and strategies of local communities.

The study does not conclude that the conflict threat of climate change can be prevented or mitigated solely through natural resource management and adaptation at the local level. The unprecedented pace and scale of climate change threatens to overwhelm local coping capacities and so will require an urgent and co-ordinate response at the national level to support local capacities and adaptation strategies. The recommendations that arise from this study are therefore directed primarily towards the Kenyan Government.\(^\text{14}\)

The Kenyan Government has begun to develop its response to the threats of climate Change. The Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources initiated the formulation of a National Climate Change Response Strategy (NCCRS) in May 2009. The brochure for the NCCRS\(^\text{15}\) details the devastating effects that climate change has already had upon Kenya’s environment and natural resource base. The Kenyan Government also published in September 2009 a National Policy on Peace-building and Conflict Management (NPPCM)\(^\text{16}\) which highlights the environmental context of Kenya’s conflicts and the salience of natural resource competition. What is notable is the disconnect between these two policies: the NCCRS emphasizes the impact of climate change upon natural resources, but makes no mention of the conflict or security implications of this; while the NPPCM emphasizes the significance of natural resources in Kenya’s conflict dynamics,

\(^\text{14}\) Climate change and conflict: Conservation Development Centre, International Institute for Sustainable Development and Saferworld, 2009, p. ii
\(^\text{15}\) Republic of Kenya, National Climate Change Response Strategy (brochure), (Republic of Kenya 2009
but makes no reference to the impact of climate change on this. There are in addition a number of other policies concerned with natural resource management and with the development of Kenya’s northern region that should take into account the increased threat of conflict arising from climate change.

A major issue to be confronted when working in pastoral areas of east Africa is insecurity. Galaty finds that addressing insecurity in northern Kenya is critical due to the impact of escalating local cycles of conflict. Kratli & Swift discuss alternative theories about the source of this violence, noting a gradual erosion of elders’ authority, the failure of the state to provide security, the proliferation of small arms, and greater integration into the national political and economic sphere. While conflict between ethnic groups in this area has always been present, there has been a qualitative transformation in this conflict from battles among spear wielding warriors into indiscriminate assaults on populations using semi-automatic weapons over the past thirty years.

This change in the nature of conflict in Marsabit District has contributed to a climate of fear and insecurity in the whole region, and left a legacy of hostility and mutual suspicion. Overall in Africa, there is an expanding recognition that peace and security are fundamental to Africa’s social and economic renewal. This is increasingly being realized by donors active in pastoral areas. The experience of a development project trying to work in an insecure pastoral area of Uganda. The program began by trying to address other development needs in an insecure area, but was eventually led to the realization that to meet these other needs they had to directly address the issue of insecurity. Confronting the issue of insecurity is particularly important for programs attempting to address environmental issues. As is increasingly recognized, rangelands in northern Kenya are characterized by localized rather than widespread overstocking. Total rangeland resources are more than adequate to support the aggregate livestock herd, but

---

the majority of the rangeland is either underused or completely unused due to insecurity. Environmental change occurs due to the poor spatial distribution of animals rather than the absolute number of animals owned by the herders.20

Community management of natural resources thus takes place in an environment where the boundary of the resource area is often defined as “one of fear”. This presents both an opportunity and a challenge to such management structures. The opportunity arises from the fact that positive environmental change can be brought about by reducing the level of fear so that grazing pressure is spread to areas currently underused due to insecurity thus allowing currently overused areas to recover. The challenge is that communities are often not able to stop the cycle of violence that they find themselves in, and may need outside facilitation. We describe a case study of how environmental management programs in northern Kenya faced these opportunities and challenges.

However the case, it is important to be able to see the early warning signs of developing conflict. Conflict is rarely abrupt. It develops over time, by the time it erupts, its sign have been there for some time. The problem is that, in many cases, people fail to watch out for signs of conflict that are developing. This usually means that conflict catches them unawares, and they are not able to respond appropriately to it. In many cases, they are left with a big problem of trying to manage a conflict that has already erupted, and often which has already caused a lot of harm and damage.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

There are major theories that inform the thinking of about conflict and its causes. In this context the debate underlines much of the thinking about conflict, and is also one basis for responses to conflict. We characterize this debate on nature and nurture. The nature against nurture theories has not only been carried on in the scientific sphere, but it has also been translated into explanations of the international system, how it works and why. The arguments of nature theory contend that human beings are by nature violent and aggressive, and this derives from an innate drive in human beings for domination. They

say that violence is inevitable since it is in the nature of human beings to be violent. People get into conflict situations because of the circumstances they find they find themselves in. In this view, it is not inevitable that they will get into conflict. When those in authority take the nature view, their response to conflict in society will be use of force and repression.

The nurture theory argues on the contrary that human beings are not violent and aggressive by nature. It states that violence and aggression are conditioned by the environment in which people find themselves in. Violence is therefore not inevitable in human society and just as it was learned, it can be unlearned. On the nurture view, their responses to conflicts within society would be accommodation and negotiation. The responses of the government to the political agitations in Kenya in 1997 for example, suggested that the authorities took an irremediably nature view, and therefore their response was to call the riot squad. On the other hand responses to various instances of students demonstrations in Nairobi suggest that the authorities view of the students is bad, aggressive and violent by nature, to which the only response is violence and repression.

People may be in conflict without realizing it. Third parties can also enter into the conflict, and be instrumental in its management. This sometimes might mean polarizing the conflict, so that the parties begin to feel and experience it. Indeed conflict can be avoided having better information about situations, less misinterpretation of situations and more rational behavior. This research is based mostly on nature theory as human beings are inherently evil and respond to the situation at hand both emotionally and physically. Therefore they are the main of the conflicts and insecurities that occur among them.

1.8 Hypotheses

- Conflicts in this counties are caused by competition over pastoral land.
- Conflicts in upper eastern undermines development efforts in the region.
- The government has done nothing to help resolve the conflicts.

1.9 Methodology of the Study

1.9.1 Primary sources

The study will be undertaken through case studies conducted between the communities. The case studies generate primary and secondary data through a variety of methods and approaches. Primary data will be generated through key informant interviews as well as focus group discussions. Key informants will be selected from among elders and other opinion leaders within the communities, local functionaries of government including administrators, range management, and law enforcement officers, members of civil society and development partners active in the region and within the communities. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) will be conducted at local level with selected groups representing leaders of traditional institutions (men and women) of the relevant communities as well as local peace and community based organizations. FGDs will be used to collect diverse views from the people who have been affected by the conflict. Information collected on the history of each conflict, its impact and community perceptions about it. The FGDs further fostered interactions and exchange of information and ideas among different social groups according to gender, social class and age. Elders, women, men, youth and the most at risk populations would be targeted for the FGDs. Some Participatory Research Appraisal (PRA) tools will be employed for local level data collection. Information that helps to understand the background and history of the conflict situation identify primary and secondary parties to the conflicts, as well as factors that underpin the conflicts will be gathered using conflict analysis tools.

1.9.2 Secondary Sources

Secondary data will be generated principally through a review of literature, journals and reports of relevant peace and development actors involved in conflict prevention and peace building work in the study areas.

1.10 Scope and Limitations

The study as conceptualized is extremely ambitious with a wide and diverse scope. To properly manage and implement it as such would require a research team with an equally diverse technical orientation including, at a minimum, a social scientist, socio-economist and a conflict analyst, complemented with skills in policy research,
livestock/range/production and marketing, environmental and gender issues. This study will also be subject to a major challenge that all conflict studies invariably face, namely, the un-predictability of the conflict situation on the ground. For obvious and good reasons (e.g. recent violent conflicts, outstanding resolutions, fear of retaliatory attacks amongst others), communities involved in conflict are suspicious and sometimes anxious about ‘strangers’ who ask questions about the respective conflicts. This is particularly the case where there has been no adequate investment in obtaining community buy-in into the purposes and objectives of such a study. Unfortunately, the building of such trust is a slow process that requires time which may not be available in the context of this particular study.

Nevertheless, every effort will be made to ensure that the study is conducted appropriately and adequate data generated to respond to the objectives. In any case, the study should be understood to be an exploratory undertaking to map out the issues in question, and create a foundation for more detailed research where this is considered necessary. The respective consultants are familiar with the study areas and have experience and linkages with local actors that will help mitigate many of the identified challenges.

1.11 Chapter Outline

Chapter one: It is an introductory chapter containing the proposal of the study.
Chapter two: it analyzes the root causes of conflicts in upper eastern
Chapter three: this chapter analyzes the impacts of the conflicts on livelihoods of the involved communities in the upper eastern
Chapter four: it looks at the effects of conflicts in upper eastern on development planning.
Chapter five: this chapter contains the conclusion and recommendations of the case study.
CHAPTER TWO

2.0 THEORIES OF EDUCATION, CONFLICT AND POVERTY

2.1 Introduction

Isiolo being one of the case study of this research, was once the Headquarters of the Northern Frontier District and considered a gateway to the wild north. Today, it still promises to be a gateway to a devolved northern Kenya, expected to usher in economic transformation. Vision 2030 is the Kenyan government’s flagship set of mega projects with key pillars in political, economic and social dimensions, aimed at speeding up the country’s attainment of middle income status by the year 2030. Initiated by President Kibaki’s government, the key components of the Vision 2030 projects were aimed at opening up and revitalising development in the country with a special focus on regional tourism and infrastructural connectivity.

Isiolo County is one of the major beneficiaries of the mega projects, set to benefit from an international airport, a Resort City and a railway link under the proposed Lamu Port South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) project – making the county once more a critical gateway to the north. Additionally, as espoused in the Vision 2030 plans, Isiolo will be the gateway of Kenya’s future development, which depends on tapping energy supplies from the north and developing infrastructure (including road and rail networks) to promote greater economic integration with its northern neighbors, especially Ethiopia and South Sudan. How these infrastructural developments and transitions coexist with conflicts and violence is a policy problem that this study addresses.

This Chapter uses Theories of conflict and poverty and attempts to establish potential connections and relationships between them. In addition, the chapter traces the path of marginalization and uses a pre and post-colonial time frame in order to understand the background to the current situation.
2.2. Historical Overview and the Trajectory of Conflict and Poverty in the Upper Eastern Region

East Africa extraordinary size and diversity makes it exceptionary difficult to generalize about conflict and instability trends across the region. Each case has its own dynamics, drivers and trajectories: each community afflicted by armed conflicts has its own unique set of adaptations and levels of resilience. There is no substitute for close contextual knowledge of each case of conflict and instability. Nonetheless, some broad trends and dynamics exist across most of the regions cases of armed conflict and instability. Assessing transborder conflicts dynamics requires understanding the nature of the border lands themselves. In some portions of East Africa especially the Great Lakes region, borders areas are high-value, and the site of fertile soil, watersheds, valuable minerals, fisheries, and dense population. By contrast, border areas in most of the Horn of Africa have until recently been viewed as remote, expansive, uneconomic, and thinly populated. Governments have thus made what some observers argue are economically rational decisions not to expend scarce public resources to control areas with little prospect of an economic return. As a result, millions of regional residents in these borderlands have lived largely beyond the reach of the state.

Geography and climate are critical drivers of communal conflict across the region, but shape conflict in complex ways. In some parts of the region, worsening resources scarcity, combined with profound poverty and underdevelopment, are clearly exacerbating communal conflict. The more arid zones of the lowlands of the Horn of Africa suffer frequent and sometimes devastating droughts and hence are prone to communal clashes over pasture and access to water. Rapid population growth, possible long-term climate change, increased alienation of land for irrigated farms or ranches, and disruption of pastoral movements are among the many factors intensifying pastoral and agro-pastoral clashes in semi-arid zones. Periodic catastrophic drought, including the

---

22 USAID, *Conflict Assessment Framework 2.0* (Analytics), (Draft as of April 26, 2011).
2011 crisis which produced famine conditions in the parts of Somalia and which affected over 12 million people in the Eastern Horn, also trigger large scale population displacement and migration which can badly strain relations between host communities and newcomers. Portions of the region that receive better rainfall have a different resource problem namely, growing pressure on available land due to dense populations and rapid population growth. Competition for land and water has intensified in recent decades across East Africa and can play an important role in both communal clashes and civil wars. Local communities possess well-established mechanisms for managing resource scarcity, but those mechanisms have in some instances been overwhelmed by the magnitude of new pressures and competition for land, water, and access to markets.

Some of the most deadly and destructive instances of armed conflict and violent criminality have occurred in resource abundant portion of East Africa, reflecting troubles associated with what some have termed the, “resource scarce”. This has been most drastically in evidence in Eastern DRC and the Great Lakes, where the competition to control the region’s endowment of high value minerals has been a major conflict driver at the local and interstate levels. Control over exploitation of revenue from oil and natural gas have also triggered or perpetrated insurgencies in Sudan and Ethiopia, and at times have raised tensions between neighboring states in parts of East Africa.  

2.2.1. Measures that should be taken
2.2.1.1 Education and Educational Activities
There is a need for civic education, sustained peace education, and advocacy programs on access to education. Further, it is necessary to develop schooling facilities and programs that address special challenges of nomadic lifestyles. It is therefore important to have more boarding and mobile schools in the province. School feeding programs are also important.

Educational activities also create platforms from which, young person’s promote understanding amongst themselves. Many youth are proactive agents in their

---


17
communities, schools, work places, sporting teams, youth groups and universities. Given the vital role among the Meru and Isiolo communities, parental and familial pressure can also be crucial in influencing individual armed youth or militia to discontinue their anti-social activities. With commensurate support, young people can be active and positive force for peace and development, locally, nationally and internationally. Youth however need to be seen and treated as potential assets and engaged in processes of dialogue and decision making.\(^ {26}\)

**2.2.1.2 Water & Sanitation**

Construction of water points such as boreholes, water pans and dams are a major need in as much as a number of them exist. More importantly, it is necessary to build the capacities of community members to manage and share such water points in a sustainable and harmonious way to avoid escalation of conflicts.

**2.2.1.3 Livelihoods & Food Security**

The communities in Upper Eastern have, on a small scale level began diversifying their food sources with isolated cases of some individuals and/or groups practicing agro-pastoralism. Capacity building initiatives aimed at strengthening such progress would be helpful. Further, there is need for advocacy strategies communicating the need to boost the livestock industry in pastoralist areas.

**2.2.1.4 Small Arms and Light Weapons**

Key to addressing the small arms problem is ceasing the current government preoccupation with a singular disarmament process. Rather, there is a need to first improve the regional security architecture as a confidence building measure for communities to surrender arms. Disarmament requires a regional and not an area-specific, partial approach.

**2.2.1.5 Interventions and Dialogues**

Resources are the biggest drivers of conflict in the former province. There is therefore need to enhance the role of the county Steering Group as a coordination mechanism for

\(^{26}\) Commonwealth Secretariat, *Civil Path to Peace, Report on Commonwealth Commission on Respect and Understanding*, p.59-61
interventions in the province. Agencies need to embrace consultative processes to promote agency-beneficiary understanding. The goal of the community dialogues is to restore trust and a common bond, minimize suspicion amongst the affected groups, and move towards reconciliation. Dialogue immediately after a conflict is initiated to restore the trust necessary to allow communities to work and live together. Most organizations have also attempted to set up structures to allow for ongoing community dialogue with the aim of preventing the breakout of future conflict. The impact of community dialogue as a means of reconciliation after conflict was seen by many respondents as positive. Peace-building structures with a focus towards community dialogue were able to relieve initial suspicion, and communities were able to interact and return to the status quo—“students can go to school, people intermingle in trade centers, intermarriages are ongoing, casual work is done together. In Isiolo, community dialogue sessions in 2011–12 with professionals and warriors have led to fewer numbers of raids and stolen livestock in the participating communities, as well as evidence of different ethnic communities sharing the same pasture for grazing.27

2.3 The Root causes of conflicts in Isiolo County and its neighbouring communities

The consequences of conflict whenever they occur is largely to undermine relations between the parties. The causes of this conflicts are diverse but include hierarchy, poor working conditions and remuneration, competition for scarce resources, wanting governance and constitutionalism within a country, territorial disputes, food and water insecurity, climate issues and among others.

Conflicts in the case study area are an integral component of larger conflicts within the Moyale-Marsabit-Samburu-Isiolo-Meru axis, referred to as the upper eastern region. They are linked to and fed by animosities between Borana, Gabra, Samburu, Rendille, and Somali community in Isiolo and Meru. The inter-communal animosity involves disputes over water, grazing rights and boundaries. One of the causes of violent conflicts involves cattle rustling between the Borana and Gabra, Rendille and Gabra/Borana, and

Borana and Somali clans in Marsabit and Isiolo. Since 2002, animosities in the county/district have reduced considerably but there are sporadic, albeit deadly, outbreaks of conflicts between the major protagonists.

2.3.1. Education and Conflict

Today the link between education and conflict is now squarely on the EFA(education for all) agenda. Inaccessibility to education is viewed as part of the definition of chronic poverty, for instance in terms of deprivation, where chronically poor people have less access to productive assets and low capability in terms of health, education and social capital. They associate the decline of the enrolment patterns observed in Kenya and other developing countries with political instability and armed conflict.

Several research studies suggest, armed violence has hastened the long-term decline of pastoralism in northern Kenya. Thus armed conflict corresponds with impoverishment in northern Kenya. During livestock raids many households’ herds diminish to the extent of material insignificance and arguably the armed violence coupled with lack of alternative economic opportunities, creates irreversible conditions of poverty which is mostly as a result of lack of education. Arero identified the positive and negative faces of education in relation to ethnicity and conflict. He observed that school education amplifies social divisions and precipitates political violence. Thus, destructive educational practices when combined with casual factors such as economic tensions, poor governance and perceived threats to cultural identity potentially fuels suspicion, hostility and ethnic intolerance and subsequent violence.

2.3.2 Inadequate Security Provision

The scattered police (both regular and administrative police) presence in Upper Eastern is considered a major reason for conflicts. In the absence of the deterrent availability of security forces in the region, communities are primarily left to self-help arrangements. These have been in the form of armament. Arms proliferation and a warrior culture (moranism) that has led to militarization of communities have contributed to a culture of violence. Police stations are located up to 600km away from some of the remotest parts of the province. In an area where security threats not only emanate from internal inter-group rivalry but also from external cross border attacks, illicit arms proliferation aimed at securing life, territory, and priced livestock persists. Government disarmament efforts that are pursued without requisite security provision in this region are counterproductive as they trigger increased arms trafficking and an arms race. Worse still, the often partial disarmament programs (i.e. disarming one group while ignoring armed neighbours) only makes the disarmed community vulnerable to cattle raids and other attacks from environing rivals.\(^{31}\)

2.3.3 Climate change and conflict

It is evident that climate change will lead to the depletion of natural resources, which will lead to increased demand for reduced supply, which will in turn generate socio-economic tensions leading to violent conflict. Vulnerability to the effects of climate change depends to a considerable degree upon adaptive capacities, both at national and community levels. It has long been recognized that poorer countries bear the biggest burden since climatic variability increases with the degree of aridity\(^{32}\) and many of the world’s dryland areas are located in developing countries. In these countries livelihoods are more reliant on the natural resource base and on environmental goods and services, but their capacity to invest in adaptive technologies, such as improved varieties or water systems, is lower.

\(^{31}\) Embracing the practice of conflict sensitive approaches, an analysis of the Kenyan context. 2010 p101

2.3.3.1 Vulnerability to climate change
The degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the character, magnitude, and rate of climate change and variation to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity.  

2.3.3.2 Adaptation to climate change
The actions that people take in response to, or in anticipation of projected or actual changes in climate, to reduce adverse impacts or take advantage of the opportunities posed by climate change. Nevertheless, the impacts of climate change in northern Kenya are potentially highly destructive, given that people rely heavily on natural resources and food security is already fragile. Pre-existing developmental challenges and weak governance in the area make the climatic stresses more threatening. Indeed pastoralist groups have been referred to as the ‘climate change canaries’ since their livelihoods are so vulnerable to environmental changes. The interaction between climate change and migration affects more than just pastoralist communities. The effects of climate change on natural resource scarcity and competition is likely to influence broader migration patterns, both temporary and permanent migration, and migration within Kenya as well as cross-border. Migration adds extra pressure on resources in destination areas, urban as well as rural, and increases the number of conflict actors, potentially complicating conflict and stressing otherwise effective micro-level natural resource management mechanisms. When migration leads to crossing state borders, state security forces may be drawn into conflicts.

This exploration of the connections between climate change and conflict in eastern and northern Kenya highlights that natural resource scarcity and competition are central to  

their interaction. It also makes clear that this is not a simple connection, rather there is a complex interaction in both directions: on the one hand, climate change is one of a range of factors causing natural resource scarcity and competition; on the other, natural resource scarcity and competition is one of a range of factors causing conflict. Thus climate change is regarded as a conflict ‘threat multiplier’ – a factor that will compound and fuel other drivers of conflict.

2.3.4 Water and conflict

There are a number of ways in which climate change is likely to affect the availability of natural resources, which may in turn contribute to violent conflict. Rainfall feeds vitally important water sources such as rivers and lakes. Depletion or disruption of established water supply will affect livelihoods, while lack of access to clean drinking water may have negative implications for people’s health and well-being. Attempts to secure control of water sources are likely to be divisive and may become politicized along ethnic lines, or even lead to inter-state tensions with neighboring countries. Moreover, many people in Kenya rely on rain fed agriculture for their livelihoods as small farmers or as employees in the commercial agricultural sector. Changes in the distribution and amount of rainfall (potentially longer dry spells interspersed with damaging floods) will impact on food security, which is already under pressure from the country’s rapidly-growing population (projected to increase from 35.6 million in 2005 to 46.2 million by 2015). Not only will this growing population stress food supply, but access to land will come under pressure from increased demand, exacerbating what is already a highly politicized issue.36

2.3.5 Pastoral land and conflict

In the recent times, prior to the outbreak of violent ethnic conflicts in Tana River on the coast and Moyale Town of Marsabit County, the central Isiolo region was one of the most affected hotspots of violence. In the 2009 Census, Isiolo County had a cosmopolitan population of 143,234, with Borana, Samburu, Gabra, Sakuye, Turkana, Meru and Somali being the main ethnic groups in the region. From late 2011 into 2012, hundreds of people lost their lives and livestock were stolen in intense, well-organised violence as the

Borana and Somali communities violently clashed with their Turkana neighbours. The conflict led to widespread internal displacements, the torching of several villages and schools and market disruption, with grave knock-on effects on people’s livelihoods. According to reports by the Isiolo District Peace Committee (DPC), from 2009 to January 2013, the Isiolo violence claimed 165 lives and about 9,000 livestock were stolen; an estimated 2,900 were displaced. 37

Many conditions and factors have aggravated the situation of violence. Whereas the fragility of the ecosystem, bad governance, biting rural poverty and weakened livelihood systems all exacerbate conflicts in pastoral regions such as Isiolo, it was the dominant political and economic interests that drove and sustained the violence in Isiolo, aided by easy availability of SALWs. 38

This case study focused on the dry season grazing area around Isiolo and it neighbouring communities in the upper province, which is at the convergence of Samburu East, Wajir, Isiolo, Meru and Marsabit districts. The area is traditionally used by the Borana, Samburu, Rendile and Somali pastoralists for grazing, but its use has been constrained by conflict over the years. This investigates the nature of the conflict in this area and how it has impacted on the use of the rangelands and on relations between the neighbouring pastoralist communities. An effort was made to clarify the link between conflict over this specific grazing area around the upper province and similar conflicts around Koya on the border between Laisamis and Samburu East, and how the two conflicts are impacted upon by the establishment of conservancies in the area by the Northern Rangelands Trust. This Kisima Hamsini/Kom area is a dry season reserve grazing area situated at the convergence of Isiolo, Meru, Marsabit, Samburu East and Wajir districts. It operates as a last resort drought refuge for pastoralists for the Somali community from Isiolo, merian from Meru, Borana from Garbatula and Merti, Samburu from Wamba Maralal and

Baragoi, and Rendile from Laisamis and Marsabit. During severe droughts, like the one experienced in 2011, the area also hosts the Turkana from Isiolo and Somali (Degodia and Aajuran) pastoralists from Garissa and Wajir districts. It is reported that pastoralists from as far as Moyale also migrate into the area.

The area has perennial natural springs, a remarkable geographical feature in a dryland area. According to Samburu elders, there are water points located at Sabarwawa, Kauro, Kom, Sereolipi, Merti, Laresero and Lokuamoru. There are no permanent resident communities in the area. During the rainy season the pastoralist communities have plenty of water and pasture in their home districts where they remain. During this time, the pasture in area regenerates and is in abundance. Indeed, when the weather is favourable with sufficient rains in the region, Kisima Hamsini/Kom area can, except for limited wildlife, remain uninhabited for up to two years. As grazing resources diminish with the onset of the dry spell, pastoralists from the different communities gradually move towards the area. In most cases the grazing resources in the area are sufficient to support both resident and migratory populations of both livestock and wildlife during the dry season.

Some informants reckoned that conflicts in this area do not have a long history and are mostly a result of climate change that has resulted in more frequent droughts forcing different pastoralist communities to meet more often as they each search for grazing resources. Samburu elders on the other hand, trace the conflicts to a longer history, observing that the history went back to 1962 at a place called Kauro/Kom where one Samburu family was wiped out by the Borana in an act of revenge for theft of a herd of cattle. The elders further noted that the conflicts have picked up since July 2009 with the Samburu constantly fighting the Borana, the Turkana fighting the Borana and the Rendile also in conflict with the Borana.

Research in pastoralist areas in Kenya indicates that an increasingly adverse climate has already contributed to lowering income levels, the expansion of settlements lacking basic
services, migration, deforestation and growing aid dependency. However, others challenge this view of pastoralists as helpless victims, arguing that “the livelihood patterns of pastoral communities hinge upon strategies that continuously adapt to a limited, highly variable and often unpredictable resource endowment”. There may therefore be opportunities to learn from the flexibility and mobility that characterise pastoralist adaptive capacities.

An interesting observation was that the conflicts also arose from differences in natural resource management approaches and practices and the lack of adherence to established rules and regulations on resource use. Other factors that were cited as engendering conflict include poaching, boundary disputes, conflict beneficiaries (including development organizations) and an apparent bias by government towards issues, notably, in its pursuit to serve its self-interests. On the part of the communities, illiteracy, ignorance, poverty, underdevelopment, lack of alternative livelihoods, monetization of cattle rustling, and the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons were blamed for increased conflicts.

Conflicts were said to be most prevalent at the onset of the rainy/wet season. As communities begin to depart for their home territories, they loot their rivals’ livestock to restock their own. Furthermore, during the rainy season, youth who would have otherwise been engaged in the search for water and pasture are idle and have time to engage in conflicts/raids.

2.3.6 Land Borders and Land Ownership and Conflict

To most pastoral communities’ land is considered trustlands, tensions are emerging in particular areas of Isiolo – which is earmarked for significant development. This is because through a special Presidential decree and registration processes, lucrative parts of trustlands can be allocated to individuals or groups of investors. Land is also a sensitive issue because of the growing migration of elites, investors and communities from both pastoral and agricultural regions of Samburu, Baragoi, Marsabit, Meru and other parts

40 Op Cit Davies & Nori (2008)
Kenya to the strategic Isiolo area. Land is becoming scarcer in the Isiolo region. Therefore the politics of land, fear and poor communal understanding of the LAPSSET projects, and a related scramble for land by speculators and potential investors added a highly flammable dynamic to the conflict experienced as violence in Isiolo. According to Diida Golicha, the chair of the Isiolo DPC, ‘lack of proper land tenure policy and regulations are the major factor fuelling conflict in Isiolo County.’

Indeed, at the core of the conflict and violence in Isiolo is the land question, which has been greatly politicized. A report by a local Kenyan NGO, Act on the scarcity of land as a conflict accelerator in Isiolo observed. An important dynamic is that the land in Isiolo is divided in a manner that by its very nature encourages conflict. The land in Isiolo is divided into portions: one fifth of the land is taken up by national and international military camps; another one fifth is taken up by Game Reserves and Parks. Ranches take up another one fifth, while yet another one fifth is used by the Government as livestock holding grounds. The last one fifth is left for human settlement, pasture, farming, commercial usage, among other human activities. The first four masses of land are restricted. This leaves one fifth of Isiolo for competition among resident communities. It is this competition that has tended to escalate into deadly violence. Kochare observed, ethnic rivalry and violence is linked to the competition between the various communities to claim a stake of the land with a view to its future sale to investors.

2.3.7 Unemployed youth and conflict

In conflict situations, the youth are normally engaged as combatants, especially if they are not engaged in gainful activities. The history of the world is replete with many young people being victims of cultural, direct and structural violence and hence become carriers

of that violence or perpetration. Rarely do thoughts turn to positive, preventive and transformative role of youth both in violent as well as non-violent conflicts. At times the youth are depicted in a negative light, just as helpless victims affected by violent conflict due to age, or as criminals or child-soldiers who are inherently violent or easily manipulated by others into becoming perpetrators and not peace-builders and as positive agents of non-violent change. In many cases the young persons are victims, perpetrators, and peace builders at different moments and in various situations in their lives. It is accepted that violent conflict situations have devastating effects on any human being and can be particularly shattering for young people. Youth are normally full of physical strength and whose contribution to peaceful situations can be enormous. In conflict situations, many are subjected to forced labour, recruitment into armies or militias and child prostitution. Many more are displaced, separated from their families, or orphaned and must undertake a long, painstaking processes to rebuild their lives after war. Their daily lives are affected, but their future is painted conflict are the life they grow up knowing is conflicts, they are also jeopardized as many grow up with the weight of hopelessness that influences their adult life choices.

Where there is not wide-scale armed conflict but there is experience of high unemployment rates and inequality, research has found that urban gangs appear. Young people group themselves to protect each other from the police, from other groups and to create sources of income, in most cases through illegal activities. The gang identity clearly defined and it’s members express that they feel a sense of “family” who would do anything to protect the group. The birth of urban youth gangs is often attributed to young peoples opposition to the individualism that has come to dominate modern civilization. For example, in Kenya, gangs such as Taliban, Mungiki, Sungusungu, Chinkororo, Baghdad Boys, Mombasa Republic Council (MRC), Sabaot Land Defence Forces, Kamjesh, Otang and many others which have emerged, first they act as vigilante groups but later turn into purveyors of insecurity once hijacked by politicians for parochial selfish interests.


46 Andrew McLean; Tackling small arms in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa: Strengthening the capacity of Sub-Regional Organisations, Institute for Security Studies, 2000 p.39
Structural inequalities are at the root of violence-prone youth gangs. The forces of the market economy in the county have encouraged rural-urban migration and it is as a result of this that youth gangs and urban violence flourish. For example not long ago, traditional rural society provided a sense of security besides producing food for the clans. This has since changed with the dwindling opportunities and pressure on land, giving rise to insecurity and all forms of crime. In urban context, young uneducated people who unable to find productive engagements have been joining hardcore criminal. In countries like Somalia, they have been joining military deserters to engage in different forms of crimes and setting new structures and rituals that work for them.\(^{47}\)

In a rush to curve their identity and space, the youth are arming themselves with all manner of weapons, which they use to terrorize victims, some of who they kill when they decline to yield to their demands. The trends appear to be expanding to smaller urban centers with serious consequences on socio-economic activities. In futile efforts to arrest the menace, state authorities often resort to extra-judicial executions which have not helped the situation going by the responses from human rights groups.

Youth unemployment is a contributing factor to violence in Isiolo, as it is in Kenya more generally. Poverty and high rates of unemployment have pushed some young men into forming gangs for hire. In addition to engaging in drugs (miraa/khat chewing which is endemic in Isiolo), ethnically organised predatory gangs have emerged around sand harvesting sites in the Isiolo West location – one of the epicentres of violence. It was in Isiolo West during the 2007 General Election that a Turkana politician won the seat, defeating the Somali incumbent. This ethno political competition should be considered in light of Isiolo West’s importance as a transit route with rich reserves of high quality sand for construction. Prior to the breakout of violence in Isiolo and surrounding areas, Turkana and Somali youth jointly controlled the sand harvesting ventures.\(^{48}\) However, as rifts and tensions deepened, rival gangs competed to control the lucrative sand harvesting

\(^{47}\) Ibid p. 25
\(^{48}\) See, the politics of pastoral violence: a case study of Isiolo County, Northern Kenya. Focus group discussion with Somali community members, Isiolo West, July 2012 p. 9
sites. Aided by the easy availability of small arms, rival youth gangs with political and economic backing resorted to illegal exploitation of sand harvesting in the area. When a local politician was arrested for political incitement, it came out that he was linked to a sand harvesting cartel, fuelling rumours that local politicians are behind the youth militias fighting to control the harvesting sites.

2.4. Impact of Conflict
Conflicts in the case study area have resulted in insecurity that undermines the entire fabric of the society. They contribute to a breakdown in societal values, undermine coping mechanisms thereby engendering general economic decline. Food insecurity and lack of essential amenities are also created by conflict. Conflicts also contribute to degradation of the rangelands as mobility is constrained and the institutions that traditionally ensure their sustainable use are rendered ineffective. The associated breakdown of law and order has a spiraling effect on virtually all aspects of life. Insecurity arising from the conflicts has accorded criminals an opportunity to smuggle in and trade in illicit firearms. The fact that communities with homes bordering Somalia, a country in conflict, migrate into the reserve grazing area is a further opportunity as certain elements within the community are willing conduits for illicit trade in smuggled goods, including firearms. The conflicts have resulted in the breakdown of contacts between communities. Traditional social networks that could be used to address the conflicts have collapsed. The death of large numbers of men involved in the conflicts, as is evident from mass graves in Kisima Hamsini/Koma area, have changed established family roles. Women have to assume additional responsibilities on top of their arduous workload of providing for the family.

The collapse of pastoralist livelihoods leads to large out-migration and displacement of communities, leading to destitution, idleness, abuse of substances e.g. alcohol and khat (miraa), particularly among the youth. Such youth, already disgruntled by other challenges like unemployment, are a potential reservoir for violence that can be (and is usually) exploited by selfish conflict entrepreneurs (politicians, crooked businessmen etc.). The ‘appropriation of violence by the youth has had a serious effect on the normative framework and traditional hierarchy in the society, where the elders are
expected to have a modeling influence’ over their activities but are now overwhelmed by their defiance. The collapse of coping mechanisms occasioned by persistent conflict undermines local and ultimately national economies. To survive after the loss of livelihoods triggered by the breakdown of coping mechanisms, people resort to detrimental undertakings including the sale of assets, destruction and vandalizing of infrastructure, while able bodied members of society migrate to urban centers in search of menial jobs.

As a result of violent conflicts, a trading centre, a dispensary and a school in Kisima Hamsini/Kom area were closed. The once thriving livestock market is no longer operational even when the communities migrate to the reserve grazing area. Similarly, the costs of essential commodities are exorbitant both as a result of high costs of business (transport, security etc.) as well as exploitation by unscrupulous individuals who know the people have limited alternatives. Large-scale cattle rustling currently prevalent in the pastoralist areas are a major cause of destitution among pastoralists as they cause much more rapid and focused damage than drought. Unlike drought, large-scale raiding jeopardizes customary strategies for risk distribution, animal-loss management and restocking and when directed at numerous homesteads simultaneously may decimate an individual's livestock in a few hours and leave destitute the whole network of dependents, friends and relatives, who might have represented a source of help in mitigating food insecurity.

In Kula Mawe (Borana) due to insecurity, grazing of livestock, even in times perceived to be peaceful, is restricted to a radius of 15 kilometres for fear of raids orchestrated by either the Somali or Samburu. The concentration of livestock in limited places results in overgrazing and general degradation of the environment. Pastoralists who lose their livestock in raids turn to other income generating enterprises e.g. making charcoal. This is evident by the number of people selling charcoal along the Isiolo-Marsabit road and in particular around Archers Post. Cutting down trees to make charcoal has serious negative environmental and ecological impacts especially in an already fragile environment. Conflicts and the resulting general breakdown of law and order have witnessed a steep rise in poaching activities in the area. The Kisima Hamsini/Kom area hosts big numbers
of wildlife including elephants, giraffes, zebra, ostriches, different types of antelopes among others. These animals, and especially the big ones, are threatened by poachers. The poaching kingpins, mostly Somali according to various informants including the district security personnel - are from outside the area but they contract locals (armed youth) to kill the animals and remove the tusks, horns, skins etc. Poaching is reported to have picked up since the completion of sections of the Isiolo-Marsabit road, as it is now easier and faster to get out of the area and transport the poached loot out of the district.

2.5 Conclusion

The study was to investigate and analyze how persistent conflict impacts on the resilience of pastoral and agro-pastoral communities, and to capture perceptions of communities about the future in these context and their ideas on how to comprehensively address conflicts and build lasting peace for livelihoods security and economic development in the region. Conflict is a major threat to the sustainable practice of pastoralism in the region. The case studies illustrate the long history of these conflicts, which have persisted in spite of efforts to address them over the years. It is evident that the persistence of these conflicts demonstrates the failure of governance and the rule of law, which in turn is a function of long-standing marginalization of pastoralist areas by the respective government as evidenced by the failure to establish functional governance and rule of law frameworks in these regions. That failure has encouraged the emergence of local conflict entrepreneurs that take advantage of the conflict situations to advance their own political and business interests and thus frustrate any efforts to find lasting solutions to the conflicts. The impact of the conflicts is that they undermine livelihoods and opportunities for social and economic transformation.
CHAPTER THREE
3.0 IMPACT OF THE CONFLICTS ON COMMUNITIES IN UPPER EASTERN

3.1 Introduction
Both conflict and instability are concepts that are commonly used in political analysis but are surprisingly difficult to define with precision. Both are expansive terms that can depict conditions in most political systems around the world. Moreover, conditions of conflict and instability do not always fall into neat categories of war and peace as the USAID Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF) more often than not post conflict communities live in a state of war not peace. This assessment relies on the World Banks definition of conflict as organized violence, namely the use or threat of physical force by groups. It includes state actions against other states or against civilians, civil wars, electoral violence between opposing sides, communal conflicts based on regional ethnic religious or other group identities or competing economic interests, gang based violence and organized crime and international non state armed movements with ideological aims.49

3.2 Protracted Nature of Armed Violence
The single most remarkable pattern of East Africa’s instances of armed conflict and instability is the protracted nature of armed violence. The form, intensity, and purpose of the conflicts often change over time, but the conflicts themselves have proven remarkably durable in some cases lasting decades. For example, Sudan’s civil war lasted for almost 40 years and despite the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA), risks reignited new forms. Somalia’s crisis of state collapse in 1991 and armed conflict that followed involved dramatically different actors and interests today but has endured for over two decades. The violence in eastern DRC continues to produce casualties, displacements and assaults 17 years after conflict from Rwanda’s genocide first spilled across the DRC border.

This protracted nature of armed conflict is critical analytically. First it changes the nature of investigation into causal factors, highlighting the distinct features of intractable conflicts and reminding us that the drivers that initially start a war are not always the same factors that help to perpetuate it.\textsuperscript{50} Second, protracted wars privilege political economy analyses which are best suited to illuminate the mutation of interests that can occur the longer a war is fought specifically rise of economic interests at both the level of war merchants and soldiers who benefit from perpetuating conditions of “durable disorder” within which a range of illegal and predatory behavior can take place.\textsuperscript{51}

East Africa is replete with cases of war economies of local and external actors who seek to prolong civil wars for economic gain, and of entire communities who develop survival strategies around existing conditions of violence. The region has also generated many examples of leaders who foment communal divisions and violence to advance their narrow political interests and for whom consolidated peace would likely mean the end of their political careers and perhaps even arrest. This serves as a reminder that though these conflicts have been extraordinarily costly they are for some an opportunity to be exploited not a problem to be solved. It also serves as a powerful explanation for protracted wars, in that some key actors are not fighting to win war in some corners of East Africa has become an end in itself a continuation of “economics by other means.”\textsuperscript{52}

3.3 Grievances and Resiliencies

Across East Africa, many armed conflicts especially insurgencies, civil wars and violent extremist movements are fueled at least initially by deep social grievances. Some of these grievances are fueled by economic frustration. Poverty and unemployment are high across the region, dramatic population growth rates (in some countries exceeding 3% per year) have helped to produce a youth bulge in East Africa that compounds problems of access to education and jobs. Urban drift is producing sprawling slums that serve as easy recruiting grounds for criminal gangs and armed groups and the sense of deprivation is


\textsuperscript{51} David Keen, “\textit{Incentives and Disincentives for Violence}” in Mats Berdal and David Malone , eds, \textit{Greed and Grievances: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars} (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1990) pg 19-42

\textsuperscript{52} Martin van Creveld, \textit{The Transformation of War} (New York : Free Press, 1991) p. 57-62
compounded by much greater exposure to conspicuous signs of wealth in the urban areas and over the television and internet.

In much of East Africa upward mobility is very limited, thanks to political economies in which patronage and class are significant determinants of access to education and jobs leading to a pronounced sense of exclusion among large portions of the youth population. Grievances in East Africa are equally strong in rural areas, especially where politically and socially weak groups lose access to land and water at the hands of government or the politically well connected. Ethnic marginalization constitutes one of the region’s most explosive sets of grievances. Almost all East African countries are multi ethnic in nature and many are multi sectarian. Ethnic hegemony has been an enduring problem in the region, creating volatile grievances among ethnic groups which believe they have been shut out of political power and by extension economic opportunities. Almost all of the most deadly episodes of civil or communal violence have had ethnic grievances as a driver and almost all have witnessed political entrepreneurs exploiting those grievances to mobilize fighters. Marginalization of religious groups is equally dangerous especially among Muslim populations in Christian dominated countries like Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and Eritrea.

3.4 Mobilization and Resources

Insurgencies and armed groups in the region face relatively few constraints in translating local grievances into material support. The youth bulge combined with extremely limited employment prospects for young men across East Africa provide a ready source of recruits into armed movements, tribal militia, insurgencies and extremist movements. The enormous refugee camps in the region, and the practice of warehousing refugees for decades as civil wars go unresolved provide still more recruits. Tribal militias are also easy to mobilize when tribal elders actively recruit on behalf of the commanders. In instances where locals are unwilling to join, militias such as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and Al Shabaab engage in forced conscription. Financial support to armed groups is also relatively easy to come by across the region. Most local recruits understand

---

53 *East Africa regional conflict and instability assessment. March 2012* pv
that they will mainly be self financed through looting and extortion of local populations they make for inexpensive though unreliable and predatory fighters. Many regional governments outsource counterinsurgency to tribal paramilitaries or armed actors often under the guise of local defense forces. Often militias garner material support from external actors, especially regional governments engaging in proxy wars against one another. Though regional states are increasingly organizing to manage and prevent armed conflict, deep regional rivalries and proxy wars remain a persistent impediment to peace, and a lucrative source of financing for armed groups, tribal militias and insurgencies. The region’s long running crises have produced sizable diasporas many of which have become powerful sources of funding for both peace building and mobilization for war. A robust small arms trade mainly the domain of private arms traffickers but in some cases promoted by regional and external states has for decades saturated East Africa with cheap semi automatic weapons and ammunition making it easy to muster armed forces at low cost. In the Great Lakes region armed groups raise money and control lucrative trade of high value commodities as evidenced in conflict minerals and illicit trade networks emanating from eastern DRC. In Somalia, Al Shabaab is well financed through its control of charcoal exports out of the seaport of Kismayo, taxation of local populations and businesses, and diversion of humanitarian and assistance. It may also be earning a cut of revenues generated from piracy ransoms.

3.5 Impacts of Conflict
3.5.1 Violence and Ethnic Cleansing
Some cross border violent criminality in East Africa is at least partially driven by the aim to push rival ethnic groups out of contested land. Tribal and clan social boundaries often cross over state borders in the region, the interplay between these two types of borders is complex with state borders sometimes serving as opportunities for communities to stake new or additional claims in a neighbouring country or to deny others access. Violent crimes especially massacres and rape are in this case not so much a case of criminality as an act of communal war.

---

3.5.2 Spillover Effects
One of the most alarming aspects of CVE in East Africa is growing danger of spillover into neighboring states. This is especially of concern with regard to Somalia’s Al Shabab and the destabilization of Kenya by violent Islamic extremists. But other issues including the powerful impact on tourism and investments by growing cross border kidnapping into northern Kenya underscore how vulnerable East African states are to spillover of transborder crime and extremism.

3.5.3 Increasing use of Violence
Acts of crossborder livestock and property theft were in the past executed with minimal violence and loss of life, but the trend over the past two decades is more violent criminality due in part to the easy availability of semi automatic weaponry and in part to a breakdown of old norms that had constrained use of violence in earlier decades. Assaults, rape and massacres are now increasingly common as part of major crossborder raids and are producing casualty levels akin to those of civil wars.

3.5.4 Crime as Trigger of Violence
In the absence of effective state capacity to arrest and try criminals in border areas, local communities look to other means of security and justice. Where criminal violence has produced unprecedented casualty levels and customary law is overwhelmed communities often resort to retaliatory attacks producing cycles of violence that create deep ethnic animosities.

3.5.5 Internal Displacement of Persons
The problem of displacement in Kenya is closely linked to land tenure issues and forced displacements that occurred in the country since colonial past. When, in the early 20th century, the British colonialists chose to settle in the most fertile land of the Rift Valley, upper regions (Meru, Isiolo, Timau area) they evicted the indigenous nomadic pastoralists and recruited agricultural labourers from neighboring provinces to work on their farms. After independence, a majority of the ‘White Farmlands’ owners chose to go back to Europe, leaving their farms to the Government who in turn sold them through

---

55 Term ‘White Farmlands’ refers to the race of the British Colonialists.
the famous ‘Land Buying Schemes’. The land was mainly bought by the non-indigenous labourers and this in effect locked out the original owners who had been evicted by the colonialists.

Apart from mild incidences of resistance to the new owners of the white highlands, calm generally reined in these areas until the introduction of multiparty politics in 1991\(^\text{56}\) and subsequent calls by Government Ministers to non-indigenous agriculturalists to leave the Rift Valley and the upper region, and return to their homeland.\(^\text{57}\) What followed were violent conflicts dubbed 'land' and 'ethnic' clashes\(^\text{58}\), massive destruction of property, immense fear and insecurity in that region and rapid displacement of persons. Human Rights Watch approximated that by 1993, over 300,000\(^\text{59}\) persons had fled their homes.

The election year of 1997\(^\text{60}\) was another major period of violent displacement in Kenya with similar calls being made to the non-indigenous\(^\text{61}\) people to leave for their homelands, 2007 election also resulted to people getting displaced. An outbreak of violence in Coast Province caused the displacement of over 120,000 persons and numerous others dead. The victims were once again perceived to be politically opposed to the Government.\(^\text{62}\)

While the politically instigated conflicts have ebbed down, Kenya now experiences internal conflicts in some regions over access to water and pasture, cattle rustling in the pastoralists’ communities and border conflicts. This has been worsened by prolonged droughts and the proliferation of small arms\(^\text{63}\) in the former Districts of Turkana, Isiolo,

---

56 The Constitution was changed to make Kenya a multiparty state from a one party state
58 Also referred to as ‘ethnic cleansing’. These not only affected the Rift Valley but also other multi ethnic regions in the Coast and Western Provinces. Common border areas such as Gucha, Trans Mara, Migori, Tigania and Tharaka Nithi, among others experienced tensions that often resulted in violence.
59 Human Rights Watch, June 1997, P 36
60 This time round, the country was gearing up for a General election and calls for constitutional reform were increasing. Well armed raiders carried out a series of deadly attacks in Mombasa.
61 Also referred to as the ‘upcountry people’. They were perceived to be supporters of the opposition.
62 The displacement of thousands of people was aimed at undermining their civic and political rights, specifically, their right to vote. In effect tilting the result of an election in favour of the perpetrators.
63 There are over 100,000 illegal arms in the districts of West Pokot, Turkana, Isiolo and Samburu.
borders of Meru, Samburu and West Pokot. The most recent conflicts that have led to displacement are the Mau Narok in the former Naivasha District and former Marsabit District. The Pokomo, Isiolo and Orma continue to fight over pasture, water and land resources. This is exacerbated by continuous draught experienced in the area. The ongoing conflict in neighbouring countries and the porosity of Kenya’s borders has not helped matters. The availability of arms has been blamed for the rise in incidences of cattle rustling among pastoral communities. The need for communities to have arms to defend themselves from their even more armed neighbours has created a kind of arms race and led to a culture of violence.

3.5.6 Economic Outcomes

Economic analysis of the outcome of conflicts shows that outbursts of violence between pastoralists affect milk and livestock prices, and indirectly the prices of many other goods, as insecurity and low incomes influence both demand and supply. On the other hand, the loss of livestock usually induces herders to sell animals in order to buy food, to compensate for the fall in milk production.

(i) Loss of Livestock

If with reciprocal raiding the looted animals remain within the pastoral economy and therefore can always be raided back at a later stage, with commercial raiding the raided animals are channeled into the wider national or international economy and permanently lost. In the case of recent Wajir and Isiolo inter-clan clashes, as one part allied with clans in Somalia and the other with the Boran, most of the raided animals went to

---

64 CISA, 26 October 2004.
65 Over 16,000 families are currently displaced in Marsabit and being assisted by the Kenya Red Cross.
66 IN 2001 over 3,400 people were displaced, over 50 dead and over 120 houses torched down completely. OCHA Report, 30 October 2001
67 Small arms themselves do not cause conflicts and criminal activities in which they are used, but their wide availability, accumulation and proliferation escalates conflicts, intensifies violence and hinders the development of social stability, democracy and good governance. See E. Reyneke, Small Arms and Light Weapons in Africa: Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2000) pp. 55-57.
68 Ibid
Somalia and Ethiopia. The increasing demand for automatic weapons induces a continuous flow of livestock out of the pastoral economy, in payment for arms.

Livestock market prices drop as food shortages and increased prices of essential goods force people to sell animals. The market supply of animals is also increased by the threat of rustling. Herders prefer to sell at a disadvantageous price rather than risking to loose everything in a raid. However, the price of meat drops in the areas affected by clashes or heavy raiding but not in distant large markets. Ocan notes that the herders’ wish to sell as a response to raids is very convenient for livestock traders, who may take advantage of desperate sales in conflict prone areas and then make huge profits by taking the animals to distant markets where prices are high. With respect to the effects on the market, one should therefore distinguish between the immediate and direct consequences of violence, and the long term indirect consequences of insecurity.

It may be useful to investigate the links between raiding and regional markets. For example, livestock prices are high after droughts; if raids take place in conjunction with high prices, than raids should increase after drought both for economic reasons and because poor households are desperate to get back to a viable herd. On the other hand, as raids increase the sale of cattle, in periods of escalation or after large-scale raids we may expect a fall in the cattle market prices due to the flood of supply, and perhaps a vicious circle in which low cattle prices force herders to sell even more.

(ii) Loss of Property

Apart from the raided animals, recent conflicts have involved the loss of large quantities of property. Many years of inter-clan clashes in Wajir, for example, many homesteads were looted and burned, some business were looted, several of which were also destroyed, vehicles were robbed or hijacked and others were stolen.

---

(iii) Loss of Grazing Land and Water Points
Leaving land ungrazed not only causes an immediate loss of production but also its degradation in the long-term, as decreased grazing pressures result in bushy, ungrazable vegetation gradually taking the place of grass. Water points are also degraded by not being used. The shrinkage in grazing and water availability due to insecurity causes abnormal concentrations of animals in safe areas, thus also leading to ecological degradation and increasing the risk of new disputes.

(iv) Destitution and Displacement
Increasingly over the past two decades, large-scale raids seem to be a major cause of destitution among pastoralists. Raids cause much more rapid and focused damage than drought, which is more likely to jeopardize customary strategies for risk distribution, animal-loss management and restocking. Large raids directed at numerous homesteads simultaneously may decimate an individual's livestock in a few hours and leave destitute the whole network of friends and relatives who might have represented a source of help. Just like severe droughts, exceptionally large-scale raids attract national and international interest in the most badly affected areas, and may mobilize aid and relief agencies which are unlikely to react to small raids and banditry. Perverse as it may seem, this may represent a chance also for those families which have become destitute because of minor events which did not attract national interest. To agencies and field operators with a limited budget and scope, is left the thorny problem of sorting out “peace-time” destitute families from genuine “conflict” victims. Large-scale raids are a classic covariate risk, happening to everyone in a particular area at once, compared to individual risk which strikes individuals randomly. The food security literature suggests that governments should insure people against covariate risk, whilst encouraging individuals and local communities to insure themselves against individual risk.

---

73 WPDC 1998. *Update of Wajir/Moyale Massacre at Buthutha/Bagalla on Saturday October 24, 1998*, Wajir Peace and Development Committee
(v) Conflict and Social Differentiation
Automatic weapons can be seen as a new means of capital accumulation, which contributes to the ongoing process of economic differentiation between pastoralists. Belshaw, suggests this approach, identifies five processes of capital accumulation involved in modern raiding: modern weaponry, fighting men, livestock, range/water supply, and knowledge about cropping system technology (for example via abducted women from agro-pastoral groups). The interaction of these processes, it is argued, appear to have replaced the negative feedback of traditional livestock raiding (homeostatic effect on animal distribution over time) with new ‘positive feedback reactions’. In a more general way, conflicts allow some groups of people and individuals to capitalize on the insecurity and to usurp land or purchase it at extremely advantageous prices from the victims who have no alternative but to leave.

(vi) Effects of Insecurity on Markets
People desert areas of conflict or areas believed to be too dangerous. This has a number of effects on short and long term production which usually lead to food shortage. Crops are destroyed or abandoned. Insecurity induces transport hardships, as the owners of lorries and taxis fear to travel in conflict-prone areas. There is a link between market days and attacks, since bandits know that on those days traders travel with cash. Consequently, market activities are hindered, commodity supply may be interrupted and essential items such as maize, salt or sugar may undergo sharp increases in price. In Wajir/Moyale, during the Bagalla massacre in October 1998, about 17,000 heads of livestock were stolen in a single raid. Wherever such numbers of animals are moved, even if distributed to more than one market, they are likely to have a substantial effect on local prices. As market prices in pastoral areas are often monitored as part of early warning systems for

food security, drought and famine,\textsuperscript{76} perhaps changes in market prices may have a part in tracing stolen animals or establishing a link between specific raids and cattle traders. To establish causality and disaggregate from other influences, of course, may prove difficult. However, this would depend on the relationship between number of animals and size of the market: for example 500 cattle marketed in Mombasa would not affect the price in any significant way, but 500 marketed in Isiolo would.

3.5.7 Political Outcomes

At a national level, insecurity and clashes are used as an argument against multi-party democracy and pluralism.\textsuperscript{77} At a local level, victims of violence become easy prey for political manipulation. Conflict fuels “ethnic democracy”, with political representation constructed along ethnic lines and political parties used as flags for ethnic sentiments and interests. The increased lack of trust in central government, generated within the context of injustice and violence, makes manipulation by local powers easy. Writing about contemporary India, Chhachhi argues that ethnic conflict and regular outbreaks of violence, as well as of re-enforcing ethnic feelings, increasingly force ethnic identities upon individuals of various communities as a matter of fact, independently from their real feelings or choices.\textsuperscript{78} Within this theoretical approach, the communal identity prevalent in contemporary Somalia, that of clan, has become a compelling reality for all Somali people, for it is one in whose name people have killed and have been killed. Even individuals and groups who have spent their lives resisting it, have found this identity forced upon them.

Protracted conflicts and insecurity in pastoral areas contributes to a widening of the gap between pastoral groups and the rest of the country. Economically, it prevents investments and hinders development programmes. Politically, it contributes, through media representation, to public images of pastoralists as backward, irrational and violent.


3.5.8 Social Outcomes

Protracted clashes and escalation of conflict cause the breakdown of contact between neighbouring or adjacent communities and the consequent loss of lengthily constructed social networks (for example through inter-clan marriages) and institutions which have proved to be crucial for coping with uncertainty. Insecurity in rural areas and the associated increase in poverty and destitution contribute to the increased number of people moving to towns, where already a large majority of the population lives in unplanned settlements, without legal access to land or services. Further pressure on resources in urban settlements is likely to result in the intensification of urban conflicts although there is very little systematic documentation of violence upon women, some points can still be made. Insecurity for young women means also the risk of rape and abduction. The social effects of rape have to be measured in terms of the threat that violence upon some women represents for all women, and the role that such a threat plays in influencing women’s behaviour in general.

In conflict-prone areas, the risk of rape or abduction of girls creates a pressure for early marriage. In a hurry to place the girls safely in marriage, their families are ready to accept unusually low bride wealth. Under pressure from their families and well aware of the risks involved in waiting, the girls lose the negotiating power that they might have had on the issue. One of the consequences of this is a considerable lowering of the age of marriage, possibly triggering an increase in fertility rate. The risk of rape connected with violent conflict may persist, or even increase, even when women flee from conflict-prone areas. A huge incidence of rape has been recorded in refugee camps in the North East, apparently confined to Somali women. Little is known about how raiding transforms the marketing activities of pastoral women. Insecurity is likely to reduce the possibility of selling milk in a neighbouring town.

---

79 Hassan Z. M. 1997. The Role and Effects of Somali Pastoralist in Conflict. Paper presented to the workshop Promoting the land rights of pastoralists in the Horn of Africa
80 Seifert R. 1993. War and Rape: Analytical Approaches, Women International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), Geneva
82 Nairobi Workshop: African Rights, 1993
A raiding-induced shift in household herd species composition from large to small stock is also likely to reduce women’s income from milk sales, as well, possibly, as increasing women’s labour load. Women and children or sometimes just children, are sent away from dangerous areas to distant villages and often to towns. Intense and prolonged situations of conflict tend to create large numbers of displaced children in urban centres, usually living in a state of abandonment, with no assets, health facilities or education. These children are likely to become cheap fighting manpower to fuel existing and new conflicts. Insecurity affects formal education directly. Teachers may abandon conflict-prone areas due to lack of security, and the schools are closed. During the clashes in civil servants, including teachers, leave the district or refused their appointment, school closes. Poverty and destitution further diminishes the already scant possibility that parents have to afford the costs even of primary education.

However, Belshaw records a different phenomenon in Uganda, where the Labwor, having lost by raiding almost all their cattle and being now dependent on intensive cropping, small stock and wage labouring, have by far the highest school enrolment in Kotido district.

3.6 Linkages between Livelihood and Conflict

Land is a critical issue in both Isiolo and Burnt Forest and inseparable from livelihoods for the majority of Kenyans. “As for the vast majority of the Kenyan rural population, land is the basic, and often only, economic resource from which their livelihood and it is also around land that socio-cultural and spiritual relations among community members

---


are defined and organized.\footnote{Republic of Kenya (2002) Report of the commission of inquiry into the land law system of Kenya on principles of a national land policy framework, constitutional position of land and new institutional framework for land administration. Nairobi: Government Printer.6153} Land is also a major source of conflict, precisely because its close links to livelihoods. Appropriation of land was seen as a motivating factor in much of the 2007/8 violence in Burnt Forest. For example, after many of the inhabitants of Rironi farm in Burnt Forest relocated to Central province due to the violence, it was reported that the farm was taken over by Kalenjin farmers and renamed Kaplalech.\footnote{Mwangi S. Kimenyi and NjugunaNdung’u (2006) “Sporadic Ethnic Violence: Why Has Kenya not Experienced a Full-Blown Civil War?” in Economic Models and Case Studies of Civil War, edited by N. Sambanis and Paul Collier, 2006. p 144}

In the pastoral areas, competition for resources is also a leading cause of conflict both pasture and water for livestock. Livestock production is the primary livelihood strategy in the arid and semi arid lands (ASALs). Livestock production accounts for 26% of total national agricultural production and over 70% of the country’s livestock and 75% of wildlife are in the ASALs.\footnote{Government of Kenya Government of Kenya, 2005. Session Paper on Sustainable Development of Arid and Semi Arid Lands of Kenya. Nairobi.}

Increased scarcity of arable land, due to droughts and demographic pressures, has contributed to civil violence, including insurgencies and ethnic clashes.\footnote{Homer-Dixon (1999) Environment, Scarcity, and Violence. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p 188} Pastoralists move from one place to another according to rain patterns in search for the scarce resources for their livestock. These movements occasionally take them and their livestock into other communities’ territories and if the rules of entry and sharing among the communities are not observed, conflicts erupt. During more severe droughts, as the number of available pasture and sources of water diminishes pastoralist communities are forced to congregate in fewer and fewer places, increasing the likelihood of conflict. By the same token, fear of conflict may prevent the rational usage of resources in remote areas if security of human beings and livestock cannot be assured or negotiated.

Any environmental decline is also closely linked to declining economic prospects as livelihood assets become less productive. During droughts, pastoralists are mainly faced with two processes that adversely affect their capacity to support themselves and
effectively raise the minimum herd numbers required to maintain their households: they face losses in their livestock capital from higher mortality rates and are forced to sell off their cattle rather than face losing them to starvation. This adversely affects their terms of trade and purchasing power, leading to serious livelihood implication. Due to the reduced purchasing power, periods of “restocking” are characterized by raiding other communities for cattle, and hence can result in conflict.

Declining economic prospects has contributed to the commercialization of cattle raiding and pastoral conflict as a source of livelihood. One of the reasons for raiding used to be the need of restocking. Thus raiding was generally seen as a cyclical process in which groups in a restocking phase raided enemies that happened to be currently better off. However commercialization of raiding, coupled with a larger availability of arms in the ASALs has had negative consequences on the region’s stability. It also removes the risk management component that traditional raiding implied. Due to commercialization, raiding has been divorced from land and labor availability and excludes reciprocity, as cattle sold in the market cannot be raided back. Environmental degradation and resource scarcity and their impact on livelihoods interact in a complex fashion with political and economic forces and can increase existing horizontal inequalities or create new ones. Declining land quality or availability, erosion, and lack of access to clean water for livestock all have a detrimental impact on livelihoods and increase inequality, which can breed unrest and conflict. “Egregious land inequity (e.g., the district percentages of both landless population and large farm holdings are in the top 15th percentile nationwide) estimates an increase of roughly 73 casualties against constituencies with land inequity comparable to the national average.”

Inequitable access to common resources that are important to livelihoods or even just the perception of inequitable access is a source of conflict. The presence of fluid boundaries and territorial claims by different ethnic groups leads to numerous clashes. Much of the land in Isiolo is trust land, which means the Isiolo County Council manages it. The

Council is responsible for controlling settlement and the processing of title deeds to the population; however the Council has been accused of favoritism and multiple allocations, as well as the privatization of formerly communally used pastures. The resulting tenure insecurity as well as the squeeze on commonly available pasture has heightened different community claims over territorial boundaries and historical claims of marginalization. This sense of victimization in turn makes practically all groups easy prey for political manipulation. Land issues are very easy to instrumentalize in the context of polarized relations between ethnic groups when political leaders are involved in a power struggle.

3.4 Conclusion

Kenya is highly prone to drought and flooding. Along with natural disasters, election violence has been endemic in Kenya, mainly since the introduction of the two-party system in 1991. Conflict in pastoral areas is frequently associated with resource access, exacerbated by drought or other acute events that sharpen competition. Over the years it has been exacerbated by proximity to national boundaries and the flow of small arms from neighboring countries. However, much of the pastoral conflict has started to transform into more political conflict, as groups vie to have a representative of their ethnicity in a seat of power.

Due to Kenya’s proclivity to natural hazards and conflict, it has numerous organizations designed to work on disaster and conflict management. The structure of many of these organizations in Kenya (as elsewhere) is similar: organizations often have units or teams working on conflict resolution or peace building, on humanitarian response, and on disaster risk reduction, but these groups are often quite “siloed” and working relatively autonomously from each other, and not necessarily working towards the same goals in the same place.91 Similar language is used to describe similar activities, but the activities themselves are rarely joined up or part of the same strategic plan. There is also a wide range of civil society actors engaged, one leading expert estimates that 3,000 organizations working on “peace building” have emerged since 2007.

91 Field notes, Kenya interviews, June 2010
Many of these groups have not made linkages to livelihoods issues. Yet there are both cause and effect linkages between conflict and livelihoods. The “backward” (causal) link is mainly the land issue, but the land issue is complex, with its history dating back to the colonial era, and its outcomes linked with the question of identity and power. The obvious “forward” (impact) link, in addition to the loss of life, is the loss of livelihoods through displacement, but also through the destruction of informal sector businesses during the violence, particularly in cities and peri-urban areas. But even the fear of conflict undermines rational usage of scarce natural resources in times of drought, so even the threat of violence can undermine rural (and especially pastoral) livelihoods in Isiolo and its neighboring communities.
CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 EFFECTS OF CONFLICTS IN UPPER EASTERN ON DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

4.1 Introduction

Transborder criminal and extremist groups sometimes encounter robust local systems of public order that they cross at their peril. Ample evidence from the region highlights the impressive capacity of local communities to build informal systems of protection and rule of law that deter, mitigate or at least modify some forms of transborder criminal violence. Al Shabaab’s units in the Somali Kenya border area, for instance have had to negotiate with local social authorities and respect their prerogatives. The resilience of local security and governance arrangements in the face of new or heightened criminal activity and violent extremism was a central research question for the fieldwork phase of the study. Existing research also points to the possibility that in some cases transborder criminal elements and violent extremists whether in the form of small gangs or large syndicates, can simultaneously be sources of stability or protection and armed violence. This observation is borne out in general research on mafias and related protection rackets which occupy gray zones between predatory criminals and local protection units as well as in historical research on state formation which reminds us that pirates and bandits can, for self serving reasons become a force for building political orders.92

Empirical evidence from East Africa confirms that this can occur. Al Shabaab for instance maintains forceful local law and order in areas it controls even as it sows instability and violence elsewhere and some of the safer zones of East Africa’s ungoverned spaces such as the pirate villages of coastal Somalia are under the control of criminal networks. Neither organized criminal groups nor jihadists flourish in zones of complete anarchy, they prefer political orders and security arrangements they can manipulate. Some activities which are technically illegal, specifically the smuggling of consumer goods across borders are in fact part of a vibrant region wide informal commercial economy that creates shared interests and alliances across communal and

state borders and which in the words of a recent study represent a robust resource for market based cooperation and local economic security.93

Sustained efforts by local communities’ regional governments and external donors to address transborder clashes over livestock raiding and other localized criminal activities have helped to reduce and manage retaliatory violence and harmful spillover. Instances of massacres and mass casualties from crossborder raids still occur but the overall fatality and incident rates are lower than a decade ago and better systems are in place to ensure the return of stolen property and compensation for losses. Transregional criminality is increasingly taking on the form of large powerful international syndicates and cartels. This has long been true of certain types of criminality in East Africa, such as mineral smuggling and gun trafficking. More recently, however, drug transiting mainly through Kenya, but with a worrisome presence in southern Somalia has become a major new criminal force providing annual revenues to those involved in Kenya alone of up to an estimated one billion dollars per year.94 As with Somali piracy and the conflict mineral trade, the drug trade may implicate top level political figures in some regional governments. This is raising concerns about the possibility of organized crime syndicates with enormous revenues exercising growing influence over some regional governments.

The growing clout of criminal cartels is of added concern when considered in the context of local sources of resilience. The money and coercive violence that large criminal syndicates can muster in pursuit of their interests can easily overwhelm a local system of governance and conflict management and can silence government law enforcement agencies. Border communities in zones of active criminal syndicates are extremely vulnerable. None of the local governance arrangements in border areas were strong enough to resist criminal syndicates on this scale.

Regional and international pressure is creating new opportunities to curb and combat at least some types of transborder criminality. East Africa is seeing some progress in

93 Sally Healy, “Hostage to Conflict: Prospects for Building Regional Economic Cooperation in the Horn of Africa” (London: Chatham House Report, November 2011), pg ix

94 These estimates were generated in separate, forthcoming USAID based study, Peter Gastrow, “Termites at Work: Transnational organized crime and State Erosion in Kenya (New York IPI, September 2011.)
combating criminal impunity, thanks to a combination of genuine government commitment, the threat of sanctions on individuals violating arms embargoes posed by UN monitoring group reporting, US and other external legislation on conflict mineral trade and the robust activities of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the region. Lucrative smuggling opportunities exist across all East Africa, even in areas where strong governments seek to exert control. Smuggling of minerals, guns, consumer goods and people is only one of the many affordances of border areas that attract criminal operatives with a vested interest in evading co opting or intimidating local law enforcement, as well as a range of other middlemen and opportunists. Portions of Somalia’s coastline have attracted concentrations of armed men as pirates.

Some transborder criminal activities have grown enormously in scale, violence organization and government complicity due to commercialization of the looted items. This has been frequently cited as a major problem with regard to livestock rustling in the past 15 years, thanks to the lucrative urban markets for meat. While much transborder crime and violent extremism involves local or regional interests some have become essentially global in nature bringing powerful external actors and forces into the fray. Islamic extremism in Somalia and coastal Kenya has in the past two decades, been transformed by linkages to Al Qaeda, the mineral trades in the Great Lakes region is driven entirely by global demand arms trafficking in the region has involved dangerous international criminals like Victor Bout piracy of the Somali Coast affects shipping throughout the Indian Ocean and implicates external financial investors worldwide, especially within the Somali diaspora and newly emerging drug trafficking through parts of East Africa involve drugs from South America, markets in Europe and global operatives.

4.2 Resolution and Management of Conflict

4.2.1 Resolution of Conflict

The philosophical basis of resolution rejects power as the basis of relationships, especially in situations of conflict. Resolution of conflict is therefore non power based,

and non coercive. It aims at a post conflict relationship which is not based on power, and which endures because the parties find it legitimate.

Resolution is based on the belief that at the bottom of every conflict are certain needs which are not negotiable. The non fulfillment of these needs causes the conflict in the first place. Therefore conflict management should aim at identifying ways in which these needs can be fulfilled for both parties. A central proposition of resolution is that these needs are not in short supply. Thus each party can have its needs satisfied and the satisfaction of the needs of one party does not entail a corresponding loss for the other.

The structure of conflict resolution is characterized by the mutual satisfaction of needs, and not by the power relationships between them. In resolution processes bargaining is rejected. Resolution aims at reaching a mutually self sustaining solution. This is obtained by addressing the basic causes of the conflict and the parties’ needs.

In the process of conflict resolution, the parties analyze their conflict and make adjustments to their relationship. The goal is for the parties to reperceive and redefine their relationship. This leads to the creation of a new set of values between them which they can pursue in a non coercive and mutually self sustaining way. Resolution of conflict is not zero sum. The gain by one party does not entail a corresponding loss for the other, because the things which the parties need are not in short supply. These needs should not be fought over because each party’s needs can be fulfilled. These needs cannot be bargained over or fulfilled through coercion and power. If each party accepts that the other’s needs can be fulfilled without loss to itself, they are on the way to resolution. In this context resolution means the mutual construction of a relationship which is legitimate because the needs of each are fulfilled.

An outcome based on resolution is enduring. It is not based on coercion and is founded instead on the parties’ estimation of mutual gain. Resolution also addresses the core of the conflict between the parties. It rejects an outcome in which power is the defining characteristic.

4.2.2 Settlement and Resolution in Practice

This identification of conflict management methodologies and the philosophical basis underlying them has more than theoretical implications. It suggests that a third party entering into a conflict should have a clear idea about the outcome expected from the management exercise. A conflict manager who enters a conflict without such a clear idea will essentially be agreeing to be held hostage to fortune. The problem here as was noted earlier is that in the real world there may be little time at the outset to do this. This is especially the case with violent conflict where the immediate priority is to do anything that stops the killings. In that kind of situation the concern will be first to separate the parties. Only after that will a decision be made about how to approach the conflict and its possible outcome, given various factors such as the resources and the expertise available.

There is a further dimension to this. It is often wrongly assumed that third parties act altruistically. But in reality they act on the basis of their calculations about what they will gain from playing a third party role. As Mitchell has noted, there are various rewards that third parties expect from undertaking mediation. Third parties whether they are individuals, states or organizations agree to take the risks of mediating because amongst other things they derive certain benefits from doing so. They should therefore prepare carefully for the role. They ought also to have read the conflict they are entering into and decided about the best methodology to follow. Beyond this whether one subscribes to the philosophy of settlement or of resolution is a matter of belief. The decision about which of the two to pursue is not reached abruptly. It should have evolved over time. It is a decision that while calling for serious soul searching should be clear at the outset.

A further dimension to this discussion relates to the persuasive and sensible critique of conflict resolution, namely that it might in any case be necessary first to engage in settlement approaches before the parties to the conflict are ready for resolution. This is a fair criticism. It suggests that it may be necessary first to go through settlement methodologies before embarking on resolution. But a caveat should be placed here. It

98 See V. Jabri Foreword in J. Burton, Violence Explained; The Sources of Conflict, Violence and Crime and their Prevention (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997) pg x-xiv
does not mean that this approach will be necessary for all conflicts, or that all parties in all conflicts will not be amenable to resolution processes from the outset.

The problem about what to do with a conflict once the parties and other actors have been brought together is one that has dogged Kenyan diplomatic efforts at mediating regional conflicts. In the conflict in Zaire in 1996 to 1997 for example, having summoned the parties and other interested actors to Nairobi Kenya did not seem to know how to proceed further. Therefore, the whole process ended up being no more than an exercise in making set speeches. It is not surprising that the whole exercise eventually collapse. This should have provided serious lesson for Kenyan conflict management diplomacy.\textsuperscript{99}

The decision about whether to adopt settlement or resolution in the management of a particular conflict is additionally important because the methodology adopted defines the strategy used during conflict management. Both settlement and resolution processes have clearly defined strategies which can hardly co exist once the management exercise is underway. Jabri has made the point that strategies change during the process of mediation\textsuperscript{100} and that this depends on a variety of factors some of which cannot be foreseen at the beginning of the exercise. This might well be true but changes of strategy in that respect refer to changes within basically the same management approach. It is unlikely that such changes of strategy refer to a fundamental shift of the grand strategy of either settlement or resolution.

\subsection*{4.3 Actors in Conflict Resolution}

In response to the escalating cattle-rustling related conflicts in Isiolo, Samburu and Laisamis districts, a number of actors have expended their efforts towards preventing escalation and managing the conflict. These efforts have largely been spearheaded by many stakeholders including Community(s), District Peace Committees (DPCs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs); National Steering Committee (NSC); Government, Faith Based Organizations (FBO) and others. Despite this, there are existing gaps which


makes their efforts less effective and not visible particularly at the grassroots levels where actual conflicts continue to take place.

4.3.1 **Intervention by Respective Communities and Corresponding Gaps**

Owing to the negative impacts of the conflict, the Samburu, Borana, Rendille, Turkana, Meru and other communities in the “Isiolo triangle” have been involved in various peace building activities. Loosely knitted community based groups like Women associations, Community based policing groups; religious groups; elders and others have played different roles in trying to prevent these conflicts from escalating. Occasionally, and in the spirit of community policing, the community do share information with the administration/security officers in the process preventing and reducing the frequency of these cattle-rustling related cases. These efforts however have been marginal and the effects across the community divide have not reduced the reported incidences of conflicts. In particular, the elders in the Samburu community lack total control over the Morans making it difficult for any peace agreement to be respected or implemented. Equally, the pastoralist communities across the “triangle” continue to overlook the provisions laid down in the Modagashe and the Laikipia peace declaration/pacts. As a result of this, any effort to achieve peace has been difficult and ineffective.

4.3.2 **The Role of DPCs, NGOs, CSOs and NSC.**

4.3.2.1 **Role of District Peace Committees**

A large percentage of respondents noted that Peace Committees play a significant role in facilitating consultative peace dialogues; act as alert systems to prevent conflict before they happen; and also raise awareness within and between the warring communities. There are several concerns however which were raised touching on the role, the structure and capacity of these Peace committees. With regard to their roles, many felt that the Peace Committees do not have defined roles and as a result their impact at the grassroots level where the actual planning and carrying out of conflict particularly by the Samburu Morans has not been realized.
The structure of these Peace committees is also loosely organized, unrepresentative and not all-inclusive. They are also under-resourced both logistically and financially making their capacity and attempts to prevent and mediate conflicts less effective. The Peace Committees also lack enforcement mechanisms. They just have to rely on community goodwill in the process of implementing and enforcing peace agreements. Sometimes they are perceived as illegal outfits established mainly for the purposes of “eating” funding from NGOs. They have also been accused of taking sides during peace dialogues, exaggerating conflict situation in order to get funding and that some of them might be participating or benefiting from cattle rustling activities. The list continues to say that some of them have turned out to be point-men of political leaders with others using DPC as a stepping stone to politics. Still, others (members of DPCs) are accused as traitors whenever they try to perform their duties with cumulative effects being loss of morale and energy to perform their duties. These accusations mainly originate from a small section of the community but all in all DPCs work under extreme difficult situations, with threats to their lives increasingly lurking.  

\[101\]

\[101\] Conflict dynamics in Isiolo, Samburu East and Marsabit South Districts of Kenya. Amani papers. Volume I No 3 June 2010 p11

4.3.2.2 Role of Non-Governmental Organizations and Civil Society Organizations

Non-governmental organizations such as Oxfam GB, APFO, SRIC, Safer World, CJPC and others have been instrumental in assisting these communities work towards achieving peace. Apart from efforts aimed at training the DPCs, the NGOs have also worked with local organisations in developing early warning mechanisms. CSOs have been funding peace dialogues, lobbying the government to be more responsive and working hand in hand with NSC to speed-up the policy development process that will among other things and once enacted, legitimize and fund DPCs. In terms of identified gaps, there seems to be a lack of coordination in as far as CSOs activities are concerned. As a result, many activities are duplicated and become short-lived. CSOs also seem to exclude key actors in the conflict, the morans, in the various peace processes they engage in. Most of the meetings are also held away from the actual “hot spots” in the process brokered peace agreement being rendered unbinding to the
morans. CSOs need to rethink and review their engagement with DPCs and approaches in peace building efforts.\(^{102}\)

### 4.3.2.3 Role of NSC (the Secretariat) and Government (Provincial Administration)

The NSC has and continues to play a critical role in Peace building and conflict management. Although its main role has been understood to be coordination of peace building activities, it has played critical role in facilitating peace work by liaising closely with government officials to support the work of CSOs and DPCs. NSC is spearheading the process for developing National Conflict Management and Peace building policy document. This policy document will define, coordinate and secure peace building efforts in the country and across the borders where appropriate. It’s actually DPCs association with NSC that has given it the little legitimacy they enjoy. Even the work of the assessment team was made easy by the fact that the team had been send by NSC (Office of president).

On the other hand, DCs in the “triangle” were complaining that NSC secretariat promised to fund some of the peace building activities they were to organize but such support has been missing. And for the very few times such support is availed, it is not enough, the DCs complained. The government has also been handy in responding to conflict issues in the three districts. Among these are; the conduct of operations by the security forces in Samburu district; establishment of rapid response mechanisms to combat cattle-rustling and drought; facilitating dialogue between the warring communities; provision of small arms particularly to the Borana community. A major concern however on the issue of arming the Borana community when the mood at the ground was to disarm the communities, especially the Samburus and Rendilles.

However, and the government has admitted it (DCs) use of force alone will not result to peace. As such, the government needs to work closely with other actors in getting to the root of the conflict and in designing appropriate response mechanisms. Human security calls for close collaboration between government and communities. Other gaps include

\(^{102}\) Conflict dynamics in Isiolo, Samburu East and Marsabit South Districts of Kenya. Amani papers. Volume I No 3 June 2010 p11
lack of vehicles and fuel (especially during rapid response activities to track, recover and return stolen livestock). Some of the Administration Police Posts are understaffed and ill-equipped with basic communication gadgets lacking.\textsuperscript{103}

4.3.3 Other Actors

The Conservancies and the Northern Rangeland trusts have assisted the Samburu, Isiolo and the Rendille communities in conflict management and the combating of the effects of drought. The Lewa Wildlife Conservancy in particular, has worked closely with the Meru Police in providing fuel and vehicles to track animals that have been stolen. The Conservancy has also provided demarcated grazing lands to the neighboring Samburu community. Some of the proceeds from tourism have also been channeled towards the establishment of schools, awarding of scholarships; sinking of boreholes amongst other positive developments. It is also a source of employment especially to the Samburu community. The Conservancies however have not raised sufficient awareness on the importance of conservancies. The Boranas in Isiolo district feel that the Conservancy is encroaching on their grazing lands. As a result, propaganda and negative political sentiments have taken center stage in the “triangle”.\textsuperscript{104}

4.4 National Influences on Conflict

4.4.1 Ethnic Conflict and the Issue of Multi-party Representation

In the past ethnic conflicts all over Kenya, including those in the northern districts, have provided the government with a strong argument against pluralism and multi-party representation. Writing on the links between “tribal warfare” and political conflict, Fratkin argues that a government policy of low-response or non-intervention in contexts of increasing ethnic fighting is an indicator of vested interests and should be added to the list of the causes of conflict.\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{103} Conflict dynamics in Isiolo, Samburu East and Marsabit South Districts of Kenya. Amani papers. Volume I No 3 June 2010 p11-12
\textsuperscript{104} Conflict dynamics in Isiolo, Samburu East and Marsabit South Districts of Kenya. Amani papers. Volume I No 3 June 2010 p12
Similarly, Walker and Amisi argue that the clashes in the Rift Valley and Western Kenya were part of a wider political strategy of the KANU government to frustrate the efforts of the democratization movement and to prove to both Kenyans and Western donors that the implementation of democratic reforms, such as multi-party representation, in a multi-ethnic society like Kenya's would result in civil war. Ethnic conflicts and high levels of insecurity allow the government to maintain extraordinary powers in its relations with the population. All the Northeast Province in Kenya remained under a State of Emergency from independence until 1992. This gave the administration the power to kill on sight on the grounds of suspicion.

4.4.2 Instrumental use of Conflict in Political Elections
Conflicts seem to increase in frequency and intensity before elections. Within the context of clan or ethnic based politics, and a mobile population, attacks can be timed so that the voters of the opposing ethnic group flee the constituency before the election, leaving only the supporters to vote.

4.4.3 Cultural Clash on Decision-making Procedure and Legitimacy
The imposition of majority onto pastoralists’ cultural tradition of consensus decision making, particularly within a context of clan based politics, is a primary cause of political disputes, leading to increased conflict between ethnic groups or clans. To a large extent, consensus is also the criterion for customary patterns of justice administration and conflict resolution, which are focused on reconciling the disputants and maintaining peace, rather than on the punishment of the wrongdoer. A "give-a-little, take-a-little" principle is preferred within customary institutions to "winner-takes-all" judgments.

In councils like the *Njuri Ncheke*\(^{110}\) in Nyambene society, all the representatives of disputing parties are allowed to speak, earlier precedents and details relevant to the dispute are discussed by the council and the process of deliberation is repeated if consensus is not reached. The council rarely acts as a ruling third party. Rather, it usually plays a facilitating role, cooling the parties in conflict and manipulating the length of the procedure until the disputants settle affairs among themselves.\(^{111}\) State justice, supposedly rapid and based on precise evidence bearing on the case, has no room for the long proceedings required to reach consensus. Furthermore, a third party ruling within a context where the state enjoys little trust, always gives rise to the suspicion that the decision has been manipulated. In any case, the legitimacy and authority of customary conflict mediation is not based on independence from the opposite parties and neutrality, but on affinity and inside knowledge of the context.\(^{112}\)

### 4.4.4 Links with Territorial Political Representation

The parliamentary democracy system of territorial and residence-based representation clashes with the reality of a largely mobile electorate. Often, for residential reasons, some people do not have the right to vote or to access political and administrative appointments within the constituency where they have their major interests. This creates situations in which those who are involved in disputes are not represented by those who are officially in a position to prevent, mediate and resolve conflicts. Within such a context, the model of democratic representation is bound to give a large political advantage to permanent settlers and to further marginalize pastoralists.

---

\(^{110}\) *Njuri Ncheke* is a council of elders who act as account to settle disputes traditionally. It also means the narrow jury, and it is the supreme court to which only a few are chosen. The members are believed to be almost faultless, people of integrity and honesty


4.5 Conflict Dynamics

Conflicts in Upper Eastern have a systemic basis. For instance, what began as an adaptive movement of pastoralists from NEP’s Wajir to Eastern’s Isiolo later led to increased competition over resources which led to the Wagalla Massacre of 1984. Similarly, the Ajuraan’s bold incursion to raid the Borana in Upper Eastern attracted Sakuye intervention to forestall the movement of cattle through their territory to Wajir. Gabra and Borana rivalries draw in the OLF, who are believed to side with the Borana. Thus, conflicts in Upper Eastern cannot be disaggregated and treated as separate occurrences. Rather, the level of interconnections – cross-provincial, inter-group, cross-state, and so on – need to be appreciated. Identity issues also define inter-group relations. The growth in the numerical strength of the Turkana in Isiolo politics has recently been a trigger of inter-group tensions.

The dominant Borana-Somali alliance feels their political dominance is at stake. But such political concerns, mixed with equally identity-based competition for grazing land has proven critical in accelerating conflicts towards violence. This, with the Chinese prospecting for oil in Isiolo, raised the stakes for pastoralist groups – land in the district has attained more value, and groups are keener to assert rights to territories in the area. Further, livestock rustling in the region, which spans several areas – Samburu (in Rift Valley), Marsabit, Isiolo, and Meru – is commercialised. The Meru view themselves as victims of such cattle raids, but with commercialisation of rustling businessmen from Mt. Kenya region (the Kikuyu and Meru) are said to be intricately involved in the trade. The protracted nature of identity conflicts in the region has made them difficult to permanently resolve.

A good example is the Borana-Gabra discord that often turns violent, in the words of one respondent “even children can narrate the conflict history” between the two communities.\textsuperscript{113} It has led the two groups to assert different positions on identity as earlier discussed. The sensitivity of identity issues means agencies need to wisely design

\textsuperscript{113}Embracing the Practice of Conflict Sensitive Approaches: \textit{An analysis of the Kenyan context}. 2010 p111
interventions in the province in a way that doesn’t brand them as partial. It is hard to break the conflict patterns, while small arms can proliferate. It is a region that suffers from harsh climatic factors (e.g. drought), and worse still, marginalization. The then prospects for oil, the road construction, and development planning related to the Vision 2030 should be done delicately. The quest for oil re-emphasized the value of land for groups in Isiolo, and led to an increased desire to define community territories. The government ought to have a clear policy on resource exploitation and wealth sharing arrangements to forestall problems. The killing of an expatriate engineer in the area was only a pointer to possible challenges with an unclear policy regime on oil exploration and possible exploitation.

The Isiolo groups are especially keen to understand the implications of Vision 2030 to them. There is some apprehension that with the implementation of the plan, they stand to lose their land and nomadic lifestyle. Hence, in the status quo scenario, the communities are bound to reject any development and/or investment efforts in their area whose aims aren’t clear to them. In the worst case scenario, the OLF factor in Upper Eastern can get more complicated as the conflict grows more internationalized. With this, there is bound to be heightened inter-group conflict over identity. But conflicts over resources and political representation have the potential to equally grow. With such conflicts the danger of increased poverty is real. Yet forceful government forces’ intervention to stabilize the situation can add to more controversy given tendencies for the forces to commit human rights violations. Lastly, with challenges associated with climate change, pastoralist groups would be forced to adapt and diversify their livelihoods.

In the best case scenario, there is the prospect of better developed infrastructure (e.g. with current construction of Isiolo-Moyale road). Better investment in water supply and irrigation projects would yield resource abundance (water & pasture) for human and livestock consumption. The local structures would be more effective in promoting inter-group harmony while the regional security architecture would be effective. Literacy levels would shoot up and employment opportunities would be abundant for the youth.
4.6 Conclusion

Social integration, and maintenance and growth of social capital, are essential for poverty reduction, and their absence leads to violence, which in turn has impacts on economic activity and welfare. Management and reduction of conflict are essential components of poverty eradication, especially in the arid and semi-arid districts. This will not be an easy task. Development planning has rarely been adequate to the conditions of the ASAL districts, and there are many unsuccessful interventions, especially in the pastoral areas.

Development planning has rarely incorporated conflict reduction as an explicit goal. There is a need to research and experiment how specific development interventions (at micro-economic, national and local levels) can be designed to reduce conflict and make conflict management easier. A key task will be to provide viable alternative livelihoods to young men to reduce the attraction of raiding and banditry. Activities could include: better water provision and especially water management in disputed areas, a clarification (not necessarily a formalisation) of natural resource tenure rules, better food security, livelihood diversification especially for demobilised ethnic militias, safer livestock marketing, and credit for household restocking.

There is a need to better understand the links between conflict and poverty, including the situation of both internally displaced and refugees. There is a need for a screening procedure (“conflict impact analysis”) for new development funding proposals, to assess their potential impact on existing or future conflicts. Adequate indicators of peace building should focus on process rather than product. A conflict identification and management component should become an essential requisite for all new projects.
CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusions

Kenya had a shocking insight into the potential dangers of unchecked violence. This demonstrated how inadequate all stakeholders, including government, the security forces, and the peace-building sector had been in their ability to control events. This has sought to place peace building and conflict mitigation in the range of activities around mitigating the risk of humanitarian emergencies. The risk had both local and national facets and dangers associated with it. So there was recognition that risk-reduction and preparedness was needed at both levels to address the potential for violence. Skills at the individual or even community level have not been shown to be capable of addressing some of the larger issues, such as historical grievances between ethnic groups that are played out in the national arena. As evidenced by the research into the situation in Isiolo, without a functioning justice system the impact of conflict mitigation activities at the community levels are likely to be limited. They clearly need to be linked to a working system of law enforcement and justice, whether customary or statutory, or a combination.

The main criticism against peace-building approaches is that they do not deal (or at least, have not dealt) with the underlying issues. While the rhetoric of addressing underlying grievances is ever-present, much of the actual observable activity in conflict management is less about addressing the underlying problem than it is about trying to put a stop to violence when it is happening, or getting people back to talking to one another after violent conflict has broken out. This is actually a shared characteristic between peace building and DRR in a natural disaster hazard context. When discussing DRR some might take the position that DRR work is not mandated to tackle the “root causes” of whatever the potential disaster might be; rather it simply enables vulnerable communities to deal with the consequences in ways that minimize risk to human outcomes. However, there is an obvious significant difference between man-made disasters and natural disasters, which is that while it may not be possible to tackle the “root causes” of natural disasters, it is possible to address those of potential man-made disasters such as conflict.

The work of the DPCs and the majority of peace-building organizations has been around the prevention of the escalation of conflict, and the ability of individuals within the peace
committees to respond to incidents once they have occurred. So if the “normal” drivers of “everyday” conflict have not changed, then one will not see any change in the levels of conflict being experienced by the community, except that perhaps someone might intervene to try to stop the overt violence, and law enforcement might be notified more quickly. In the case of Isiolo, the conflict has reduced, not as a result of the change in conditions or drivers, but rather in the institutional response that the government takes, so that there is real accountability rather than a culture of impunity. Whether (and precisely where) law enforcement and justice are placed within the spectrum of peace-building activities is a separate issue, but without these fundamental pieces of the governance equation in society, peace is very difficult to achieve. Without systemic functional institutions that can deal with injustice, conflict will likely continue, as there is little chance of breaking cycles of violence, revenge, or struggle to address the injustice. Peace-building activities by themselves in this context will have limited impact.

One place where peace-building programming specifically works to address root causes is when those root causes are related to resource competition. For instance in ASAL areas, peace-building activities often take an approach to limit the competition and reduce the underlying source of conflict. This may be through the introduction of additional water points or improved rangeland techniques that seek to improve the resource base available to the competing groups. Addressing other types of conflict, particularly those involving arable land, are less amenable to this approach but still must be dealt with in the longer term. In Upper Eastern Counties such as Isiolo there appears to have been insufficient investment in addressing some of the root causes of conflict, in part because of the lack of a sufficiently specific conflict analysis, lack of capacity, the lack of resources, and perhaps most importantly, the lack of political will.

Many organizations see a link between conflict and livelihoods, and indeed incorporate some elements of livelihoods into peace building and conflict management. But much of this is post-hoc provision of inputs, goods, and services for people displaced; reconstruction of housing that had been destroyed, or training for youth based on the observation that unemployed (and particularly male) youth are the main group perpetrating the violence (if not necessarily always the party instigating it). These may all
be helpful things to do, but they likewise are mostly not addressing the underlying issues. Again, this is not to conclude that these aren’t useful things to do, but many of these activities are less about enabling ways of reducing the risk of conflict than they are about restoring the situation to “normal” afterwards.

Increasingly, with the introduction of conflict-sensitive approaches, most NGOs in ASAL and conflict-affected areas are blurring the edges further and further between traditional sectoral programs involving livelihoods or education and active peace building that may attempt to address the root causes of conflict. For instance the Kenya Red Cross, having moved from the pure humanitarian end of the development spectrum, is now looking at introducing such elements as resource-sharing agreements and conflict management into their work in these areas: programmatic boundaries are increasingly flexible. An acknowledgement that conflict is multi-causal and encompasses multiple sectors also implies a responsibility to address the nexus between sectoral programs and conflict.

Significant differences arise about the wisdom of humanitarian agencies engaging in peace building. Some agencies, tired of simply binding up the wounds of conflict, have begun to invest significant program resources into peace-building programs. But a number of respondents argued that there is a good reason why humanitarian agencies steer clear of peace building. First is the issue that engagement with actors in conflict may compromise the principle of neutrality unless that engagement is restricted to the question of humanitarian access. The second is the politics of risk reduction; it is seen to be okay to work on natural hazards but not to work on political hazards. One the other hand, peace-building principles and some humanitarian principles appear to overlap, the most obvious example in Kenya being the work of the Kenya Red Cross Society as a trusted “honest broker” in situations like the conflicts in Moyale or Tana River. That is, as a result of their obvious humanitarian principles of independence and impartiality, KRC had the credibility with all communities in the conflict to mediate a cessation to the violence.
In considering long-term risk reduction approaches to conflict issues, particularly with respect to areas where livelihoods and competition over natural resources lends itself to the blurring of the edges between peace building, addressing root causes of conflict, and DRR, it is worth more deliberately exploring a variety of models that blend the lessons learned and approaches of DRR, conflict transformation and integrated livelihoods programming. Some organizations in Kenya have done this, though it is rare to see more than one organization at a time in one area taking this approach, it could yield an enormous benefit in terms of stability, the improved effectiveness of the programs, the creation of a stronger foundation for long-term development, and a reduction in the impact of conflict and the associated costs of ongoing humanitarian responses.

5.2 Recommendations
Community-based peace-building programs should be broadened to address root causes rather than focus primarily only on conflict management approaches. Simply closing conflict programs down as the elections have passed “peacefully” is a shortsighted and potentially dangerous option. Donors should consider allocating funds and supporting programs that specifically address the historical grievances that are fundamental conflict fault-lines within Kenyan society and have been shown to be deep national hurts that can be tapped into for political ends and can erupt in violence. Conflict mapping can help to prioritize the most fragile of the new Counties, where there are fears of conflict breaking out during the devolution process. A comprehensive, coordinated approach can then be developed to assist these Counties through the devolution process.

Agencies that normally focus on livelihood development programs and who are working in conflict-affected areas should adopt, not only conflict-sensitive or Do-No-Harm approaches to their work, but should also either partner with a specialist peace-building agency or ensure that specialist peace-building/conflict transformation technical assistance is embedded in their programs to put addressing root causes of conflict at the center of their efforts, rather than having only sectoral objectives. Conventional Disaster Risk Reduction approaches and peace-building approaches should be better integrated at the local level, even if some degrees of specialized capabilities for both are required.
There is need to ensure that development activities in Counties use the County-based “conflict priority” documents that are to be shortly available to the public as the initial basis for designing programs, in whatever sector, to be mindful of the key conflict issues in that environment.

“Negotiated democracy” should be conducted to understand the phenomenon and the extent to which it is a positive force for peace and stability, or whether it has a less favorable impact by preventing conflicts from being aired and addressed. Devolution of power to the County level should be used to enhance the active participation of pastoralists in development planning to ensure projects and programmes are supportive and relevant to their livelihoods.

The role played by the Ministry of State for Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands through ALRMP was appreciated and it is hoped that its capacity can be enhanced to enable it to respond better to development needs of the region. Communities would like to see the land demarcated to avoid conflicts between different communities. Demarcation is seen as a means of protecting the land from unscrupulous land grabbing and invasion as well as appropriation by the government without proper consultations and compensation. Government should ensure enforcement of rules and regulations governing the management of pasture and water. Movement into the dry season grazing zones should be strictly regulated through a grazing/migration calendar complemented with reliable early warning/early response mechanisms. Establishment of conservancies should be rationalized to ensure that they do not compromise the communities grazing and migration needs. Conflict resolution efforts should seek to deal with the root causes and not just the symptoms of the conflicts. They should be gender sensitive especially as the women, youth and the elderly are increasingly being left out of important decision making processes and they, particularly the youth, are significant stakeholders in the conflicts.

Innovative ways should be devised on how to involve and incorporate the politicians in conflict resolution processes, because they are at the heart of the conflicts. Traditional structures and approaches of conflict resolution should be supported. Extensive
consultations should be made regarding, which traditional approaches need to be promoted as some of them are retrogressive and/or one community specific. Opinion leaders and elders in the community such as Njuri Ncheke in Meru County should be involved in any review of the traditional setup.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books


Makumi Mwagiru, Conflicts in Africa: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management, centre for conflict research, 2006,


Journals


Embracing the practice of conflict sensitive approaches, an analysis of the Kenyan context . 2010

Feinstein internal centre, Conflict Management and Disaster Risk Reduction: A case study of Kenya, A partnership study between Tufts University, Kenya Red Cross, and Nairobi Peace Initiative – Africa for USAID/OFDA Feinstein International Center 2013.


USAID East Africa Regional Mission (USAID/EA) covers Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Djibouti, Somalia, Republic of Congo (ROC), Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, and Burundi.

USAID, Conflict Assessment Framework 2.0 (Analytics), (Draft as of April 26, 2011).


**Reports**


Common wealth Secretariat, Civil Path to Peace, Report on Commonwealth Commission on Respect and Understanding.


Hassan Z. M. 1997. The Role and Effects of Somali Pastoralist in Conflict. Paper presented to the workshop Promoting the land rights of pastoralists in the Horn of Africa


Newspaper Sources


Internet Sources

